In the end, we will remember not the words of our enemies, but the silence of our friends - Martin Luther King Jr., 1967


Wednesday, 19 September 2007

How the UN system, specifically UNDP and UNOPS respond to requests for audits

An e-mail by Francisco de Almeida (Assistant Resident Representative UNDP Angola) to Maria Teresa Felix (Programme Officer UNDP Angola) on 12 December 2000:
For the inclusion of the RUTEC project in the audit of our office, mr. Stan asked us to prepare an informative note about the antecedents and major problems related to the RUTEC project.
When could you give this note to Stan???
On the bases of your note Mr Stan will prepare the justification for the inclusion of RUTEC in our audit plan.
Thanks Francisco.

A letter, dated 27 December 2000, that Zoraida Mesa had sent to James Curry, Director of the Office for Audit and Performance Appraisal, UNDP, New York:
This letter is being sent in request of an audit for UNDP Angola. You will find attached justification, from both Programs and Operations, for this audit.
As you will note in the justification for the RUTEC contract Programs has stated that the key issue to be addressed is the lack of information to justify the 1.65 million US dollars recorded by UNOPS as total expenditure for activities related to the NEX project no ANG/96/B01. Clarity is sought on this issue through the audit to enable the preparation of the report of the CO being prepared for the government and donors and in order that recommendations are developed for UNDP and UNOPS to regularise the situation. . .

Amongst the recommendations she concluded:
Only a formal audit could conceivably raise these questions with UNOPS, RUTEC and any other interested parties in a manner that would help clarify them within the framework of the report that the CO needs to prepare for the government and donors on the CRP Trust Fund. The audit would have to elucidate these issues in a way that enables them to make recommendations to UNDP and UNOPS on how to regularise the situation.

Memorandum from James W. Currie, Director, Office of Audit and Performance Review to Bisrat Aklilu, Deputy Executive Director, UNOPS, 14 January 2001

Subject: Project “Capacity Building for the Community Rehabilitation and National Reconciliation Programme” (ANG 96/B01)

This communication relates to issues which the UNDP Resident Representative in Angola has raised with me concerning the UNOPS implementation relating to The Contract UNOPS signed with a South African company by the name of RUTEC under the above mentioned project. The main issues he raises is the general lack of information to justify the use of the funds under The Contract. Specifically, he alleges that:

· It appears that the decision that led to the award of the contract to RUTEC was made by UNOPS, as the implementing agent for this activity, only, without any involvement of the government (the Ministry of Planning), as the executing agent;
· There is lack of information as to the results that may have been achieved or the manner in which the funds under the contract have so far been spent;
· There is no record of a monitoring visit by UNOPS;
· On-site monitoring by RUTEC seems to have been limited to a one-day mission undertaken in 2000, with no substantitive technical support provided for ongoing activities and no mission report on follow-up;
· Apart from the Contract document itself, there is no detailed description of the activity to be undertaken by RUTEC; therefore, there are no specific goals to determine payment of the different instalments of the agreed fees, and;
· There is no final report indicating results achieved and lessons learned.

I would appreciate it if you could look into the above and inform me as to the facts of this matter, with any supporting material as you may deem appropriate.


Response of Bisrat Aklilu (UNOPS) to James W. Currie (OAPR), 13 February 2001

Subject: Project “Capacity Building for the Community Rehabilitation and National Reconciliation Programme” (ANG 96/B01)

This is in response to your Memorandum of 14 January 2001 pertaining to queries and concerns raised on the above mentioned subject by the UNDP Resident Representative in Angola. We believe that before addressing the allegations, a short presentation of the project and the relevant background would help to understand our role in this project.

In September 1996, UNDP submitted to UNOPS a draft Project Document ANG 96/005 “Establishment of a Pilot Community Production Centre in Huambo” with a request to provide implementation services.
The project was to be funded through a UNDP Trust Fund and private sector funding as well (Coca-Cola, Equator Bank). For lack of interest from some Donors, the project never materialised.

In November 1996, UNDP submitted a different Project Document ANG 96/003 “Establishment of a Pilot Community Centre in Huambo” The minutes of the Local Project Appraisal Committee as well as a letter from the Provincial Government of Angola formalising concession of land premises for the Centre in Huambo was also provided. Officials of the Government of Angola were fully involved. UNOPS was requested to act as Executing Agency for the project.
The Project Document identified RUTEC as a pre-selected contractor, which was fully endorsed by the Government. It is UNOPS understanding that RUTEC was pre-selected in accordance with the applicable UNDP procurement rules and procedures.

In December 1996, UNOPS presented this project ANG/96/003 to its Project Acceptance Committee (PAC) which was fully endorsed for execution by UNOPS. The minute of the PAC is attaché herewith.

Due to security reasons and funding issues, activities of the project were initiated only in February 1998. A contract was issued to RUTEC as pre-selected entity, following PRAC recommendations and CPO approval early April 1998.

In March 1998, we received an official communication from the UNDP Country Office stating “please note that RUTEC, though conceived initially as a stand alone project, was made an integral part of the ANG/96/100-Community Rehabilitation Project. It is a subcontract to be financed from the output budget: ANG/96/B01 budget line 2101- Trust Fund for the CRP.”
Due to budgetary constraints, UNDP asked UNOPS to charge the RUTEC contract to this project.
Later on, at UNDP request, RUTEC’s contract was charged against 2 project budgets, ANG/96/B01 and ANG/96/100.

It is UNOPS understanding that all project documents received from UNDP Luanda have followed UNDP’s internal procedures including adequate consultation with the host government and hence we believe that the Government of Angola, and the Ministry of Planning in particular, has endorsed them. It is difficult to conceive that UNOPS would have taken a unilateral decision pertaining to the award of the RUTEC’s contract or any other major project action unless it is in full conformity with the provisions and arrangements specified in the project document which has been signed by both UNDP and the Government.

With respect to project results and achievements of the RUTEC contract, these are documented in the quarterly reports from RUTEC as well as recent expressions of interest from the Government to raise additional funds for this centre.
With regards to the manner in which UNOPS as executing agency, has spent the funds, all financial records have been maintained according to the applicable procedures and are available for verification. An overall audit of Angola Programme was conducted in February 2000.

‘Monitoring visits were made by UNOPS project staff in Angola and can be verified. All invoices from RUTEC were certified by our then Co-ordinator and Programme Manager, Mr Lawrence Doczy and Mr. José Saléma who have visited the Centre regularly. Mr. Dimitri Samaras, the SPMO and myself on mission from New York, visited the site in March 1998 and 1999.’

Contrary to what is alleged by the new UNDP Resident Representative, on site monitoring by RUTEC was not limited to a one-day mission undertaken in 2000. Mr. Dommett, the RUTEC Programme Manager in South Africa visited Angola many times and met with UNOPS staff, UNDP Country Office and Government Representatives. He and his staff in Huambo have met on many occasions to assess project progress. Periodic reports, from which results can be seen, were submitted to UNDP by RUTEC itself. A final report is being prepared by RUTEC.

The statement of work which was to be undertaken by RUTEC is attached to the contract signed with RUTEC and appropriate specific goals and milestones are fully described in the project document as well as the contract.

We are at your disposal to further review this case, if you deem it necessary.

(Note: None of the attachments mentioned in the letter were in fact attached.)

Note Prepared by Leon Kukkuk and distributed to UNDP, UNOPS and Bereket Sletzion, UNDP auditor:

Project: ‘Capacity Building for the Community Rehabilitation and National Reconstruction Programme’
(ANG/96/B01 –BL 2101)

Notes as general background information:

Documents can refer to several project codes:

ANG 96/003
ANG 96/ 003/ 01/31
ANG 96/001
ANG 96/100
ANG 96/005
ANG 96/B01

These all refer to the same project, which was by all appearances implemented without finalising the codes, project documents and clarifying the roles of the partners.
This project is also generally referred to at UNDP as the ‘RUTEC Project’, at UNOPS and RUTEC as ‘The Huambo Community Production Centre’ and in Huambo as ‘Microform’ (This is a local initiative to bypass the problems created by the vague arrangements between UNDP, UNOPS and RUTEC).

There are no signed Project Documents, although there are various related versions of such. Requests over a period of two years to obtain these were unsuccessful. Apparently the Project Document for this project is the CRP programme document.

The project went through a planning phase from late 1995 – beginning 1998.
(The impression that is gained from the correspondence in the files is that implementation was hampered by a lack of funding and by a lack of clarity regarding what RUTEC can provide. Although much of the correspondence does not appear to be available, it seems as though a decision was taken late in 1997 to implement the project before these issues were finalised and that the original contract was signed with RUTEC, without resolving its weaknesses.)
In February 1998 UNOPS signed The Contract with RUTEC.
RUTEC started setting up the project in Huambo in the beginning of June 1998.
Contract amendment 1 brought the original termination date of 31 May 2000 forward to 31 January 2000 based on a starting date of September 1998.
After several delays and a suspension of activities for two months the centre started functioning at the end of January 2000.
Considering that The Contract allows for an 18-month pilot phase, the termination should have been 31 July 2000. This was never contractually or otherwise confirmed.

The Provincial Government requested an extension of the project on the argument that it can perform a key function in the reconstruction of the province.

UNOPS had no presence in Angola since the end of January 2000. Several meetings held with UNDP and CRP suggested that the future of the project shall be decided during a tripartite review. This was originally planned for May 2000, then July 2000. The only review that was eventually held was as part of the Country Co-operation assessment on 21/22 October 2000.

The SDRR (P) visited Huambo on 04 November 2000 where the issues were presented to him. To date no feedback has been received.

On 10 November 2000 the Project Manager received a copy of a letter from UNOPS to RUTEC, dated 01 November 2000, instructing the centre to be closed down and the transfer of custody to UNDP of all assets. This was forwarded to UNDP asking for instructions regarding the action that need to be taken. To date no instructions in this regard had been received.

Due to lack of action on the part of UNOPS and RUTEC, and indecision by UNDP, in defining a specific course of action for the project, the staff in Huambo was faced with three options after July 2000:
Abandon the project along with all ongoing activities, a considerable investment in equipment, vehicles and goodwill.
Place everything in storage pending a solution.
Continue as is best possible pending a solution.

The first option was considered too extreme and the second not practically possible due to local expectations and the absence of sufficient funds. The last option was decided upon after consultation with the staff, CRP (Huambo) and local Government officials.

Local authorities advised that only the Minister of Planning is authorised to close projects of this type. Correspondence between the CRP and the Provincial Government suggested that an extension of the project shall be sought with additional funding as well as replicating the project in another province by December 2000. This is reflected in the CRP Phase II Project Document.

This situation was explained in some detail to the CR team and UNDP representatives on 21 October 2000. The Provincial Governor also specifically requested the CR team to find support for the project.

Due to further lack of action it became practically impossible to continue with the project and, again after due consultation with the staff, CRP (Huambo) and local Government officials, as well as informing UNDP, the centre was closed down on 31 January 2001 amidst substantial chaos and ill feeling.

Immediate consequences for me were the fact that I was confined to my house for two days by the Governor who also wrote a very strongly worded letter to the Ministry of Planning and UNDP. After discussions with him it was decided that I should come to Luanda for one week to resolve the problems of the project.

Action that need to be taken:

UNDP need to take responsibility for the project, which now rests with a private individual, which has neither the resources nor the mandate to solve any of the outstanding issues.
These issues include:
Resolution of expectations of staff, beneficiaries and Angolan Government.
Legal and satisfactory closure of the project.
Unless these issues can be resolved and unless UNDP can regain credibility, all talk of a follow up project is pointless.


Response To Issues Raised By Angola CO In Relation To Project ANG 96/B01 BL 2101 On 27 December 2000 And Memorandum To Mr James W. Currie From Mr Bisrat Aklilu Dated 13 February 2001 (Prepared by Leon Kukkuk on behalf of UNDP)

Issue:
The activity undertaken under this contract was an integral part of the CRP (NEX) project, but was never included in the project evaluation that took place in 1999, or in related NEX audits, thus leaving everyone in the dark regarding its operational performance.
The government executing agency of the CRP, namely, the Ministry of Planning, has verbally stated that it never had any hand in the decisions that led to the award of The Contract and is not aware of any results that may have been achieved or the manner in which the 1.65 million dollars have so far been spent.

UNOPS Response: The copy of the minutes of the PAC is attached. (It is not attached)

UNDP Response: There are no signed copies of Project Document, PAC, PRAC recommendations or CPO approval in UNDP files. Would it be possible for UNOPS to provide such items?
There are no reports from UNOPS or RUTEC itemising expenditure of the amount under the contract.

Issue:
Despite the importance of the amount of money involved, there is no record of any monitoring visit by UNOPS, and on-site monitoring by RUTEC seems to have been limited to a one-day mission undertaken in 2000, with no substantive technical support provided for ongoing activities, and no mission report on follow-up.

UNOPS Response: ‘Monitoring visits were made by UNOPS project staff in Angola and can be verified. All invoices from RUTEC were certified by our then Co-ordinator and Programme Manager, Mr Lawrence Doczy and Mr. José Saléma who have visited the Centre regularly. Mr. Dimitri Samaras, the SPMO and myself on mission from New York, visited the site in March 1998 and 1999.

UNDP Response: (Refer to chronology of project)

Mr Doczy never met any of the project staff from Huambo, neither in Huambo itself nor in Luanda. Attempts to meet with him in 1998 were frustrated by his illness. By October 1998 he was no longer in Angola.
The Project Manager met frequently with Mr José Saléma in Luanda. Mr. Saléma was never in Huambo during the duration of the project. Consistent requests by Claudio Lopes from UNOPS during 1999 to visit the project were turned down. The UNOPS administrator, Ms Filomena Oliveira actively discouraged any assistance by any UNOPS staff member to the project. UNOPS consistently maintained that this is not a UNOPS project but an UNDP one.
In March 1998 there was not yet any project. To date no confirmation of a UNOPS visit in March 1999 can be obtained from WFP flight manifests or from the security unit. Mr Balima visited on 30 March 1999, whilst the Project Manager was in Luanda. Whether or not UNOPS staff accompanied him on this visit remains unclear. There are no UNOPS mission reports in the files.

UNOPS Response: ‘Contrary to what is alleged by the new UNDP Resident Representative, on site monitoring by RUTEC was not limited to a one-day mission undertaken in 2000. Mr. Dommett, the RUTEC Programme Manager in South Africa visited Angola many times and met with UNOPS staff, UNDP Country Office and Government Representatives. He and his staff in Huambo have met on many occasions to assess project progress. Periodic reports, from which results can be seen, were submitted to UNDP by RUTEC itself.’

UNDP Response: In 1998 Mr John Dommett from RUTEC visited Huambo in May and then again in August, both times for two days. The Project Manager met with him in Johannesburg on two occasions. The Centre was not yet established. At no time has he ever met with any government official. (Mr. Dommett had done this in January 1996 and never again subsequently) According to Mr Dommett at the time co-operation with the government is yet undefined and need to be finalised during the course of the project.
In 1999 he met with the Project Manager in Luanda in March then in April in Johannesburg, both times for one afternoon. On 13 October 1999 he met again in Johannesburg with the Project Manager for a morning whilst the latter was in transit to Angola. The Project Manager was told that under no circumstances should he provide any financial information to UNDP as per Teresa Felix’s request. Since then there has been no contact. Project progress was never discussed. Meetings have generally been acrimonious discussions regarding lack of assistance and lack of funds. This can be supported by abundant correspondence. Correspondence also exists to demonstrate that TA (Technical Assistance) passed from Huambo to RUTEC and not the other way around. RUTEC themselves are unaware of John Dommett’s whereabouts since late 1999.
Buzwe Yafele, as acting CEO of RUTEC, visited the project in Huambo on 31 March 2000 during his stay in Angola from 29 March – 03 April 2000. Soon after his return to South Africa he was dismissed from RUTEC. This was perhaps in part because he had failed to secure funding from the project to buy 10 tons of wheat flour and to arrange an extension of the contract with UNOPS. No mission report was produced by RUTEC.
No periodic reports submitted by RUTEC to UNDP exist in the files. (See Annex IV)

Issue:
Apart from The Contract document itself; there is no detailed description of the activity to be undertaken by RUTEC, and no specific goals to determine payment of the different instalments of the agreed fees.

UNOPS response: The statement of work which was to be undertaken by RUTEC is attached to the contract signed with RUTEC and appropriate specific goals and milestones are fully described in the project document as well as The Contract.

UNDP Response: There is no project document attached to the contract.
The problem with the contract is that the item ‘Management of Centre for Two Months’ is not clarified. Only $227 000.00 had been made available to the project by RUTEC over a period of two years. This included all costs for construction, set-up and 18 months running costs.
Of $1 505 000.00 that RUTEC had received from UNOPS there is no explanation of how $1 041 000.00 had been spent. (In contravention with points 2.4 and 2.5 and Article 12 of contract no C-971794.)
An exchange of letters between the current MD of RUTEC, Mr Boris Kamstra, from October 2000 and between Teresa Felix and same in February and March 2001 and myself shows that RUTEC is unable to justify any technical contribution to the project or how funds had been spent under the contract. Mr. Kamstra was for several months after his employment unaware that RUTEC had a UN contract to implement a project in Angola.
Abundant communication between RUTEC and myself exists regarding lack of financial support to the project. This was communicated to Mr Michel Balima at UNDP on 19 September 1998, 10 February 1999, 03 September 1999 and 12 November 1999.

In addition it is interesting to note the following:

Local staff was employed on 01 July 1998 and consistently received their salaries two to three months in arrears until November 1999. Salaries were then paid on time until January 2000. The Project Manager supported staff salaries in February and March 2000 before it fell into arrears again.
RUTEC had provided no insurance, employment or health benefits to any staff as was required by the contract. (Article 5 General Conditions for UNOPS Contracts for Professional Services.)
The Project Manager was employed on 28 May 1998 and received his first salary on 23 March 1999. A promise to provide him with cash allowance in Huambo was honoured once in September 1999. His salary is currently 16 months in arrears until July 2000. To date he has not received any payment in this regard in spite of continued requests. Add to this the fact that he has now spent an additional 9 months dealing with the problems of this project, without any contract or salary, which means that he has now been two years without an income.
By the end of 1999 he had personally invested $10 000.00 in the project.

Issue:
Although by all indications the activity is considered by UNOPS as having been satisfactorily completed (the last instalment of The Contract fee has been paid) there is not a final report indicating results achieved and lessons learned.

UNDP Response: RUTEC is unaware of what the project activities were and cannot justify any expenditure under the contract.
A draft final report will be prepared by Leon Kukkuk, as Consultant for CRP, following recommendations by the audit team.

Issue:
The Country review mission did not focus on this project. However, following a visit to the project site in Huambo, the mission separately raised many questions with the CO regarding the nature of the undertaking between UNOPS, UNDP and RUTEC.

UNDP Response: During the visit to Huambo on 21/22 October 2000 the following issues were raised:

With Leon Kukkuk, Project Manager:

The project was not monitored by UNOPS or UNDP. RUTEC made only $227 000.00 of the $1.65 million available to the project, provided no logistical support or technical assistance.
UNOPS in Luanda claimed that it was not their project.
Substantial correspondence to UNDP failed to elicit any responses. Specifically a letter from UNOPS to RUTEC (01 November 2000) ordering the cessation of all activities under the contract and referring the project staff to the UN Resident Co-ordinator in Luanda for the practical and logistical aspects of such a transfer to the custody of UNDP, received no response. This left project staff with the responsibility for a substantial investment but no mandate or contractual framework within which to act. This was complicated by the fact that the Provincial Government was requesting that further funds be mobilised for the project.
Staff is working without salaries or contracts pending a solution.

With Paulo Kassoma, Provincial Governor:

The project is potentially one of the most important in the province, yet is treated like a second or third-rate project. It has no proper infrastructure, the reports submitted to the provincial government does not reflect the commitment of $1.65 million made by the international community.
‘We don’t want to see money or sign cheques, we only want to see that promises made to us are honoured.’

With Fernando Arroyo, OCHA Field Advisor:

The project is one of the most visible activities of the CRP in the province, yet receives no logistical or financial support.

Date: Fri, 15 Jun 2001 15:27:44 +0200
From: "Bereket Sletzion"
To: Herbert Haraldsson
CC: M Ali-Kparah , Stanislaus Nkwain , Teresa felix
Subject: (no subject)

Subject: UNDP ANG - Project "Capacity Building For the Community Rehabilitation and National Reconciliation Programme..." (ANG/96/B01).

Background: The project was executed by UNOPS and a South African company (RUTEC) was selected to implement activities whose funds were US$ 1.65 million. Regarding this arrangement, the following events should be noted.

1) The former UNDP-ANG RR requested for an audit to be carried out for the above mentioned project through a letter to Mr. J. Currie on 27 December 2000. In her letter she raised issues and concerns justifying her request for an audit.
2) Mr. Currie requested UNOPS/HQs to provide clarification on the issues raised by the RR. (refer to his memo of 14 January 2001).
3)UNOPS/HQs responded to Mr. Currie through a memo on 13 February 2001 generally disagreeing with the concerns raised by the RR. This memo was also sent by UNOPS/HQs to the CO.

As a follow up, the audit discussed the issue with the management of UNDP-ANG during the management audit carried out in April/May this year. As a result of the discussion, the following were decided:

1) The CO felt that an audit was still necessary. However, an evaluation of the project would be carried out before finalizing the arrangements for an audit mission.
2) A response to the UNOPS/HQs memo of 13 February 2001 would be sent to UNOPS/HQs and copied to OAPR. (At the exit of the mission a draft was already prepared and a copy is with the audit).

OAPR is therefore to wait for the results of the evaluation; renewed request for the audit; the COs response to the UNOPS memo of 13 Feb. and the reaction of UNOPS.

If you require more clarification, kindly let me know.

Regards.


An e-mail sent by Dimitri Samaras (UNOPS) to Herbert Behrstock (UNDP Angola) on 12 March 2001:
. . .Lots of money have been spent in Angola and wasted for no reason. . . or reasons beyond my imagination.
We have invested but never capitalised on it. Cost benefit analysis is indeed needed.
I do believe that this office needs a Central Management and Coordination Unit which will implement/ execute and supervise all operational activities.
. . . Regarding RUTEC, we have responded to the auditors and I am sending you a copy as well as their reaction.
I will provide at anytime all infos related to the said activity.

From Michele Falavigna to Dimitri Samaras on 13 April 2001:
Thank you Dimitri for transmitting the enclosed fax from RUTEC on ANG/96/003.
I believe that the sense of frustration about this project goes beyond not receiving the final report. There are questions in the CO on the appropriate use by RUTEC of UNDP funds and fulfilment of the contract obligations. That’s (why), the Audit which is expected to start in Angola next week has been asked to look into the matter. Definitively, this project has projected a negative image that is important to address. I was wondering whether UNOPS has any suggestion of how the failure of this project can be addressed apart from drawing lessons for the future.
Thank you.

The fax attached went like this:

Subject: ANG 96/003 Huambo Development Centre

Dear Sir,
I am in receipt of your fax of 10 April 2001.
I appreciate the frustration you are experiencing in receiving the final report. It is not that we have not been paying attention to deliver this report, but we have been out of contact with the centre in Huambo. Having recently joined RUTEC I have no knowledge of the project and it would be senseless for me to provide you with a report as all I can report on is the instructions from yourself. It is almost impossible to receive any instructions from the centre if we are out of contact with them, we have investigated the possibility of chartering an aircraft to physically take us there. However, no charter company will fly to the area. The only flights in and out are those of the World Food Programme and the military. To get on any of these we need to talk to the centre. This gives some idea of the dilemma we find ourselves in.
Your instruction to close the centre was forwarded to the centre. We were informed that this was not in accordance with the procedure required and there was a concern for the centre staff’s safety should they unilaterally close the centre. I informed them that with no further payments from UNOPS for the contract it would not be possible to provide them with additional funding. In the light of this the contract was closed. It appears that the centre took it upon themselves to continue operating whilst trying to secure funds for its future. This was a decision taken at that level with no instructions to do so from RUTEC and as such any liabilities or credit cannot be accounted to RUTEC.
We have recently re-established with the centre manager and are in the process of receiving the material for a final report, which we will forward to you as soon as we complied it into a report.
As I do not have the fax numbers of Mr Behrstock and Mr Almeida please could you forward a copy of this fax to them.
I apologise for the intolerable delay in finalising this issue.
Yours Faithfully

(Note: There is something interesting that need to be noted with regard to this fax. The “facts” represented in it are of course all fabrications. RUTEC had made no attempt, and had no intention of making any such an attempt, to travel to Huambo, by chartered plane or otherwise, and they did not need to since the Project Manager was in touch with them almost daily wanting to know what they had done with $1.65 million that they had received. The thing that is interesting is that the very same people, who had received this very large sum of money to implement a project in Huambo, now claimed that they were unable to report on how they had in fact implemented that project since they have no contact with this project and does not know how to get to it.)


On 23 April 2001 an e-mail written by Dimitri Samaras (UNOPS) to Michele Falavigna (UNDP New York):
Many thanks Michele .
One thing which I am sure of is that UNDP participated fully in the selection and the award of the contract to RUTEC and the funds were used for services that are spelled out in the RUTEC’s contract.
In addition, it is my understanding that the activities undertaken were so positive that the Local authorities were to mobilize additional funding.
I can assure you that the Production Centre’s initiative had met the full endorsement of many actors and in particular the Funder i.e. UNDP and the Recipient i.e. the Government of Angola.
So to question it today, as it was done by UNDP new Leadership was indeed not a plus in terms of projecting a positive image but rather was felt as some kind of “ retaliation” for which UNOPS is not part of.
Mr James Curry, Director of OAPR submitted to UNOPS on 14 January 2001 a memo in which he referred to some allegations made by the Resident Representative. That kind of attitude is indeed not conducive to constructive understanding of what went well and wrong.
Nevertheless we have answered his queries and concerns in a memo dated 13 February 2001. A copy of this memo will be sent to all so that you get a better idea of the situation (where we started, how we started and which role we played). Talking about failures is already taking a strong position which I believe at this juncture is premature.
I am scheduling a visit to Angola next month with the Division Chief and would hopefully be able to clarify the misunderstandings that are occurring.
I hope we can joint efforts and try to overcome perhaps things that are beyond our control.
I am waiting as well as a positive reaction from the CO since I have many times offered my services to regularize situations which can be with of course a good will.
MANY THANKS.
I stand ready to bring any contribution required from our end and serve the noble cause that we are serving after all i.e. the development one.

And then the issue became forgotten until one Erick de Mul came up with the following justification in a letter to the staff, dated 13 January 2002, and addressed also to the Director of Planning Dr. Henrique Barbosa, the Governor, Engo Paulo Kassoma and the Minister of Planning, Ana Dias Lourenço:
Subject: Your requests of 21 December 2001 and 09 January 2002

The office of the United Nations Development Programme in Angola has the honour to present its respectful compliments to the collective of the ex-staff of the project RUTEC-Microform in Huambo and makes reference to the issue mentioned in the title line.

In this respect we would like to inform you that we take note of your concerns manifested by way of your requests, and to guarantee you that our office has pledged to do everything since the end of 2000 to find a solution to this difficult situation.
However, as you know UNDP did not have any direct responsibility in the execution and implementation of the RUTEC-Microform project in the province of Huambo. The responsibility of UNDP is limited to the formulation and financing of the project[1], the execution of the same having been entrusted to the United Nations Office for Project Services “UNOPS,” that had in turn contracted the private South African company “RUTEC” as implementing agent for the project.
. . .
(Signed by Erick de Mul as Resident Representative UNDP)

One wonders if it should be noted that Graig N. Murphy, in his pseudo-factual book “UNDP: Abetter Way?” describes UNDP as a “model of efficiency.”
[1] Underlined by Author.

A World of Development Experience

This is a slightly revised and shortened extract from my book:

A lot had been by know been said about UNDP and I may have hinted here and there that perhaps it was a somewhat haphazard and unprofessional organisation. Perhaps it would be best to stand back a little and have a look at what other people were saying about them. We shall also not forget to have a look at what they have to say about themselves.
It is important to keep in mind that the international humanitarian and development aid system is omnipresent in the Third World. Even if a development issue is purely local, there is a strong likelihood that an international organisation would be involved in addressing the issue. The poorer the country and the weaker its Government is, the more important the role and the power of International Development organisations. In many African countries, for instance, Development is to all practical extents, managed by the UNDP Resident Representative and The World Bank delegation.
In Luanda the United Nations occupies an eight-story building, with some agencies, such as WFP, UNHCR and OCHA occupying their own premises. For local communities, this international presence is often seen as much part of the problem as of the solution.
Soon after my arrival in Luanda, on 21 February 2001, I was given the report from the UNDP Country Review undertaken from 16 October to 03 November 2000. This was the same group of people that had visited our centre on 21 and 22 October 2000. United Nations Agencies work in countries within the legal context of a thing called the Country Co-operation Framework (CCF), renewed periodically, which defines what they are supposed to do.
In Angola the UNDP CCF ran from 1997-2000 and included the following programmes:
Theme 1: Direct Post Conflict Activities, Theme 2: Community Rehabilitation and National Reconciliation and, Theme 3: Economic Management, Institutional Reform and Administrative Modernisation (Governance).
These were all ambitious objectives, especially for an organisation, that, from my own experience, was still battling with the modalities and mechanics of internal communication, unable to use the excellent postal service provided by WFP or even to realise that they have to respond to letters.
Just to make things clear to those not familiar with these sorts of things. The above mentioned themes are considered to be programmes. Projects are then designed to comply with the thematic objectives of these programmes. Our project, for example, was part of Theme 2: Community Rehabilitation and National Reconciliation.
What did the report have to say about UNDP’s endeavours to do these things?
Their overall assessment makes the following statement:

“While these programmes were well conceived, relevant and important, they all suffered major problems for a number of reasons, and lasting results are very few. Principally, the success of immediate post-conflict activities depends on a secure environment, which was not (and has yet to be) fully achieved in Angola. The contribution by these programmes towards the achievement and consolidation of more peaceful conditions was limited, if any.
Yet other factors influenced the implementation of these activities:
Poor design of the actual projects, without adequate consultations with and ownership by the government institutions involved;
Weak programme management by UNDP and inadequate accountability by its institutional partners, especially UNOPS;
Inadequate transfer of technical and management expertise by external consultants to local staff; and
Inability by UNDP to quickly modify programmes to reflect the changing political and security environment. This includes the absence of an effective monitoring and evaluation system.”

Time and again one would come up against arguments from UNDP that they do not have funds to do many of the things that they had promised to do. Yet the country review stated quite clearly, that, with $65.9 million available:

“UNDP had thus a very good starting point for the implementation of its CCF. However, as this Country Review will show, most programmes and projects suffered serious problems during implementation, some had to be terminated, and there are very few sustainable results at the end of the CCF. The big paradox is therefore: How could these seemingly good programmes produce so meagre results? Could this have been avoided? And what lessons can UNDP and the government draw from these experiences?”

This report mentions that it was not the first time that an evaluation reported on large scale failures by UNDP. The previous review, in 1997, identified a list of five weaknesses in the previous CCF. These included poor quality of national staff, high turnover of senior staff, lack of coherent and flexible strategy in the face of emergencies, no capacity in co-ordination and implementation of reintegration and rehabilitation roles and that the absence of translation facility delayed approval of project documents, but then goes on to say that:
“Unfortunately, only the last point has resulted in a remedial measure, while all other “lessons learned” did not lead to any substantial change – and indeed were thus not “learned” by UNDP in Angola. Similarly, practically none of the objectives and success indicators of the CCF were achieved during this period. The minimum requirement for the next CCF is that it establish more realistic immediate objectives for UNDP interventions and measurable performance indicators that permit evaluation and periodic assessment.”

I personally would suggest, on the point of establishing more realistic immediate objectives for UNDP, that they stick to the basics such as to train their staff to be able to communicate with their colleagues from one office to another, that they learn to respond to correspondence in a meaningful way and, very advanced for UNDP, but important to learn anyway, that failures are a necessary part of the learning process providing the reasons for failures are adequately addressed and become part of the lessons learned and the procurement of solutions.
I could thoroughly agree, from personal experience, with the report’s observation that:
“It seems equally evident that UNDP did not thoroughly scrutinize the proposed programmes and projects, before accepting funding.”

The report then proceeds to observe that:
“The relationship between UNDP and government partners was not good at the central level during 1997-98.”

“Both NGO’s and private sector partners interviewed by the CR Team indicated that their experience with UNDP in the execution of projects to have been negative.”

“Experience in project execution through UNOPS has also appeared to be costly, bureaucratic and slow. . . Partners have questioned the quality of technical assistance particularly that recruited through UNOPS. The CR Team has not been able to find performance evaluations nor information on targets, indicators and outputs, which could corroborate these opinions.”

“Bureaucratic procedures have been employed by both UNDP and National partners to protect themselves and to provide excuses for inaction.”

Regarding the CRP specifically, the report mentions:
“. . . the impact on communities targeted by programming in this sector has by and large been negative. High expectations have not been met, promised funding to community projects has been slow to deliver at best, and often not arrived. Local level leaders and NGO partners have lost credibility with their constituencies.”

The report concludes with a number of observations and recommendations:
“The above analysis uncovered serious weaknesses in the way the Country Office has functioned . . . “ (more or less a repetition of previous reasons)

“. . . the CO[1] did not adequately support the implementation of these projects in a timely and efficient fashion but was rather seen as slow, bureaucratic and without transparency.”

“UNDP must also ensure that the inputs, especially the international advisors and consultants that are funded, are relevant, efficient, effective and client oriented.”

“The CR Team strongly believes that UNDP should not handle any more cost sharing, Trust Funds and other funds on behalf of other partners, before it has drastically improved its own performance and efficiency.”[2]

This last point is particularly important and cause for some concern. Why would an organisation not be required to handle things such as cost sharing, Trust Funds and other funds on behalf of other partners? Could it perhaps be that they cannot adequately explain how the money entrusted to them are spent? And if they cannot, or are unwilling, to explain how it is spent, where are they in fact spending it? We are not talking about small change here but about several tens of millions of Dollars, in other words several large suitcases worth of money, if one was to convert it into cash. One is inclined to believe that it would be difficult to loose track of such an amount of money unless a deliberate effort was made to do so.
The UNDP website states:
“UNDP helps developing countries attract and use aid effectively. In all our activities, we promote the protection of human rights. . .”

If you had a few million lying around in spare cash, would you give it to UNDP to use effectively?
On the other hand, one could accept that the Country Review was done by a bunch of vindictive individuals more concerned with doing harm to UNDP than with constructive comments. Nevertheless, in a technical meeting on the Country Review held on 02 March 2001, chaired by the Deputy minister of Planning, it highlighted the fact that in general the Government agreed with the assessment of the CR team.
Arve Ofstad, Director of the Chr. Michelsen Institute in Norway, previously the UNDP Resident Representative in Sri Lanka, and team leader for the Angola Country Review, later wrote a paper entitled; ”When Peace And Development Both Fail – The UN System In Angola.” These are his observations:
“The UN development agencies, here exemplified by UNDP, has a mixed experience in Angola, in periods playing a very traditional “developmentalist” role, and in other periods taking on innovative roles much earlier that elsewhere. In the initial phase, before and up to the peace accord in 1991 and the elections in 1992, UNDP was very active in “filling and bridging the gaps” to the humanitarian and political spheres. UNDP was in fact providing support to the coordination of humanitarian assistance prior to establishment of DHA[3] in 1993, and contributed funding to the first elections. While this was early compared to UNDP in most other countries, this could have been partly inspired by the transition and elections in Namibia just before.
However, when the war broke out in 1993, UNDP suspended its regular development programme, as a traditional development agency would do. But during the follow-up from the 1994 peace accord, UNDP again changed its position, and provided heavy support to this follow-up through the organisation with the government of a major Round Table with donors in Brussels in 1995. During this period the new UNDP Resident Representative combined this role with the position of WFP Country Director and being the Humanitarian Aid Co-ordinator as well, and he worked very closely with the SRSG[4]. This seemed to be the “golden period” for UN cooperation, and their support to a peace process.
In the following “in-between” phase, UNDP nevertheless failed almost completely. It turned incapable to make good use of these opportunities, while it also suffered from deteriorating external environment. Despite a good and relevant programme and substantial donor support, very few sustainable results were obtained. This can partly be explained by the weak leadership of another Res. Rep, who did not combine the post as Humanitarian Aid Co-ordinator. In a study of “in-between” phases, the poor performance by UNDP, and the lessons and experiences from this, will require special attention. As the 1998-99 war broke out, UNDP again had to reduce its activities as was unable to redirect its efforts to respond to the changing environment. With the arrival a new Res. Rep again in 2000 and a new combination of the role as Humanitarian Aid Co-ordinator, UNDP seemed to enter a period of slow recovery, also reflecting the new “in-between” phase.
Finally, the humanitarian agencies played a relatively limited role within the UN system before 1991, despite the continuous war with refugees and displacements since independence. However, with the large-scale “war of the cities” in 1993-94, the humanitarian assistance increased rapidly, especially as food aid through WFP. DHA took over direct coordination, most of the period handled by WFP as Humanitarian Aid Co-ordinator. Since then, the humanitarian agencies have maintained a strong role, especially during the periods of large-scale war. In the “in-between” phases the humanitarian agencies have tried to move into support for resettlement and recovery, but not very successfully.
Interestingly, the humanitarian agencies in Angola seem to have had a positive relationship with the political and security presence of the UN, as opposed to the strained relationship that has been the case in many other countries. Especially during the 1993-94 war, the humanitarian agencies through their presence in the field throughout the country were supporting the SRSG in providing information and situation analyses, and in maintaining contacts with the UNITA side. During the 1994-95 “golden period” of UN coordination, the humanitarian agencies were also part of this. Since 1995, however, it seems that the humanitarian agencies have been acting more separately on their own, while expanding their activities, rather than integrating with the developmental parts of the system. During and after the 1998-99 war, the humanitarian agencies have no longer been able to provide assistance to the population in unsafe and in UNITA areas, which is a major breach of basic humanitarian principles.”

Although it is a bit of an aside, Arve Ofstad also asks and then answers some interesting questions:
“Is the volume of aid contributing to or subsidising the war efforts? – This has apparently been seen as an issue in Angola, where regular aid has been limited and further reduced during periods of heavy violence, while humanitarian aid increased. But the military strength of both government and UNITA has depended on other funding sources, and has hardly been influenced by the level of aid. The humanitarian assistance has clearly provided life-saving support to large populations, and it seems unlikely that the two sides would have paid more attention to suffering civilians with less external assistance. This may require more discussion, however.
Can the content of the aid programme provide incentives for the peace process? – This is exactly what was attempted especially in the wake of the 1994 peace accord. This project is an attempt to understand why these incentives were so weak.
Will aid for reconstruction in contested areas promote peace? – Given the clear pro-government position of the UN agencies, they have worked on the assumption that re-establishing civilian administration and initiating development in (previously) contested areas would promote the peace and reconciliation process. However, it is not clear whether this assumption is correct.
What are the options and implications of aid for rehabilitation and development efforts in rebel controlled areas? – This has hardly been an option in Angola for the UN, possibly with the exception of UNICEF. Before 1992 other major donors (USA) and their NGOs were actively involved on the UNITA side, but this was primarily a political position not necessarily motivated by promoting a peace process.”

Not only was this the only person not fully positive about UNDP. In a conference called “The Struggle for Peace, Peace-building and Canadian Policy, Roundtable on Angola,” held in Ottawa, Canada on 26 November 1999, the following statements were made:
“The donor community in 1995 mounted a program as a contribution to peace building, the Brussels Round Table process. It underwrote the Lusaka peace accords with a billion dollar, to assist in community revitalization. It wanted to engage communities in national rehabilitation, as part of a peace-building process. The UN set up independent evaluation teams to look at a well conceived, inclusive program but it was left to the UNDP to implement. UNDP is one of the weakest structures in terms of administering programs. After almost 4 years, none of the rehabilitation had taken place. Proposals received in late 1995 from communities had still not been processed 4 years later. Due to poor implementation, the international community was further discredited. If implemented early and effectively, this program could have assisted in the consolidation of peace.

UNDP’s own bureaucratic systems of financial planning, reporting and monitoring - Imprecise and overlapping sets of definitions of programme and project boundaries made budgeting a difficult process for non UN personnel to understand. Government, Donors and Communities each became frustrated and impatient with programme procedures and tended to look for means to circumvent them. The use of the UN Trust Fund as a pool to finance both the programme administration, necessary office infrastructure rehabilitation, capacity building aspects of project as well as community based projects, without sufficient separation of these functions, prevented programme managers from monitoring the overall financial situation of the CRP. The problem became a serious constraint for local Government and Donors who need clear and accurate financial reporting in order to plan and carry out their functions within the CRP. The lack of transparency of reporting systems hid the fact that only a small proportion of the UN Trust Funds money was invested in community based projects.”

On their website UNDP makes the following claims:
“Accountability, Transparency, and Anti-Corruption
In an era of increasing globalisation, governments play a critical role to ensure economic competitiveness and growth, good governance and sustainable development
Accountable and effective management of public financial resources constitute some of the most fundamental responsibilities and challenges of many governments in the world, particularly those in developing countries and economies in transition. In this era of increasing globalisation of world markets and trade, public sector management and accountability have become critical elements in determining the over-all effectiveness, efficiency, and ability of governments to ensure economic competitiveness and growth, good governance and sustainable human development
The UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/51/59 adopted on 28 January 1997 provides the basis for UNDP’s mandate in assisting development countries to fight corruption. In July 1998, the UNDP Executive Committee approved the corporate position paper, Fighting Corruption to Improve Governance to guide the organization’s work in this field. At the heart of this mandate is UNDP’s holistic approach of tackling corruption as a problem of poor governance. UNDP recognizes that minimizing corruption is critical to reduce poverty and promote social and people-centred sustainable development. UNDP’s emphasis on long-term systemic changes and the human dimensions of development, coupled with its impartiality, underscore its unique contributions in promoting good governance and public accountability and transparency.”

How did UNDP react to this report? Surely if any company or organisation receives a report that concludes that it is almost a complete failure, this would cause a mass panic amongst staff and management and, at the very least, some attempt to start correcting things. Yet, it seemed to be barely noticed by the staff at UNDP. At higher levels the reaction could perhaps be best summarised by the following example:
Michele Falavigna had produced a Back-to-the-Office report soon after his visit to Angola (in March 2001). As an aside, but of interest, was the fact that this twenty-two-page report does not once mention the two-hour meeting that I had had with him. There is nevertheless an interesting section entitled, “Working with Oil Companies.”
It goes like this;
“Collaboration between UNDP and Oil Companies (BP-Amoco, Chevron and Sonangol) has already started with a full cost-sharing project to support fisheries in Ambriz. . . . Considerable progress has been made on setting up infrastructures and equipment. . . . it was suggested to give greater visibility to the accomplishments made to date by producing articles for the national newspapers and videos for the national television. . . .
Beyond, the Ambriz project, the opportunities for increasing UNDP co-operation with oil Companies in Angola are promising. . . .
The Country Office has to pursue the matter vigorously not only because of the opportunity for resource mobilization but also because of the nature of the projects, high visibility and quick impact, which can boost UNDP image as a reliable and efficient co-management partner.”

Sterling stuff, all of it, except for the fact that the report from the Country Review team has the following to say about the very same project:
“The artesian fishing project in Ambriz is a pioneering partnership between UNDP, Equator Bank, BP-Amoco (a private sector petroleum company) and the Ministry of Fisheries.
The programme is still incomplete and the execution has been slow. The primary donor BP-Amoco indicated to the CR Team a certain disillusionment with the performance of UNDP, having expected a more professional management and better reporting. BP-Amoco indicates that reluctantly they are being drawn into a greater “hands-on” role in the project for which they feel poorly equipped as a donor. Due to poor performance in the execution of this project, UNDP risks jeopardising a future relationship with a potentially important investor/partner.”

An important objective of Michele Falavigna’s visit was in fact to close down the CRP. I can well, and with a lot of satisfaction, remember how the top management of UNDP left the office full of confidence for their meeting to do just that. A few hours later they returned, less confidant, and laughing embarrassingly. The Minister of Planning had told them in no uncertain terms that the Angolan government will make such a decision and that Angola is governed by Angolans and not by the staff of UNDP.
Likewise Mark Malloch Brown, the UNDP administrator, in other words the top person in the agency, had visited Angola in February with a view of speaking to the President, José Eduardo dos Santos, in an effort to improve relations between UNDP and the Angolan Government. In spite of not having received any response from the President’s office regarding an audience, Mr. Malloch Brown arrived anyway. After kicking his heels for a day in Luanda, a response arrived.
“The President does not meet with people at this level.” It said, indicating Jorge Chicoti, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs as the appropriate person to speak to.
Mr. Malloch Brown returned to New York after three days and after what was generally considered to be a humiliation. Carol Bellami, head of UNICEF, visits Angola regularly and almost invariably meets with the President. They certainly do not discuss the success of UNICEF projects since in that respect UNICEF is perhaps second only to UNDP in their capacity for failure.
Another indication that Mark Malloch Brown might erroneously have believed that UNDP is in fact doing a reasonable job in Angola could be found in a note he distributed regarding the first regular session held from 24-28 and 31 January 2000 in New York on the Extension Of The First Country Cooperation Framework For Angola. At the very least it suggests that UNDP must have been aware at least at this level that we were active and achieving results. Point three of this note, referring to the CCF from 1997-1999, says:
“The programmes achieved many positive results. Some of the notable ones are the vocational training programmes, community rehabilitation and revival of agriculture and economic livelihoods in six provinces, and capacity-building activities in the Ministries of Planning, Finance, and Civil Service. With the onset of the conflict in Angola in late-1998, and based on discussions with the Government and other partners, the reintegration and community rehabilitation programmes have been shifted to provide vocational training and micro-enterprise services for displaced people in areas with security and access. The capacity-building programmes in the national institutions continue to be relevant in view of the increased government role in humanitarian assistance coordination, and discussions with the Bretton Woods institutions to undertake comprehensive economic reforms beginning in January 2000.”

This was not exactly what the Country Review would find at the end of that same year. (In fact most of the programmes so enthusiastically endorsed by Mr. Malloch Brown did not even exist, or had existed only briefly before being closed down. One can conclude that he was at best misleading, or, more directly, lying to his boss and good friend, Kofi Annan). Another way to judge the quality of the UNDP presence in Angola is to have a look at how the donors support them. This is a bit of a tricky issue, full of real and conceptual pitfalls but we would do our best to make sense of things anyway.
In Angola the UN requests funds from donors through a mechanism called the “Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal” usually simply referred to as the CAP. This mechanism has its origin in the wake of the UN’s poor response to the plight of the Kurds in northern Iraq, when the General Assembly in December 1991 approved resolution 46/182 designed to improve humanitarian coordination. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs[5], created as a result, established the process of consolidated appeals for major emergencies, responding to donor insistence on single requests on behalf of the entire UN system. The idea was that the UN would come up with a co-ordinated response from all its agencies to these emergencies in order to respond in an effective and coherent way. From the Angolan appeals, consisting of a series of one-page project proposals, a thorough background and lots of tables with numbers in them, it would be very difficult to deduce any form of co-ordinated effort behind it all. While the analytical rigour of current UN appeals leaves something to be desired, the response of governments to the new approach still only covers an average of 25 per cent of the UN’s requests.
There is a common misconception that donors only support issues that come to international attention through the media, the so-called media grabbing emergencies. A closer look at multilateral and bilateral funding clearly demonstrates that this is not strictly true. Donor support appears to be given primarily for strategic reasons. Then countries appear to give preferentially to former colonies, to the extent that an undemocratic formal colony can expect about twice as much from a donor as can a democratic non-former colony. Thus in Angola the major donor by far is the United States, for strategic reasons, followed by the Scandinavians, Britain and Portugal in almost equal measure. Since American Aid is almost always linked to governance issues, democracy and human rights, they almost always support organisations that promote these sorts of things. The CAP in Angola has been supported by about 50 to 70 percent of their requests on average. Countries with less strategic value such as Rwanda, Burundi and Eritrea routinely received as little as between 2 and 6 percent of their requests.
For the year 2000 the UN had requested $260 million[6] and from this only 52 Percent had been funded. The bulk of this was for WFP, receiving 52 percent. The Food and Agricultural Organisation received only 29 percent of its requirements. The UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) received only 60 percent of requirements. UNFPA received 48 percent of its needs. UNHCR received 59 percent of funding for IDP protection and assistance programmes. UNICEF received 40 percent of funding. The WHO received 55 percent of requirements.
The UNDP received a paltry 3.3 percent of requirements in 2000.
In 2001 UNDP received 19.00% of requirements. In the same year WFP received 51.29% of requirements, UNICEF 53.67% of requirements, UNHCR 79.82% of requirements, WHO 8.99% and FAO 9.62%. For 2002 UNDP received 5.29% of requirements. In the same year WFP received 80.86% of requirements, UNICEF 53.63% of requirements, UNHCR 55.24% of requirements, WHO 6.86% and FAO 74.26%.[7]
One thus tends to come to the conclusion that the donors are not overly enthusiastic in supporting UNDP, the so-called principal agency of the UN system. UNDP of course would argue that this was because of the war, when emphasis was placed on humanitarian assistance. There may even be a spark of truth in that, yet fails to explain why UNDP only received 5.29% of their funding in 2002 when there no longer was a war and when their mandate had not only become important but imperative. An analysis of how UNDP revised its requirements dramatically upwards as the war came to an end and then downwards as the donors were obviously not responding, would be interesting but, alas, it is fairly technical and boring stuff and there is regrettably no place for it here. Suffice to say, the amounts that UNDP requested varied from a little more than two million to a little more than seven million, peaking at thirteen million in mid-2002, before being cut back by more than half, a far cry from the tens and even hundreds of millions of Dollars UNDP was originally set up to manage annually.
It did not take UNDP long to get into vicious circle of claiming that there are no results because they have no funds and then not getting funds because they have no results. ROAR’s, their famous “Results Orientated Annual Reports” are a perfect example of the prevailing mentality of UNDP. Every year many of the senior staff goes into apoplexy as they start to prepare these reports. After apparently huge efforts they then produce a monumental document full of goals, sub-goals, sub-sub-goals, themes, sub-themes, sub-sub-themes, tables with numbers, tables with lists of countries with little crosses marked of against a number of indicators and little dialogue boxes with all sorts of asides. Reading through all of this is an exercise in endurance and yet at the end of it the all, the important questions; what was done, how does it contribute towards development, how many peoples’ lives are better as a result and how much did it cost? remain unanswered. These reports do not contain a single measurable result. It comes across a little bit like the “baffle them with bullshit” story. Only that there is almost 200 pages of it.
UN Agencies, which we expect to have high moral values, and to occupy the moral high ground, seems to have increasing numbers of freeloaders, parasites, charlatans and impostors within their ranks. A certain illness has crept in, and the illness seems to be infectious. The UN should be mature enough to diagnose the illness, and consider what they can do to treat it, and restore the system to health, and to its proper position of the high moral ground.
Criticism of the UN has reached such a crescendo over the last few years that one finds oneself almost unable to reach through this to the real issues in this specific case. It is easy to be overly critical about the UN. It is nevertheless important to stress that one should separate the UN system, that often fail because its member states do not support it enough, from its agencies, which are largely free from this horse trading, and should be run professionally, competently and work to the highest standards.
These are not unreasonable demands. In fact the UNDP Operational manual makes the same demands:
“In the context of the Mission statement and the 2001 project for management change, UNDP staff and management have agreed on the overall values guiding the work of the organization, namely, a results orientation, integrity in all aspects of work, and respect for the diversity of staff and development partners.

To make development assistance more effective, the General Assembly decided in 1975 that UNDP activities should be seen in terms of outputs or results rather than in terms of a package input of foreign experts, fellowships and imported equipment.”

The specialist agencies of the UN are in fact doing exactly that. There are also some fine and admirable agencies such as WFP, but they are in danger of being overshadowed by the increasing number of self-interested parasitic agencies, that represent something other than the multi-lateral, not-for-profit, not self-serving, public benefit organisations that they should be.
Without wanting to demean WFP in any way, their work is not at all that difficult. All they have to do is get food to people wherever there may be a need. Logistically perhaps very difficult and even complex but conceptually easy. The real work of the UN should be within the agencies that can respond to needs in a more conceptually mature and holistic manner, identifying and solving the underlying causes for suffering, creating programmes and projects that can meaningfully intervene in the lives of people and fundamentally make things better. Without that, the work of WFP, however excellent, is meaningless really. And I have seen this many times in the faces of WFP staff as they respond time and again to the same emergencies, having to try and save the same lives again and again, seeing the same despair and realising the same humiliation, as people live their entire lives on aid with no hope for the future.
All I saw UNDP doing during my time with them was the extent to which they expanded the frontiers of incompetence, down to levels as difficult for me to comprehend, as it is to understand quantum theory.
[1] Country Office.
[2] It must be noted here that this statement was found in the draft copy of the evaluation in my possession but did not make it into the final published version.
[3] Department of Humanitarian Assistance, later OCHA.
[4] Special Representative of the Secretary General.
[5] OCHA forms part of this,
[6] About 2-3% of the British Health budget.
[7] Information from the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals for Angola, 2000. 2001, 2002.

Letter to James Currie, Director Office of Audit and Performance Review 15 April 2002

Dear Sir,

With reference to Project ANG 96B01 BL 2101 ‘Pilot Community Production Centre Huambo Angola’ for which an audit was requested by Zoraida Mesa, Resident Representative UNDP, in December 2000.

Please find some English translations of letters that had been sent to the press, Human Rights Organisations and donors in Angola. This issue will now be resolved through the courts.

Open Letter to Erick Eduard de Mul, Resident Representative – United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Angola

Dear Sir,

Over the last few weeks we have had the privilege to read in the newspapers and hear on the radio, the UNDP promises regarding their new projects that will reduce poverty in Angola.

At the same time the project Microform – ANG 96/B01 BL 2101 – financed by UNDP and implemented in Huambo finds itself in a catastrophe without precedence. The problems related to this – lack of clarity regarding Government authorisation to implement the project, poor planning and control of funds, lack of evaluation and monitoring and a lack of knowledge of how and where almost a million dollars had been spent- was presented to UNDP from the beginning of 1999. Up to the time of this letter we have not yet received a single concrete response from UNDP of how they will solve these issues.

In January 2001 the project closed down chaotically with staff salaries already seven months in arrears and with a variety of other financial obligations. The successes that were achieved started to fail as a result of the inability of UNDP to decide the future of the project.

An audit was requested in December 2000 and all relevant documents handed over to the auditor in April 2001.

Up to date we have not received a single response. A letter dated 16 November 2001, to Stephen Kinloch, a UNDP staff member, requesting clarification of these issues, especially the seven month salary arrears that is already outstanding for more than a year, received on 26 November 2001, a very vague response with the following note:

‘For reasons beyond my control I am no longer authorised to communicate with you on behalf of UNDP. Consider this letter informal and unofficial.’

Presently we have the following questions:

· If UNDP has no capacity to assist with the basic needs of an already successful project on the ground, and to solve its management problems within a reasonable period of time, what capacity do they have to alleviate poverty that is infinitely more complex?
· If UNDP has no capacity to control the funds that they make available, even when they were advised since the beginning of 1999 that these funds are not arriving at the project, what capacity do they have to direct future funds to where they are needed?
· If UNDP has no capacity to treat staff that are already contributing towards poverty alleviation with honesty, respect and dignity what capacity do how have to treat innumerable poor with honesty, respect and dignity according to their hopes?

Concretely, what has been the contribution of more than 26 years of UNDP presence in the Angolan community? What practical and different mechanisms does UNDP have at the moment to ensure a contribution in the future?

Hoping for a quick, clear and factual response.


Huambo, Angola aos 04 de Dezembro de 2001.



Open Letter to Erick Eduard de Mul, Resident Representative – United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Angola

Dear Sir,

A letter was written in December 2001 (annexed) seeking clarification regarding UNDP’s role in Angola. The questions are very basic, legitimate organisations normally respond to these questions as a matter of routine.
We also thought that we had the right to ask UNDP questions about their activities and to receive clear and honest answers. UNDP is a public organisation that depends for its survival on voluntary donations, i.e. our money. It is not unreasonable to ask them what they do with this.

After an interview by Leon Kukkuk on radio Ecclesia, ex-director of the Project mentioned in the first letter, Francisco de Almeida responded on behalf of UNDP, also by way of radio, at the end of January 2002 and the beginning of February 2002.

(Francisco de Almeida, Assistente do Representante Residente do PNUD em Angola para Advocacia, Parceiras e Mobilização de Recursos), did not respond to the questions asked. Instead he simply claimed that the only person responsible for the problems of the project is Leon Kukkuk, as Co-coordinator of the Project in Huambo.

He also visited Huambo on 28 January 2002 to pay about U$D 33 000.00 in salary arrears that is part of about U$D 100 000.00 in financial obligations that we are attributing directly to the incompetence of UNDP. (In contrast to the claims on the radio by Francisco de Almeida in February 2002 that all outstanding debts were paid.)

During the visit he also promised that all outstanding issues (various debts, Project Director Salary and monies paid by Leon Kukkuk from his own funds towards staff salaries) will be solved by way of an audit that is already more than a year in arrears. He indicated that the audit will happen in the first quarter of 2002.

Once more he reiterated the UNDP promise, that they have been making since the beginning of 2000, that they will re-implement the project, based on a proposal by Leon Kukkuk. This new project will employ the staff from the old project.

Most of the problems that this project is suffering at the moment are caused by this promise, that UNDP had neither made any steps to achieve or had demonstrated any capacity to achieve. Circumstances are already bypassing UNDP. Leon Kukkuk, with the Provincial Government of Huambo, has already planned a new project. This project is partially financed, authorised and ready for implementation. This proposal was made by Leon Kukkuk in his private capacity with no contribution whatsoever by UNDP, in spite of their resources. UNDP still does not have the capacity to solve problems of the last four years. Angolans are already looking towards the future.

At the end of the second week of April 2002 there was still no indication of the audit that UNDP have been avoiding for more than a year now.
What is the motivation for this reluctance to have an audit?

The audit would not only have resolved the financial mismanagement of the project but would also have clarified the role of Leon Kukkuk in the project.
In the absence of this audit, by way of an e-mail on 04 April 2002, Francisco de Almeida was asked to make available all the documentation in support of his claim that Leon Kukkuk is the only person responsible for the problems of the project.

Until the date of this letter no response had been received.

The reality is that no such documents exist. On the contrary there is a wealth of documents where UNDP were advised about the project problems and UNDP simply never bothered to respond.

At the beginning of August 2001 all documents related to the project were sent to a lawyer. These are the conclusions:

· In 1996 UNDP had planned, directed and financed the project through its Economic Unit without complying with any of its internal rules or general United Nations policies regarding the type of policies that can be implemented. In addition it did not respect any of the rules regarding their agreement with the government or paid any attention to the opinions of government representatives.
· The implementation of the project was in practice illegal. UNDP treated the advice of the Project Director and Government representatives, over more than two years, to resolve the weaknesses of the project, constantly with disrespect, dishonesty and incompetence.
· UNDP did not follow their own rules for evaluation and monitoring and maintained no control over how project funds were being spent.
· They promised, and continue to promise, a new project without having the capacity to realise this promise. They have demonstrated neither the inclination nor the capacity to comply with the financial implications of this promise.
· Circumstances indicate that there is not a single person at UNDP that knows what problems they are creating for themselves or how it must be resolved.

These documents are available. Along with other documents, also available, it indicates that this project is not a special case, but a typical UNDP project.

We may conclude that in more than four years that we have been involved with UNDP we had never been treated with dignity or respect. They cannot even respond to basic questions. The probability that UNDP will resolve their own problems, which they had created, in good faith and with capacity is highly unlikely. For this reason it was decided that it would be more constructive to treat this issue through a legal process. During this process we shall return to the questions asked in the letter of 04 December 2001, amongst others.


Huambo, Angola aos 15 de Abril de 2002.


Amós David Vassouvava
António José Ernesto Camboco
Carlos Alberto Gomes
Deolindo Manuel Dungula
Emanuel Isaías Jamba Chissingue
Leon Kukkuk
Maria Helena Malaquias N´hamba


Portuguese Version of Letters

Carta Aberta para Erick Eduardo de Mul, Representante Residente – Programa das Nações Unidas para o Desenvolvimento (PNUD), Angola

Estimado Senhor,

As ultimas semanas tivemos o privilegio de ler nos jornais e ouvir na radio as promessas do PNUD sobre os seus novos projectos que vão aliviar a pobreza em Angola.

Ao mesmo tempo o projecto Microform – ANG 96/B01 BL 2101 – financiado pelo PNUD e implementado no Huambo encontra-se ainda embrulhada e numa catástrofe sem precedência. Os impedimentos ligados a este projecto - falta de esclarecimento da autorização do Governo Angolano para implementar projecto, pobre planificação e fiscalização dos fundos, falta de avaliação e monitorização e uma nebulosidade de como e onde foram gastos cerca de um milhão de dólares americanos – que foram apresentados ao PNUD desde o inicio de 1999. Ate a data de elaboração desta carta não recebemos nenhuma resposta concreta do PNUD de como será resolvido este assunto.

O projecto encontrava-se caoticamente fechado desde Janeiro de 2001 com os salários de pessoal com atraso de sete meses e com uma variedade de compromissos financeiros não pagos. Os sucessos alcançados falharam por culpa do PNUD em decidir o futuro concreto do projecto.

Foi solicitada a realização de uma auditoria em Dezembro de 2000 e todos os documentos a motivar a mesma foram entregues ao auditor em Abril de 2001.

Não ha nenhuma resposta ainda. Uma carta datada de 16 de Novembro 2001, para Stephen Kinloch, funcionário do PNUD, a pedir esclarecimento sobre o progresso destes assuntos, principalmente os salários de sete meses que já estão mais de um ano em atraso, recebia em 26 de Novembro de 2001, uma resposta muita vaga com a seguinte nota:

‘Por rações fora do meu controlo não posso mais comunicar com você em nome do PNUD. Considera esta carta informal e não oficial.’

Agora estamos com as seguintes duvidas:

Se o PNUD não tem capacidade de apoiar pequenas necessidades de um projecto já com sucesso no terreno, e resolver os problemas de gestão deste projecto dentro de um prazo razoável, qual a capacidade que tem para aliviar a pobreza no país que é infinitamente mais complexo?
Se o PNUD não tem capacidade de controlar os fundos que disponibilizou, mesmo quando foi avisado desde inicio de 1999, que estes fundos não estavam a chegar ao projecto, qual a capacidade que tem em dirigir os futuros fundos para onde existam necessidades?
Se o PNUD não tem capacidade de tratar o pessoal que já esta a contribuir para aliviar a pobreza com honestidade, respeito e dignidade, qual a capacidade que tem em considerar aos inúmeros pobres com honestidade, respeito e dignidade e de acordo as suas esperanças?

Qual foi concretamente a contribuição de mais de 26 anos de presença do PNUD na comunidade Angolana? Quais são os mecanismos práticos e diferentes que o PNUD tem agora para garantir uma melhor contribuição no futuro?

Esperando uma resposta expediente, clara e factual.


Huambo, Angola aos 04 de Dezembro de 2001.


Leon Kukkuk
Ex-Director do Projecto
ANG 96/B01 BL 2101


Carta Aberta para Erick Eduard de Mul, Representante Residente – Programa das Nações Unidas para o Desenvolvimento (PNUD), Angola

Estimado Senhor,

Em Dezembro 2001 foi escrita uma carta aberta (anexada) que pedia esclarecimento do papel do PNUD em Angola. As perguntas foram bem simples, pois as organizações legais respondem normalmente a este tipo de perguntas em forma de rotina.
Também pensamos que temos direito de pedir respostas ao PNUD sobre as suas actividades e de receber respostas claras e honestas. O PNUD é uma organização publica, que depende para sua sobrevivência as doações voluntárias, portanto, do nosso dinheiro. Não é fora da razão sabermos o que o PNUD faz com isso.

Depois uma entrevista feita pelo Leon Kukkuk a radio Eclesia, o ex-director do Projecto mencionou a primeira carta, que o Francisco de Almeida respondeu pelo PNUD, também através do radio, no final de Janeiro 2002 e no inicio do Fevereiro 2002.

O Francisco de Almeida, Assistente do Representante Residente do PNUD em Angola para Advocacia, Parceiras e Mobilização de Recursos, não respondeu as perguntas que foram feitas. Em vez disso, reclamava que a única pessoa responsável pelos problemas do projecto (Microform- Huambo ANG 96/B01- BL2101) é o Leon Kukkuk, como Coordenador do Projecto no Huambo.

Ele também visitou Huambo ao dia 28 de Janeiro de 2002 para pagar a cerca de U$D 33 000.00 dos salários em atraso que fazem parte de cerca de U$D 100 000.00 de compromissos financeiros que nos estamos a atribuir directamente a pura incompetência do PNUD (contrario das reclamações feitas pelo Francisco de Almeida no radio em Fevereiro 2002 que foram pagos todas as dividas.)

Durante a visita ele também prometeu que serão resolvidos outros assuntos ainda pendentes (varias dividas, salário do Director do Projecto e a contribuição no pagamento dos salários do pessoal feita com fundos privados do Leon Kukkuk) através duma auditoria que está já mais de um ano em atraso. Ele indicava que a auditoria pode contecer no primeiro trimestre do ano 2002.

Reiteram também a promessa do PNUD, de que deles já estão a fazer desde inicio do ano 2000, que vão reiniciar o projecto baseado na proposta elaborado pelo Leon Kukkuk. Este novo projecto vai empregar os funcionários do projecto anterior.

A maioria dos problemas que o projecto sofre actualmente foi criada por causa desta mesma promessa, pela qual o PNUD não deu nenhum passo para o alcançar, nem demonstrou capacidade para alcançar. As circunstancias estão a ultrapassar o PNUD. O Leon Kukkuk, em conjunto com o Governo da Província do Huambo, já tem elaborado um novo projecto. Este projecto encontra-se parcialmente financiado, autorizado e pronto para implementação. Esta proposta esta criada pelo Leon Kukkuk na sua própria capacidade enquanto o PNUD com todos os seus recursos não contribuiu em nada. O PNUD encontra-se ainda com incapacidade de resolver os assuntos de quatro anos atras. Os Angolanos já estão a olhar para o futuro.

No fim da segunda semana de Abril de 2002 não existia nenhuma indicação sobre a auditoria que o PNUD já esta a fugir por mais de um ano.
Qual é o motivo para esta relutância de realizar uma auditoria?

A auditoria, não só resolvia os assuntos financeiros do projecto também clarificaria o papel do Leon Kukkuk no Projecto.
Na ausência desta auditoria, foi pedido, através de um correio electrónico datado de 04 de Abril de 2002, e dirigido ao Francisco de Almeida para disponibilizar todos os documentos que prova a sua reclamação que o Leon Kukkuk é a única pessoa responsável pelos problemas do projecto.

Ate a data desta carta não foi recebida nenhuma resposta.

A realidade é que este tipo de documentos não existe. Antes pelo contrario existe bastantes documentos que atestam que PNUD foi avisado sobre os problemas do projecto e que estes (PNUD) simplesmente nunca responderam.

No inicio do Agosto de 2001, todos os documentos do projecto foram enviados para um advogado. As conclusões tomadas são as seguintes:

O PNUD tinha planificado, dirigido e financiado o projecto através da sua Unidade Económica em 1996 sem cumprir com as suas regras internas ou com as políticas gerais das Nações Unidas sobre os tipos de projecto que pretende implementar. Adicionalmente, não respeitava as regras do seu acordo com o Governo Angolano nem se importava com as opiniões dos Representantes do Governo.
Na pratica a implementação do projecto era ilegal. O PNUD tratava os avisos feitos pelo Director do Projecto e os Representantes do Governo ao longo de mais de dois anos, para corrigir as fraquezas do projecto, constantemente com desrespeito, desonestidade e incompetência.
O PNUD não cumpria com as regras de avaliação ou monitorização do projecto e não controlava como estavam a ser gasto os fundos do projecto.
Prometia, e continuava a prometer, um novo projecto sem a capacidade de realizar estas promessas. As consequências financeiras destas promessas eles não demonstravam nem inclinação nem capacidade de cumprir.
As circunstancias indicam que não ha nenhuma pessoa no PNUD que saiba qual exactamente são os problemas que deles criaram e nem como deve ser resolvido.

Estes documentos estão disponíveis. Em conjunto com outros documentos, também disponíveis, indica que este projecto não e um caso especial, mas só um projecto típico do PNUD.

Podemos concluir que em mais de quatro anos que estamos envolvidos com o PNUD, nunca fomos tratados com honestidade e respeito. Eles nem podem responder a perguntas básicas. Não é muito provável a possibilidade do PNUD em resolver os problemas, que deles próprios criaram, pela sua boa fé e capacidade. Por este razão foi decido que será mais construtivo tratar este assunto através dum processo jurídico. Ao longo deste processo voltaremos a pedir respostas as perguntas da carta de 04 de Dezembro de 2001, entre outras.

Huambo, Angola aos 15 de Abril de 2002.

Amós David Vassouvava
António José Ernesto Camboco
Carlos Alberto Gomes
Deolindo Manuel Dungula
Emanuel Isaías Jamba Chissingue
Leon Kukkuk
Maria Helena Malaquias N´hamba

How The UN System – In Collaboration With Private Business – Contributes Towards Development And The Reduction Of Poverty

The following letter was written on behalf of ordinary people who find themselves on the receiving end of the efforts of the UN to improve the lives of their community.
These are people from Huambo, Angola who have suffered through more than 30 years of war, watched their city destroyed, agricultural and industrial production reduced to almost nothing and schools, health and social services disappear. They have been bombed, shot at, massacred, mutilated and displaced from their land and homes. These are arguably some of the poorest and most disadvantaged people in the world.
It aims to outline the circumstances of a project that was designed and planned by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Luanda, Angola, to be implemented by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) through a subcontract with a private South African company RUTEC (specialists in Micro Enterprise development (rutec@iafrica.com)).
If all of this sounds very complicated, it is not nearly as complex as the subsequent consequences of this cumbersome agreement, caused by greed, corruption, mismanagement and unbelievable levels of incompetence.

It is our belief that some UN practices constitute a violation of fundamental human rights. These violations are either committed or condoned by the United Nations System, our so-called moral guardians. These events represent only one incidence, but far from being an exception, it is in all probability fairly representative of how the United Nations operate.

Background

Soon after the Lusaka Protocol at the end of 1994 (the peace agreement between the Angolan Government and the rebel forces UNITA) UNDP organised and co-ordinated a meeting in Brussels, Belgium to discuss the reconstruction of Angola. Both Jose Eduardo dos Santos, the Angolan President, and Jonas Savimbi, leader of UNITA, was present at what became known as the Brussels Round Table, as was all major donors and interested parties. The outcome of the meeting was the Community Reconstruction Programme (CRP) a sort of Marshall Plan for Angola. The International Community pledged about U$D 1.00 Billion for this programme for which a Trust Fund was set up, to be administered by UNDP. The CRP never became fully functional and none of its structures were ever fully put in place. Part of the reasons for this was the unstable and deteriorating security situation, mostly because of UNITA’s non-adherence to the Lusaka Protocol. Also, only about U$D 100.00 million of the pledged amount was ever received. Most donors preferred to channel their funding through NGO’s and grassroots organisations.

Sometime, probably late in 1995, the Economics Unit of UNDP, produced a Project Document (PD) for a ‘Community Production Centre in Huambo’. Apparently based on similar ILO projects and adapted in-house, it proposed the establishment of a Production Centre in Huambo where selected beneficiaries will receive training in Micro Enterprises and upon successful completion of the course a relevant kit subsidised by the project at 95% of its actual value. Beneficiaries will be demobilised soldiers, women heads of families, displaced and other vulnerable groups.
It is in general a sound idea that was well elaborated and that contained all the usual safeguards for monitoring and evaluation as is required by the UN. Cost efficiency and sustainability were considered and possible solutions proposed.
Carlos Bessa Victor, employed by Equator Bank, and at the time fairly influential within UNDP, seems to be the motivation force behind the idea.
Initially conceived as a freestanding project, it was to be executed by UNOPS with RUTEC as a subcontractor. Exactly how RUTEC became involved is not known.

There are no evidence to indicate that the contract has been put to tender, as is required under UN rules for services that exceeds U$D 50 000.00.

In January 1996 the Director of RUTEC, John Dommett, and his wife, conducted what they called a feasibility study in Huambo. Their subsequent report mentions that since they were not able to accurately assess the needs in Huambo they based their conclusions on the needs of a similar sized city in South Africa. The model proposed was an exact copy of the model as is found in the RUTEC Operations Manual and throughout the subsequent discussions over the next two years no alterations were made to this model.
There is no city in South Africa that even nearly approximates the reality of Huambo, Angola, and what was proposed was largely irrelevant for that city.
Huambo has an enclave economy that depends heavily on imports in spite of high agricultural potential. It has no industry, few services, no reliable supply of electricity and is virtually under siege with access only by air or in occasional convoys, protected by the military.
Unemployment runs at about 80 – 90%. Per capita income is much lower than the U$D 416.00 usually quoted for Angola. It is probably around U$D 70.00.
Twenty-three Micro Enterprise opportunities were proposed. Almost all of these were not possible for a variety of reasons: there were no suitable raw materials, it depended on formal industry that do not exist in Huambo, it relied on energy (electricity, gas, petrol or diesel) which is not freely available in Huambo, the product is unknown in Angola, the equipment would be too expensive or would not be able to be maintained, etc.
The PD, under various project codes (ANG 96/001, ANG 96/003, ANG 96/005, ANG 96/003/01/31) seems to have been circulated for the next two years looking for funding. Budgets for the project varied between a little more than U$D 500 000.00 to almost U$D 1 million. Possible donors included the Government of Italy, Equator Bank and Coca-Cola.
As this PD was doing its rounds, various questions were being asked within UNDP and UNOPS as to what RUTEC can offer.
The RUTEC proposal never altered. The same idea was presented for whatever amount of funding appeared possible at the time.

A committee meeting held on 18 March 1997, chaired by John Ohiorheneun and attended by Ibrahima Djibo, Leo Merores and Jessie Byron, raised, amongst others, the following issues:
The description of services to be undertaken by RUTEC need to be more explicit.
Justification is required for choosing RUTEC. It is most important to provide some kind of assessment. More details need to be given vis-à-vis RUTEC’s involvement in establishing CPCs. What precisely did they do? How well their performance was?
There was a question on the Due Process being followed in regards of sub-contracting. It is not clear at what point can the Bureau ask for a waiver and if some request does not have to go to the Committee on sub-contract beyond certain amount.
The meeting also felt that one needs to have an idea on the amount of subcontracting involved.
In conclusion, the committee felt that RUTEC seems qualified for the job. Nevertheless, for transparency purposes, all the questions about their work need to be fully answered. Furthermore, a clearer and better justified TOR is needed, placing greater emphasis on the services to be provided by RUTEC. The meeting suggested that the TOR be redrafted and for all recommendations made be incorporated in the new document.’

There is no evidence to suggest that these recommendations were complied to.

A letter dated 27 March 1997 to Bernard Ntegeye, Resident Representative – UNDP Angola from Solomon Akpata, Chief, Division II, Regional Bureau for Africa – UNDP New York, requests the hiring of consultants to consider the ‘waiver request for RUTEC to be awarded subcontract of components of the above project (ANG 96/003 – Community Production Centre in Huambo), which is executed by UNOPS.’
Revised Terms of References (TOR’s) are requested for forwarding to the committee.

There are no revised TOR’s.

A Fax dated 05 September 1997 from Dimitri Samaras (DimitriS@unops.org), Officer in Charge, Africa Division UNOPS New York to Bernard Ntgeye, RR UNDP Angola:

‘We would like to explain that we are not trying to be difficult but RUTEC has repeatedly resisted answering our questions in a straightforward way. …. RUTEC has made it extremely difficult for us to evaluate the value of the contract because they have continuously failed to provide a breakdown of the activities and their related costs. In addition we have explained to them repeatedly that we cannot give them an advance payment equal to over 90% of the contract value.’

At the same time the Provincial Government in Huambo was making repeated requests to Pierre Marie Achy, International Advisor for the CRP in Huambo, about when the project will be implemented. Pierre Marie Achy stated that continued delay in the implementation of this project is causing embarrassment to UNDP.

By all appearances, sometime between November 1997 and February 1998, UNDP instructed UNOPS to start operationalising the project.
Normally for this to happen a Project Document need to be signed by the Government, the implementing agency (UNOPS in this case) and UNDP.

No such document has been found to date.

On 20 February 1998, UNOPS and RUTEC signed contract no. C-971794 ‘ANG 96/003 – Community Production Centre Huambo, Angola’.

The ‘Statement of Work’ in this contract is exactly what RUTEC offered in January 1996 in spite of the fact that its quality had been questioned for almost two years.
The contract makes no reference to any Project Document and no specific, result-oriented goals are set to determine payments.
A total of fifteen milestones are set. The first five deals with licensing fees and the physical establishment of a centre in Huambo, delivery of vehicles and equipment. The remainder simply states ‘Management of Centre for Two Months’ for which U$D 57 126.00 in each instance will be paid.
The total value of the contract is U$D 1 538 201.00.
The contract is for an initial pilot phase of 18 months to end 31 May 2000.
Anticipating an earlier starting date, RUTEC requested an amendment to the contract and on 11 June 1998 signed this, which brought the termination forward to 31 January 2000 based on a starting date of September 1998.

RUTEC was now ready to start doing their thing. What this could possibly be, they are yet to tell.

It does not appear that funding for this project had been finalised at this stage.

On 26 March 1998, Michel Balima (michel.balima@undp.org) Senior Deputy Resident Representative – Projects (SDDR-P) UNDP Luanda, faxed Dimitri Samaras in New York:

‘Reference to your PS 101 regarding prodoc for RUTEC. Please note that RUTEC, though conceived initially as a stand-alone project, was made an integral part of the ANG 96/100 Community Rehabilitation Project. It is a subcontract to be financed from the output budget ANG 96/B01 budget line 2101 – Trust Fund for the CRP.’

In order for projects to be implemented under the CRP, they need to be reviewed and authorised by a Local Project Appraisal Committee (LPAC). This consists of representatives of the Government, the CRP and UNDP.

There is no signed documentation to indicate that this was ever done.

The National Director for the CRP, Dr Joao Ferreira has consistently claimed that CRP authorisation had never been given for this project. His stated reasons is that the project was too expensive for what was being offered and that it would rely on inputs from the outside instead of on local initiatives.

There is no documentation available to show that CRP authorisation had been sought or given.

During the course of 1998, UNDP made two transfers from the Trust Fund to UNOPS, totalling U$D 1 645 116.00. UNOPS retained 10% of this amount as Administrative and Overhead Support (AOS), an amount of U$D 164 511.00.

In The Beginning – Setting Up The Project

Towards the end of May 1998 John Dommett, the RUTEC Director, went to Huambo to start operationalising the project.
On 28 May 1998 he and Pierre Marie Achy interviewed Leon Kukkuk who was subsequently employed as Project Manager. He was given a copy of the contract with UNOPS as an explanation for what the project should do. Since this left him none the wiser, John Dommett explained that the project would consist of a training and production centre for Micro Enterprises. Upon completion of a two week course trainees would have the opportunity to buy a kit at its full value. Kits will be that equipment produced by RUTEC in their factory in Johannesburg, South Africa. Beneficiaries will include anybody that can afford to pay for the kit.

Although sceptical of this explanation, Leon Kukkuk felt that it to be a misunderstanding easily resolved through reference to the Project Document, which he determined to obtain from UNOPS.

Surely the UN system was not going to pay a private company to turn a huge profit in one of the poorest regions of the world?

The Provincial Government had made available an abandoned factory that needed to be cleaned and rehabilitated. It was the intention to work from tents that was to be pitched within the walls of the building. Extensive rehabilitation work was required in order to achieve this.

On 06 June 1998, Leon Kukkuk travelled to Johannesburg, South Africa, where RUTEC is based. Considering that RUTEC had been awarded the contract, without tendering for it, based on their experience on similar projects in South Africa, Leon Kukkuk requested information regarding their administrative and accounting procedures, reporting procedures, sample job descriptions, standard formats, etc. This is, in his opinion, essential for the smooth management of any project.

RUTEC had no such information.

All the administrative, accounting and logistical systems required for the running of a project was eventually put in place by Leon Kukkuk, with no input from RUTEC whatsoever.

On 13 June 1998 in a meeting with Michele Balima at UNDP in Luanda, Leon Kukkuk asked for, and was promised a copy of the Project Document.

He will eventually receive this on 19 September 2000.

From 15 June 1998, rehabilitation work started on the building. It was expected that a set-up phase, which would include rehabilitation of a building, importing all equipment, vehicles, etc, staff training and preparation of educational material, would last four months.
In Huambo fifty-five temporary workers were employed to start rehabilitation of the building. Several companies were sub-contracted to provide to provide various items.

Throughout the month of June 1998 more than 250 job applications were processed and interviews held. In the last week of June 1998 a Centre Manager, a Counsellor and four Trainers and various support staff signed an initial three-month contract that included Terms and Conditions and a Job Description.

At the end of June 1998 John Dommett went to Huambo to approve these appointments. In a meeting with staff he told them that their primary function would be to run a shop that has to sell as much equipment and raw materials as possible.

That was the last that was seen of RUTEC in Huambo for nineteen months.

The Counsellor and four Trainers went for two months training in Johannesburg on 10 July 1998. Leon Kukkuk made all their travel arrangements.

At this stage he had discovered that it is almost impossible to get any funds from RUTEC. The absence of this was causing immense difficulties for him, as was the fact that neither UNDP nor UNOPS assumed responsibility for organising his visa as is specified in the contract. He was to remain without legal documents until 15 March 2000.

Requesting funds in order to pay staff an advance on their salaries before travelling, Leon Kukkuk was told that this would not be possible since RUTEC has nobody with the capacity to travel in Angola. Staff will be given an advance on their salaries upon arrival in Johannesburg.

At the end of July 1998, Leon Kukkuk and Carlos Alberto Gomes, the Centre Manager, travelled to Johannesburg.
Carlos Gomes was supposed to receive a two-week Management Training course. He did not receive this. Neither of them did any substantive work that could be considered as contributing towards the establishment of a centre in Huambo. This two-week visit was considered by them to be a waste of their time.
In Johannesburg, staff were not provided with accommodation and food as was promised, but only accommodation. They also had not been paid any salary advances as had been promised. This meant, in effect, that they had to survive for two weeks on tea and biscuits that was provided on their course.

During discussions at RUTEC to have the staff salary advances paid, Leon Kukkuk was told by John Dommett that the staff, in line with similar practices in South Africa, will only be paid a commission on student fees and equipment sold. When it was pointed out to him that the project would then have to generate U$D 3 million in 18 months in order to cover salaries, he relented. Nevertheless, in October 1999, Leon Kukkuk received documents requesting him to implement this system. It was taken to Huambo and filed. In effect what RUTEC wanted to achieve was to make as much profit as possible out of Huambo, in addition to the U$D1.5 Million that they were already receiving from UNOPS – all at virtually no cost to themselves.

Leon Kukkuk prepared a detailed cash-flow projection that forecasted U$D 50 000.00 for construction and set-up, and minimum running costs of U$D 12 500.00 per month.

There is no reason to believe that anybody at RUTEC ever paid any attention to this document.
A request by Leon Kukkuk to open a bank account in Angola was turned down on the argument that this would be too expensive to run.

It was not clear who at RUTEC would be responsible for the project. It was also not clear which staff had appropriate skills and experience to be responsible for such a project or to contribute towards it in any way.
Leon Kukkuk, in a meeting with RUTEC staff in Johannesburg, mentioned that there would need to be a substantial improvement in RUTEC’s competence if they would want to successfully manage a project in Huambo, Angola.
Improvements in RUTEC’s performance consisted of requesting Leon Kukkuk, at the end of August 1998, to travel from Huambo to Johannesburg to arrange visa extensions for the Angolan staff that was undergoing training there.

Their explanation for this was the fact that they do not have staff that can do this.

On two occasions Leon Kukkuk was also asked to travel to Johannesburg to oversee the logistics of eventually sending about four container loads of equipment to Huambo.

Once again, their explanation for this was the fact that they do not have staff that can do this.

At this time Leon Kukkuk was overseeing the rehabilitation and construction work in Huambo, logistics in Johannesburg and trying to find out what the management arrangements for the project are in Luanda. He had no legal documents and was receiving virtually no support from UNOPS on the argument that this is a UNDP project and no support from UNDP on the argument that it is a UNOPS project.

Contact with UNOPS throughout 1998 was considered informal since Lawrence Doczy, their Representative in Luanda, was ill for most of the time and outside of Angola. Leon Kukkuk never had any opportunity to talk to him.
Obtaining funds from RUTEC proved to be an impossible task that was never resolved. After requesting funds for more than a month and explaining that the lack of such is becoming acute, Leon Kukkuk, on 13 September 1998, was asked by RUTEC to travel to Johannesburg to collect it. His explanation that this would be extremely difficult considering the construction work in Huambo, was dismissed as unimportant. Also the staff were scheduled to return to Luanda on 20 September 1998. Accommodation in Luanda, as well as transport to Huambo needed to be arranged for them. This would not be possible without funds. RUTEC maintained that they do not have staff that can travel in Angola. They were also not prepared to give any of the Angolan staff members any funds to take to Angola with them.

In the face of this, Leon Kukkuk, without funds or any support, travelled to Johannesburg by arranging a lift with the UN Peacekeepers (MONUA), arriving there on the morning of 15 September 1998. On 17 September 1998 he returned with MONUA to Luanda. In two days in Johannesburg he spoken to John Dommett for ten minutes before leaving for the airport, and had received no funds.

On 19 September 1998, Leon Kukkuk wrote and faxed a very strongly worded letter to RUTEC complaining about their lack of competence even in basic administrative matters, lack of support to the project and extreme reluctance to provide funds for work that was already under way. A copy of this letter was left with Michel Balima requesting guidance as to how these issues should be resolved.

No substantive responses were received from either RUTEC or UNDP. Mike Klosterman, Operations Manager for RUTEC, did write a letter in which he mentioned that RUTEC is attempting to implement a project in an area where they have no experience but offered no specific solutions to specific issues raised. By December 1998 his short-lived career at RUTEC had come to an end.

On 20 September 1998 the Angolan staff returned from their two-month training course. With them they brought U$D 4 700.00 of the U$D 25 000.00 that was requested.

At a meeting with them on 21 September 1998, they claimed that their impression of RUTEC in general is negative and that they have very little confidence that RUTEC can in any way manage a project in Huambo. Leon Kukkuk was asked to take up these issues and resolve them before the project is implemented.

All through 1998 the security situation in Angola was deteriorating. In the beginning of September 1998 UNOPS instructed RUTEC to suspend all project activities that would require capital investment in Huambo. Activities that do not require capital investment and activities outside of Huambo (such as staff training and preparation of training material) can however continue.

At the end of October 1998 UNOPS had given a verbal agreement that the project can continue. They promised that this will confirmed in writing.

At this time most preparations had been made in Huambo. Equipment in Johannesburg was packed and ready to be taken by road to Kaáma, Southern Angola, from there to be flown to Huambo.
Leon Kukkuk and Carlos Gomes drove two vehicles, in a MONUA convoy, from Luanda to Huambo. It arrived in Huambo on 05 November 1998 in what was to be the last UN convoy and the last convoy for more than a year.
On 04 December 1998 RUTEC received written instructions from UNOPS to proceed with the project, showing the logic of making decisions from New York.

On 05 December 1998 yet another full-scale war broke out in Angola.

Wars, almost by definition, are times of insecurity and uncertainty. Considering the advanced state of planning and the go-ahead from UNOPS, Leon Kukkuk stayed in daily contact with John Dommett from RUTEC, Michel Balima from UNDP and Jose Salema from UNOPS, Luanda seeking guidance on the best course of action. Naturally, they themselves were very uncertain regarding how to proceed but mentioned that such a decision would probably best made on the ground.

Logically, especially in the face of the new reality, the project needed to be extensively rethought. The remainder of the funds, in excess of U$D1.2 million at this stage, could probably have been spent much more usefully on the humanitarian disaster that was about to descend upon Huambo and Angola.

This agreement did not allow for that sort of flexibility.

Leon Kukkuk, perhaps somewhat irresponsibly, decided to go ahead. To achieve this, he asked for, and subsequently received, the full support of the Angolan staff.

From 09 to 12 December 1998, four planeloads of equipment were received.

Tens of thousands of people descended upon the airport trying to get on any flight out of Huambo. The airport, and, eventually a one-kilometre perimeter around it, was heavily guarded by police and military. Huambo was bombarded and attacked on several occasions. By the beginning of January 1999, two UN planes had been shot down outside the city. Torrential rain fell almost daily.

On 05 January 1999, MONUA, the UN peacekeepers left in a convoy for Benguela, on the coast.

By 25 January 1999, the Centre was set up and ready to start working.

None of the management issues and misgivings that had been generated in the previous months had been resolved.

Working On A Development Project In A War

One of the first and the greatest victories that the project achieved, and one, which, to a large extent, carried it through all its subsequent calamities, was psychological. Even though it had many ups and downs and even though it achieved some worthwhile results, it was never forgotten how it set up and started operating at a time when Angola was plunged into a devastating war for the second time in less than a decade.

None of the staff had any experience in Micro Enterprises. Considering the lack of technical support from RUTEC and the fact that the training received in Johannesburg was considered largely irrelevant for Angola, everything had to be learned from first principles.

By the end of March 1999 Leon Kukkuk travelled to Luanda. It was his intention to meet with John Dommett (RUTEC), Michel Balima (UNDP) and Jose Salema (New Representative UNOPS, Luanda) in Luanda to discuss the project.
Co-incidentally Michel Balima and apparently Dimitri Samaras (UNOPS, New York) travelled to Huambo on 31 March 1999 to visit the project. Although Michel Balima seemed pleased with what he saw, there are no mission reports available regarding this visit.
In Luanda Leon Kukkuk, Jose Salema and John Dommett met on the same day.
John Dommett, by this time had sold a 75% share of RUTEC to The Land Development Bank and the National Mineworkers Union in South Africa for about U$D 3 million.

The following issues were raised on this day:

The tents are proving to be uncomfortably hot, wet and unhealthy. Could funds be made available to replace these with structures using local technology? Alternatively, existing centres can be used. This would spread the geographical impact of the project.

Response: Using tents for projects are highly profitable to RUTEC. An alternative should not be considered. New centres can only be used if relevant contracts are signed with UNOPS.

Most of the equipment supplied by RUTEC is inappropriate. A lot of it is of poor quality and arrived broken. This, as well as the high expense (U$D1 000.00 – U$D 5 000.00 per kit) of the equipment would make it highly improbable that any of the beneficiaries could afford it or that any finance would be able to be raised for it. Would it be possible to produce equipment locally?

Response: Local production of equipment cannot be considered. If, however, anybody would be prepared to sign a licensing agreement, equipment can be assembled in Huambo. (The equipment that was produced by RUTEC was all either within the public domain or copyright violations. Evidence also exists that suggests that RUTEC deliberately sent equipment to Huambo that was broken in order to cut costs.)

Lack of funding was discussed but never resolved.

None of the management arrangements was discussed. Jose Salema felt that this is an issue that should be raised with UNDP. The termination date needed to be determined and agreed upon. This should have been 30 June 2000. It was never formally agreed.

In the beginning of April 1999, Leon Kukkuk met with Teresa Felix (teresa.felix@undp.org) the new National Programme Officer at UNDP, Luanda.
She informed him that he needs to work closer with the CRP and also requested monthly reports containing a summary of activities and the accounts. This was subsequently sent on a monthly basis. There is no evidence to suggest that anybody ever read them.

Back in Huambo Leon Kukkuk met with the Provincial Governor, Paolo Kassoma and the Director of Planning, Henrigue Barbosa. It was felt that the project, as it stands, would follow the same path as other projects by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and UNOPS, where lots of money is spent on training but that no new employment is created.
It was therefore decided that the centre will provide training and support for new businesses as well as logistical support and counselling during at least during the first year. Local production will be encouraged and equipment, as far as possible, will be produced locally.
A local Board of Directors was created to oversee the centre.
The Governor changed the name of the centre to ‘The Centre for the Promotion and Training of Micro Industries in Huambo – MICROFORM’.
It had now effectively become a local initiative, supported by the Provincial Government and to a very large extent by Development Workshop, a Canadian NGO with many years of experience in Angola.
The real owners of the project were now effectively, through their own lack of interest and competence, excluded from the project.
Leon Kukkuk was charged, yet again, to approach UNDP, UNOPS and RUTEC to improve the management arrangements, specifically evaluation and monitoring, as well as ensuring meaningful technical assistance and funding for the centre. He felt that this could best be done by getting all the partners together.

RUTEC was going through its own difficulties, which resulted in a spectacular turnover of senior staff. UNDP, as always, were preoccupied with the justification for their existence, which would see the arrival of Zoraida Mesa, the new Resident Representative, at the end of 1999, charged with putting UNDP back on track again. She would last a little bit more than a year. UNOPS stumbled along, did not feel that this project was their responsibility, and eventually left Angola at the end of January 2000, hopefully for good.

In the beginning of October 1999, after a discussion with Buswe Yafele, the new CEO for RUTEC, Leon Kukkuk started planning a mission to Huambo. These are things that should be organised by UNDP, as a matter of routine, but UNDP staff rarely leave their offices in Luanda and then seldom spend more than a few hours in the interior of the country.

On 14 January 2000 Leon Kukkuk met with Joao Ferreira, the CRP Director, in his office in Luanda. Dr Ferreira reiterated his opposition to the project as it was originally planned. In the light of the results it was achieving in Huambo, however, it was imperative that it be evaluated and a decision made regarding its future. This was supposed to be done through a tripartite meeting to be organised by UNDP.

The mission took place on 31 March 2000 and consisted of Representatives of CRP, UNDP and RUTEC.
Buzwe Yafele (RUTEC) was primarily concerned with trying to sell 10 tons of wheat flour from South Africa to the centre. The centre was supposed to raise the funds for this. He did mention that the issues that the centre management was raising could be discussed once a guarantee has been received that the RUTEC contract will be extended.
Francisco de Almeida (fransisco.almeida@undp.org), Assistant Deputy Resident Representative, UNDP Luanda, asked several times why the centre appears to be so impoverished if sufficient funds had been made available for its management. He received no reply and did not pursue the issue.

On 03 April 2000 a meeting was held in Luanda. No conclusive results were obtained from this meeting. Somewhat rambling minutes were written in April 2001 in an effort to determine what was said at the time.

At the end of June 2000 the project should terminate but this date had not been determined officially. Some mention was made that a tripartite meeting and evaluation meeting will be held in May 2000 to determine the future of the project.
With less than three months to go it was imperative that a concrete decision be reached forthwith.

At the end of April 2000 the CRP issued a report that stated that the project will be evaluated with a view towards extension, and that a project along similar lines will be planned for Benguela, to be implemented by December 2000.

By the end of April 2000, Buswe Yafele had been dismissed from RUTEC and replaced by Boris Kamstra.

What did the project achieve?

This is one of the most difficult questions to answer. There is no information available from any objective and competent evaluation.
Any attempt at evaluating its activities must take into account the very complex management arrangements and a close look at how the funds were spent.
Apart from the centre in Huambo that had kept meticulous records, accounts are sketchy to say the least. More or less specific accounts are available. For the sake of clarity only a brief summary will be given:

Sometime in 1998 UNDP transferred an amount of U$D 1 645 116.00 from the Trust Fund to UNOPS.
UNOPS, as a matter of course, retained 10% of this amount as Administrative and Overhead Support: U$D 164 511.00.
Over a period of two years, from June 1998 to June 2000, UNOPS paid a total of U$D 1 505 521.00 to RUTEC in twenty instalments.

During the same period of time the Centre in Huambo had spent a total of U$D 235 152.00. This includes all construction, rehabilitation, management, international travel, local salaries and running costs and is equivalent to 15% of the total budget available.
Of this amount U$D 227 000.00 were provided by RUTEC and the balance paid by Leon Kukkuk, a total of U$D 8 152.00.
RUTEC also supplied equipment for the centre. Although their invoice for this does not stand up to scrutiny, it reflects an amount of U$D 285 000.00.

This means that an amount in the region of U$D 1 million, or two thirds of the funds available, need to be explained.

UNOPS had quite clearly paid this money to RUTEC.

What had RUTEC done with it?

A series of e-mails between Teresa Felix (UNDP) and Boris Kamstra (RUTEC) elicited the following responses:

24 February 2001:
‘I am afraid that this is information that I don’t have. I only joined Rutec at the end of this project and will have to find the relevant files to establish what was supplied at what cost. … To get further information will be difficult and not possible before at least Wednesday, as I will have to contact John Dommett who is in Portugal (I think).’

05 March 2001:
‘I have been going through the company records at the time of the project. The system used did not separate out the costings, as such it is very difficult to allocate some costs to the project and others not, especially not knowing the history of the project or which people were employed for this project.

I am, through some bank statements, able to find a few specific costs such as flights to and from Angola and payments for satellite phones. But this by no means gives us any clearer picture of what was spent on this project.

I am sorry I am unable to be more specific. Not having the information at hand and any idea of the history of the project makes it impossible for me to get the exact numbers.’

Throughout the project (June 1998 – June 2000) local staff salaries were paid two to three months in arrears, with the exception of November and December 1999, and then January 2000 when Leon Kukkuk paid salaries from his own resources.
Leon Kukkuk for the same period of employment (June 1998 – June 2000) received payments in March 1999, February 2000, April 2001 and June 2001. At the time of writing he remains uncertain if his salary is up to date or not.

Leaving this issue aside for the time being, it is obvious that the project need to be evaluated on two levels.

The first, the UNDP, UNOPS, RUTEC alliance, at a cost of more than U$D 1.5 million, is considered by us to be an absolute and spectacular failure that should not ever be repeated. We shall have a look at how UNDP proceeded to correct this error.

On a second level, one need to consider another project ‘MICROFORM’, to all intents and purposes a completely local initiative, and what it had managed to achieve with U$D 227 000.00.

Its achievements will be summarised very briefly:

· Several Micro Enterprise opportunities were developed from first principles, using local resources and technology. Lack of funds was the major constraint for expansion.
· Equipment, adapted to local realities and often of superior quality, were produced locally. Production was limited by lack of funds.
· New products or products that were previously imported, started appearing on the market. Lack of funds limited expansion.
· Approximately 250 small businesses created in two years. Approximately 500 people gained employment through indirect activities – raw material suppliers, sellers, transporters, etc.
· It was seen as the vehicle for the future development of Huambo that could benefit both urban and rural disadvantaged communities.

It was calculated that an efficient project, with more than a thousand enterprises created in one year can be done on a budget of U$D 350 000.00 per year. The arrangement with RUTEC was considered locally to be not only expensive but also detrimental to the project. With the amount of funds available, a local initiative could have assisted as much as 50 000 people directly and indirectly over a period of 4 years and have made a significant impact on the Province.

What about the future?

Although not officially confirmed, the pilot phase of the project would come to an end at the end of June 2000. At any event, it was likely that funds would run out at about that time.

A decision had to be made regarding its future. This is the responsibility of UNDP, as owner of the project.

Various options needed to be considered, taking into account to the wishes of the local community and the Provincial Government as well as donor interest and the availability of funding.
These options included:

· Full closure of the project.
· Continuation under the same terms.
· Continuation under new arrangements.

Each of these options would have consequences and associated costs that needed to be managed. A decision regarding vehicles and other assets can only be made by the UNDP Resident Representative based on recommendations of the UNDP Local Property Survey Board.
Staff needed to be informed, at least 3 months in advance, whether their contracts would be terminated or extended and the necessary remunerations made according to Angolan Labour Law.
In anticipation of this Leon Kukkuk requested a transfer from RUTEC for an amount of U$D 45 000.00 to pay the usual salary arrears and other debts. He received U$D 19 125.00 of this amount in the beginning of June 2000. A further request for U$D 25 000.00 resulted in the receipt of U$D 9 980.00 at the end of July. Contributing U$D 5 000.00 from his own resources he was then able to pay salaries until the end of July 2000, leaving about U$D 10 000.00 in unpaid bills and commitments.

The Provincial Government was putting a lot of pressure on Leon Kukkuk to find a solution. This meant that he was faced with all the responsibility but had no authority. In two years his efforts had shown no results, but as the RUTEC contract was coming to an end various options presented themselves.

With vague promises coming from UNDP that the project will be evaluated, it drifted into a state of limbo. Hoping for the best, the staff continued working without contracts or salaries. This was a project that had achieved many positive results under extremely difficult circumstances. Many donors demonstrated an interest in financing it, if its external problems could be solved. Nobody wanted to get involved in any ‘funny agreements with UNOPS and RUTEC.’ Although they shall remain anonymous for the time being, there is also a strong belief amongst certain people that UNDP involvement should be removed from the project: ‘that’s the kiss of death for any project’.

From about the end of April 2000, even more of Leon Kukkuk’s time was taken up, not with the job that he was employed to do, but to compensate, as an individual, for the shortcomings of organisations and companies like UNDP, UNOPS and RUTEC. A project, in which responsibility was supposed to be distributed over three legal entities now came to rest on the shoulders of a private individual.

For the sake of brevity, the machinations of these three organisations to avoid the consequences of their considerable shortcomings shall not be gone into. Neither shall their machinations to accept credit for the project’s successes be described in any great detail.

Ninety nine percent of correspondence, e-mail, telephone calls and conversations by Leon Kukkuk failed to elicit any response whatsoever.

Within this sea of indifference the following events can be summarised briefly:

MICROFORM: Motivated by vague promises from UNDP, the centre stumbled from one contingency plan to the next. Staff worked without contracts or salaries. Leon Kukkuk spent from 19 September 2000 – 10 October 2000 in Luanda but returned to Huambo without achieving any meaningful results. On 31 January 2001 the centre closed amidst considerable chaos and ill feeling. Before closing Leon Kukkuk attempted to obtain support from the Provincial Government and other NGO’s. Henrigue Barbosa (Director of Planning) said that this type of project could only be closed after an evaluation and authorisation from the Minister of Planning. Alberta Gomes (Huambo Representative ADRA, an Angolan NGO) and Carlos Figueiredo (Huambo Representative Development Workshop), both members of the board of Directors of MICROFORM, were vehemently opposed to such a closure.
It went ahead anyway.
The biggest problem was what to do with substantial amounts of equipment. These were divided into four categories:
1. Those that can be distributed to selected beneficiaries.
2. Those that can be distributed to the Ministry of Agriculture, Training and Research Centres and NGO’s.
3. Those that can be sold.
4. Those that can be stored pending possible future use.

Staff was paid as much as possible from the sale of equipment and told that if there is to be no movement regarding the project, the balance of equipment shall be sold by the end of February 2001.
On 11 February 2001 Leon Kukkuk flew by military flight to Luanda.

RUTEC: A small flurry of activity as they realized that their contract won’t be extended as a matter of routine. They could not understand why, if RUTEC had such a successful project in Huambo, wasn’t it being supported. They were told that RUTEC is not necessarily seen as part of the project in Huambo and should come up with a constructive proposal if they want to play a continuing role. This proposal should answer the question of how RUTEC involvement can contribute to the project as well as address the perception that their involvement to date has been both non-existent and very expensive.
Their response: ‘For the future of your project I do not know enough of what you require and how Rutec can assist in this to be able to put forward a coherent plan for the future.’
On 10 November 2000, whilst forwarding to Leon Kukkuk instructions from UNOPS to terminate the project: ‘ Please let me have any comments that you may have on it, and take whatever action you deem appropriate given that we will not be in a position to support you financially until a new agreement is worked out.’

UNOPS: UNOPS did not have any presence in Angola since January 2000. They made no handover of the project before leaving, presumably since they felt that it was not their project in the first place.
In a fax dated 01 November 2000 from Dimitri Samaras to Boris Kamstra, RUTEC is instructed to terminate the project immediately.
A note says: ‘In order to implement steps 3 and 4 above, UNOPS shall contact UNDP/CO to initiate our internal UN procedure for transfer of project equipment to the Government and request identification of the designated entity or ultimate beneficiary (ies); the official transfer shall take place upon a decision of the UN Resident Co-ordinator based on a recommendation of the UNDP Local Property Survey Board (LPSB).’

It is almost unnecessary to say that none of this was ever done. A lot of correspondence by Leon Kukkuk seeking clarity regarding the practical and logistical aspects of such a transfer remains unanswered.

On 15 May 2001 Leon Kukkuk spoke to Dimitri Samaras via telephone. Following is a copy of his notes on the conversation:
UNOPS to disburse project and not implement it.
Pierre Marie Achy to authorize payments, thereafter UNDP RR.
Did not get along with John Dommett, and almost canceled contract.
Is available to help find solutions.
Feels that UNDP approach is retaliatory but that new management might have a different approach.
RUTEC was a pre-selected contractor, did not follow the usual procedures.
UNOPS was brought into the project at the last moment and their role was never fully clarified.
When he tried to get hold of John Dommett to discuss solutions, he was told that this person was no longer at RUTEC and found that the new management had very little idea of the project.

UNDP: On 13 July 2000, Francisco de Almeida (UNDP) wrote an e-mail to Teresa Felix (UNDP):
‘Please have the note for the file on the meeting held further to our trip to Huambo with the RUTEC Director ready by Monday at the latest. This issue needs to be finalised prior to Mr Balima’s departure, scheduled for the 18th. So please give top priority to this issue to put our office on the safe side. By the way what is happening to Leon??
Please ask him to come to see us so we can discuss the future of the project in light of our current financial situation.’

Yet again no time or space will be wasted to say that this was not done.

On 22 October 2000, as part of the Country Review, the review team visited the project in Huambo and were informed of its difficulties. As a result of this Zoraida Mesa, the UNDP RR, wrote an undated memorandum to James Curry (james.curry@undp.org), Director, Office of Audit and Performance Review, who in turn on 14 January 2001 posed these questions to Bisrat Aklilu, Deputy Executive Director, UNOPS, New York. His response on 14 February 2001 demonstrates that UNOPS had lost whatever tenuous grasp they may ever have had on this project sometime late in 1998.

On 04 November 2000 Stan Nkwain (stan.nkwain@undp.org) Senior Deputy Resident Representative –Projects, UNDP, Luanda, visited Huambo and discussed the project with Leon Kukkuk. At the end of the day he returned to Luanda with some documents and a promise that a reply will be forthcoming within two weeks.

These documents have since disappeared and no reply had been given to date.

At the end of March 2001 Leon Kukkuk and Teresa Felix presented the project to Michel Falavigna (michel.falavigna@undp.org), Regional Programme Advisor, and UNDP, NEW YORK.

As is usual this is neither mentioned in his back-to-office report, neither has there been any feedback.

Leon Kukkuk was contracted under the CRP umbrella from 01 March 2001 to 30 June 2001 charged with the following:

· To prepare the relevant documentation for the auditors as motivation for a detailed evaluation and audit of the project.
· To prepare a Termination Report and inventory of equipment currently in Huambo
· To prepare a Draft Project Document for a possible follow-up project.

Preparing a work plan resulted in the following exchange:

Before approving this plan, could you clarify what you mean by "legal
closure" of the project?

Thanks.

Dear Mr Nkwain,

Thanks very much for your question, which I will try to clarify from my point of view.

Apart from beneficiaries and donors, which is an important priority, there are several partners that feel that they have a stake in the project. These are PRC, Provincial Government and of course UNOPS, UNDP and RUTEC.

In July 2000, when the contract with RUTEC was coming to an end, and we were not receiving any concrete instructions from UNOPS or UNDP, we were faced with three options:

Abandon the project.
Close the project and place everything in storage. (or hand it over to the government, who was asking for supporting documentation)
Continue as best we can pending a solution.

These options were presented to the local authorities who told me that options one and two would be illegal in terms of recognised procedure. (Remember that they want a continuation of the project and it is very difficult to find their support for anything other than that.)

When we did close down at the end of January 2001,I was once again told that this is considered to an illegal action on my part, since it was a decision made unilaterally, without any supporting documentation or instructions from the duly recognised authorities. I was told that these instructions should be based on decisions made between the owners of the project in Luanda and that the governor should be informed of this first. By not following this procedure I am opening myself up to actions that can be taken against me. (I was confined to my house for two days as a consequence of closing the project.)

In this context legal closure would then be:

Something that is not done by me unilaterally.
Addresses the considerable ill feeling that currently exists regarding the chaos and disorder under which this project functioned and closed down.
Based on documentation that reflects the decision of the owners of the project.
Informing the local authorities.

Since a lot of mistakes and profound decisions had already been made I think legal closure should also include some sort of damage control in order to regain credibility.

Once again all information available were presented to Bereket Sletzion (bereket.sletzion@undp.org) the UNDP auditor, who apparently about the middle of June 2001 informed his superiors that he feels an audit to be necessary pending an evaluation.

On 27 June 2001 Leon Kukkuk distributed the Draft Termination Report and Draft Project Proposal. The Draft Project Proposal was prepared in full consultation with the Provincial Government of Huambo, Development Workshop, ADRA and Swiss Co-operation and a copy was also sent to them for feedback. They urgently want to know what future possibilities exist for their own strategic planning.

The evaluation mission was held from 21 – 24 August 2001. No mission report is yet available but would be responded to once received. The most polite description of the mission is perhaps that it was a dismal failure resulting in the loss of whatever little credibility UNDP thought they might have had left.

Teresa Felix informed staff, that has already been waiting for more than a year for a response from UNDP that they have to wait until phase II of the project is operational, after which their salary arrears will be paid to them in small monthly increments. Responding to a question about when phase II will start she said that it won’t be for several months to a year. She was unaware of the content of the Project Document that she had received two months previously or even of the basic structure of a possible new project.

In 13 months no progress had been made in resolving any of the issues. Most of these issues were presented for the first time on 19 September 1998.

It is difficult not to come to the conclusion that UNDP is an arrogant and incompetent organisation obsessively concerned with its own internal dynamics. Staff, on all levels, had either forgotten or has never known what the objectives of UNDP is supposed to be.
This is having an immensely destructive effect on our lives, which is nowhere near resolved.

If the Angolan people are pinning their hopes on any assistance from UNDP in the reconstruction of their country, one can only advise that it is in vain.

Here are the questions we want answered:

UNDP

Did UNDP follow their own internal procedures and safeguards in the preparation of the Project Document with due consultation to their counterparts in the Angolan Government?
What is UNDP policy on projects with conditionality? What steps are taken to prevent these sorts of projects to be implemented by UNDP?
How did UNDP ensure that the contract that UNOPS signed with RUTEC conforms to the objectives as set out in a Project Document?
Did UNDP follow their own internal procedures for monitoring and evaluation, tri-partite reviews, timely and meaningful follow-up reports and in co-operation with their counterparts in the Angolan Government? Where are these reports?
Did UNDP liase with UNOPS, RUTEC, the Central and Provincial Government and other partners, to ensure that the end of the pilot phase are managed in a meaningful way, in a timely fashion and in accordance to their own internal procedures?
What steps do UNDP take to ensure that projects that originate from their office and are financed by them are implemented with due respect to the fundamental rights of its staff and beneficiaries according to the statutes of the United Nations system?

UNOPS

What steps were taken to ensure that the contract that they had signed with RUTEC conforms to specific and achievable objectives as set out in a project document and conform to the internal procedures put in place to ensure that these objectives are met?
What steps were taken to ensure that the training methodology of RUTEC is original (and not perhaps a copy of the ILO system) and that their equipment are original (and not perhaps within the public domain or copyright violations) before paying a licensing fee of U$D 250 000.00?
Justification of how the U$D 164 511.00 received as AOS had been spent on administration, ensuring compliance with the objectives of the project, with timely and meaningful mission reports and feedback to issues raised.
Do they have completion certificates that justifies the payment of U$D 1 505 521.00 in twenty instalments. If so, what was the qualification of this person(s) to ensure that the objectives of the project were being met to justify payment?
What steps was taken to ensure that the end of the pilot phase are managed in a meaningful way in accordance with the reality and the wishes of UNDP, UNOPS, RUTEC, the Central and Provincial Government and other partners, in a timely fashion and in accordance to their own internal procedures?
What steps do UNOPS take to ensure that projects that they are required to implement are implemented with due respect to the fundamental rights of its staff and beneficiaries according to the statutes of the United Nations system?

RUTEC

What happened to about U$D 1 million?
Was health and unemployment insurance arranged for the staff as was required by the contract? If not, how can this oversight be corrected.
Are any reports available that shows what technical assistance RUTEC had provided to the project, or in general terms shows what benefit RUTEC was project? Are these backed up by clear accounts?
What steps were taken to ensure that the end of the pilot phase are managed in a meaningful way in accordance with the reality and the wishes of UNDP, UNOPS, RUTEC, the Central and Provincial Government and other partners, and in a timely fashion?
What steps do RUTEC take to ensure that the Fundamental Rights of its staff and beneficiaries are protected?


Luanda and Huambo, Angola


15 September 2001

(This document has been prepared in preparation for action that we are taking against UNDP. The Provincial Government in Huambo, Angola has already started legal procedures against UNDP, UNOPS and RUTEC for non-payment of salaries, misappropriating funds and non compliance with promises that was made to them. We also have the support of the Central Government and are hoping to take this issue as far as possible to ensure that UNDP are not any longer in any position to harm peoples lives. Any advice and assistance will be highly appreciated.)


Portuguese Version:

Como o Sistema da ONU - Em colaboração com Negócio Privado - Contribui Para Desenvolvimento e a Redução da Pobreza

A carta seguinte foi escrita em nome de pessoas ordinárias que no fim se acham receptoras dos esforços da ONU para melhorar a vida da sua comunidade.
Estas pessoas são do Huambo, em Angola, pessoas que sofreram mais de 30 anos de guerra, que assistiram a sua cidade a ser destruída, produção agrícola e industrial reduzida a quase nada e que as escolas, saúdes e serviços sociais desaparecem. Eles foram bombardeados, mortos a tiro, massacrados, mutilados e deslocados das suas casas e das suas terras. Alguns deles são provavelmente mais pobres que a maioria das pessoas mais desvantajosas no mundo.
Esta carta tem como objectivo esboçar as circunstâncias de um projecto que foi projectado e planificado pelo Programa das Nações Unidas para o Desenvolvimento (PNUD) em Luanda, Angola, a ser implementado pelo Escritório das Nações Unidas para Serviços de Projecto (UNOPS) que subcontratou uma companhia privada sul africana RUTEC (os especialistas em Micro Empreendimento e desenvolvimento (rutec@iafrica. com)).
Se tudo isto soar muito complicado, quase não é tão complexo quanto as consequências subsequentes deste incomodo acordo, causado por ganância, corrupção, má gestão e níveis incríveis de incompetência.

É nossa convicção que algumas práticas de ONU constituem uma violação de direitos humanos fundamentais. Estas violações ou estão comprometidas ou perdoadas pelo Sistema das Nações Unidas, denominado nosso guardião moral. Este relato representa só uma incidência, muito longe de ser uma excepção, é com toda a probabilidade bastante representativa de como as Nações Unidas operam.

O INICIO

Após o Protocolo de Lusaka, no final de 1994 (o acordo de paz entre o Governo angolano e a força rebelde UNITA) o PNUD organizou e coordenou uma reunião em Bruxelas, Bélgica para discutir a reconstrução de Angola. Ambos, José Eduardo dos Santos, o Presidente angolano, e Jonas Savimbi, líder de UNITA, estavam presentes ao que foi conhecido como a Mesa-redonda de Bruxelas, onde estava os principais doadores e os partidos interessados. O resultado da reunião era o Programa de Reconstrução Comunitária (PRC) um tipo de Plano Marshall para Angola. A Comunidade Internacional prometeu U$D 1 Bilhão para este programa, para o qual foi criado um Fundo de Maneio, a ser administrado por PNUD. O PRC nunca esteve completamente funcional e nenhuma das suas estruturas funcionou no seu ligar devidamente. Parte das razões era a instabilidade e a deteriorada situação de segurança, principalmente pela causa da não aderência da UNITA ao Protocolo de Lusaka. Também, só U$D 100.00 milhões da quantia prometida foi recebida. A maioria dos doadores preferiram apoiar as ONG's internacionais, nacionais e locais.

Num dia, provavelmente no final de 1995, a Unidade de Economia do PNUD, produziu um Documento Projecto (DP) para um "Centro de Produção Comunitária no Huambo". Aparentemente, baseado em projectos semelhantes aos da OIT e adaptados localmente, propôs o estabelecimento de um Centro de Produção no Huambo onde seleccionou os beneficiários que receberiam treinamento em Micro Empresas e no final do curso aos beneficiários com aproveitamento seriam distribuídos equipamento subsidiado pelo projecto a 95% de seu valor real. Seriam beneficiários os soldados desmobilizados, mulheres chefes de famílias, deslocados e outros grupos vulneráveis.
É no geral, uma ideia que foi bem elaborada e isso conteve todas as habituais formas de protecção, monitoria e avaliação como é requerida pela ONU. Foram consideradas a eficiência de custo e sustentabilidade e as propostas de soluções possíveis.
Carlos Bessa Victor, empregado pelo Banco de Equador, e na ocasião bastante influente dentro de PNUD, parece ser à força de motivação da ideia.
Inicialmente concebido como um projecto independente, seria executado pelo UNOPS tendo a RUTEC como subcontratante. Exactamente como é que a RUTEC foi envolvida não é conhecido.

Não há nenhuma evidência a indicar que o contrato foi submetido a concurso publico, como são as regras das ONU para serviços que excedem U$D 50 000.00.

Em Janeiro 1996, o Director da RUTEC, John Dommett, e a sua esposa, visitaram Angola e elaboraram um estudo de viabilidade no Huambo. O relatório subsequente deles menciona que não puderam avaliar com precisão as necessidades no Huambo e fundamentaram as suas conclusões nas necessidades de uma cidade de tamanho semelhante na África do Sul. O modelo proposto era uma cópia exacta do modelo utilizado pelo Manual de Operações da RUTEC e ao longo das discussões subsequentes nos dois anos a seguir nenhuma alteração foi feita a este modelo.
Não há nenhuma cidade na África do Sul que quase iguala ou se aproxima à realidade do Huambo, Angola, pelo que a proposta do estudo de viabilidade é bastante irrelevante para aquela cidade.
Huambo tem uma economia de enclave que depende grandemente de importações, em despeito do alto potencial agrícola. Não tem nenhuma indústria, poucas oficinas, nenhuma provisão segura de electricidade e está virtualmente dependente da via aérea e do acesso terrestre em ocasionais comboios de viaturas escoltadas pelo exército.
O Desemprego abrange aproximadamente 80-90%. Rendimento per capita é muito mais baixo que o U$D 416.00 que normalmente citam para Angola. É provavelmente a volta de U$D 70.00.
Foram propostas vinte e três oportunidades de Micro Empresas. Quase todas estas Empresas não eram possíveis por uma serie de razões: não havia matérias-primas, dependiam da indústria formal que não existe no Huambo, dependiam da energia (electricidade, gás, gasolina ou gasoleo) que não está livremente disponível no Huambo, o produto era desconhecido em Angola, o equipamento seria muito caro ou não poderia ser mantido, etc.
O DP, com vários códigos de projecto (ANG 96/001, ANG 96/003, ANG 96/005, ANG 96/003/01/31) parece ter circulado durante os dois anos seguintes a procura de fundos. Os orçamentos para o projecto variaram entre um mais pequeno de U$D 500 000.00 para um de quase U$D 1 milhão. Os prováveis doadores seriam o Governo de Itália, Banco de Equador e Coca-Cola.
Quando este DP estava circulando, foram sendo feitas várias perguntas dentro de PNUD e UNOPS sobre o que RUTEC poderia oferecer.
A proposta de RUTEC nunca foi alterada. A mesma ideia foi apresentada para qualquer quantia sem ser fundamentada e para qualquer ocasião possível.

Num determinado dia, numa reunião do comité, presidido por John Ohiorheneun e com a participação de Ibrahima Djibo, Leo Merores e Jessie Byron, abordou, entre outros, os assuntos seguintes:
“A descrição de serviços a ser empreendido pela RUTEC precisa ser mais explícita.
É requerida uma justificação pela escolha da RUTEC. É muito importante fazer avaliação. Necessidade de mais detalhes e dados no envolvimento vis-à-vis da RUTEC no estabelecimento dos CPC's. O que precisamente eles fizeram? Será bom o seu desempenho?
Havia uma pergunta no sentido de ser seguido o processo de cumprimento do sub-contratante. Não está claro a qual o ponto a Agência deve pedir desistência e se algum pedido não tem que ir para o Comité em subcontratos além de certa quantia.
A reunião também sentia que aquele precisava ter uma ideia na quantia de subcontrato envolvido.
Em conclusão, sentia o comité que a RUTEC parecia qualificada para o trabalho. Não obstante, para fins de transparência, todas as perguntas sobre o seu trabalho necessitavam de ser respondidas completamente. Além disso, um transparente e um melhor TDR eram justificados, dando maior ênfase aos serviços a ser providos por RUTEC. A reunião sugeriu que o TDR seja redigido novamente e que todas as recomendações feitas sejam incorporados no documento novo.’

Não há nenhuma evidência mostrando que estas recomendações foram incorporadas.

Uma carta datada de 27 de março de 1997 endereçada a Bernard Ntegeye, o Representante Residente-PNUD Angola, de Solomon Akpata, Chefe da II Divisão, Agência Regional para a África-PNUD Nova Iorque, pedindo aos contratantes/consultores para considerar o "pedido de desistência antes da RUTEC ser premiada com o subcontratado com componentes do anterior projecto (ANG 96/003-Centro de Produção da Comunidade no Huambo) que é executado pela UNOPS".
É pedido para remeter ao comité as Condições e Termos de Referências (TDR).

Não há nenhum TDR revisado.

Um Fax datado de 05 de setembro de 1997 de Dimitri Samaras (DimitriS@unops.org), Oficial em Custo, Divisão de África, UNOPS, Nova Iorque, para Bernard Ntgeye, RR PNUD Angola:

‘Nós gostaríamos de explicar que não estamos a tentar dificultar, mas que a RUTEC resistiu a responder repetidamente as nossas perguntas de um modo directo. …. RUTEC fez isto para ser extremamente difícil nós avaliarmos o valor do contrato e porque eles continuamente não têm provido um desorganizar das actividades e dos custos relacionados. Além disso, nós explicamos repetidamente a eles que nós não lhes podemos dar um pagamento adiantado igual ou para cima de 90% do valor do contrato.’

Ao mesmo tempo, o Governo Provincial do Huambo estava fazendo pedidos repetidos a Pierre Marie Achy, Conselheiro Internacional para o PRC no Huambo, sobre quando o projecto será implementado. Pierre Marie Achy declarou que a continuada demora na implementação deste projecto está causando embaraços ao PNUD.

Num dia entre novembro de1997 e fevereiro de 1998, o PNUD indicou a UNOPS que começasse as operações para implementação do projecto.
Normalmente para isto acontecer, um Documento de Projecto deve ser assinado pelo Governo, a agência de aplicação (UNOPS, neste caso) e o PNUD.

Tal documento assinado ainda não foi encontrado.

No dia 20 de fevereiro de 1998, o UNOPS e a RUTEC assinaram o contrato: C-971794 "ANG 96/003-Centro de Produção de Comunidade Huambo, Angola”.
A Descrição de Trabalho deste contrato é exactamente o que RUTEC ofereceu em janeiro de 1996 apesar de que a sua qualidade tinha sido questionada durante quase dois anos.
O contrato não faz nenhuma referência a qualquer Documento de Projecto e nenhuma meta específica e orientada é estabelecida para determinar os pagamentos.
Um total de quinze parciais por objectivos (etapas) é fixo. As primeiras cinco etapas são para a autorização do uso dos direitos de autor, o estabelecimento físico de um centro no Huambo, entrega de veículos e equipamento. As restantes etapas são simplesmente declaradas para "Administração do Centro" aprazadas em dois meses no qual será pago o valor de U$D 57 126.00 por etapa (cada dois meses).
O valor total do contrato é U$D 1 538 201.00.
O contrato é para uma fase inicial de 18 meses a terminar em 31 de maio 2000.
Antecipando para uma data mais cedo o inicio do projecto, a RUTEC pediu uma emenda ao contrato e no dia 11 de junho de 1998 assinou a antecipação do termino para 31 de janeiro de 2000 baseado na data de início em Setembro de 1998.

A RUTEC estava agora pronta para começar a fazer as coisas a sua maneira. O que isto provavelmente poderia ser, eles ainda não tinham mostrado.

Até ao momento o orçamento do projecto não tinha sido elaborado.

No dia 26 de março de 1998, Michel Balima (michel.balima@PNUD.org) Representante Deputado Residente Sênior-Projetos (SDDR-P) PNUD em Luanda, enviou um fax para Dimitri Samaras em Nova Iorque,:

"Referência de seu PS 101 relativo a prodoc para RUTEC. Por favor, note aquele RUTEC, entretanto concebido inicialmente como um projecto separado, foi entregue como parte integrante do ANG 96/100 Projecto de Reabilitação de Comunidade. É um subcontrato para ser financiado do orçamento de produção ANG 96/B01, orçamento linha 2101-Fundo de maneio para o PRC".

Para que projectos a serem implementados sob alçada do PRC, eles precisam de ser revisados e autorizados por um Comité Local de Avaliação de Projecto (LPAC) composto por representantes do Governo, o PRC e PNUD.

Não há nenhuma documentação assinada para indicar que isto já foi efectuado.

O Director Nacional para o PRC, Dr. João Ferreira reivindicou constantemente que o PRC não deu autorização para implementar este projecto. As razões por si declaradas são de que o projecto era muito caro para o que estava sendo oferecido e que dependia de contribuições do exterior em vez de iniciativas locais.

Não há nenhuma documentação disponível para apresentação em que tenha sido contactado o PRC para obter a autorização.

Durante o ano de 1998, PNUD fez duas transferências do Fundo de Maneio para o UNOPS, totalizando U$D 1 645 116.00. O UNOPS reteve 10% desta quantia como gastos “Apoio Administrativo e custos correntes” (AOS), a quantia de U$D 164 511.00.

No princípio-Montando O Projecto

No final de Maio de 1998 John Dommett, o Director da RUTEC, foi ao Huambo para começar a operacionalizar o projecto.
No dia 28 de maio de 1998, ele e Pierre Marie Achy (Representante do PNUD em Huambo) entrevistaram Leon Kukkuk que subsequentemente foi empregado como Director de Projecto. A ele fora entregue uma cópia do contrato com UNOPS com uma explicação como o projecto deveria ser implementado. O John Dommett explicou que o projecto consistiria num centro de treinamento e de produção para Micro Empresas. No final de um curso de duas semanas ter-se-ia a oportunidade de comprar um equipamento no seu valor comercial. Os equipamentos só serão produzidos pela RUTEC na sua fábrica em Joanesburgo, África do Sul. Beneficiários incluiriam qualquer pessoa que pudesse pagar o equipamento.

Embora céptico pela explicação, Leon Kukkuk pensava que isto poderia ser facilmente solucionado se pode-se obter do UNOPS o Documento Projecto com as referências necessárias.

Seguramente o sistema de ONU não iria pagar a uma companhia privada para tirar um enorme lucro numa das regiões mais pobres do mundo?

O Governo Provincial disponibilizou uma fábrica abandonada que precisava de limpeza e reabilitação. A intenção era trabalhar em tendas que seriam montadas no interior do edifício.

No dia 06 de junho de 1998, Leon Kukkuk viaja a Joanesburgo, África do Sul, onde RUTEC está baseada. Considerando que RUTEC tinha ganho o contrato, sem se enternecer com isto, e baseado na sua experiência em projectos semelhantes na África do Sul, Leon Kukkuk pediu informações sobre a capacidade administrativa e procedimentos de contabilidade, informações sobre procedimentos, descrições de trabalho estandardizados, etc. Isto é, na sua opinião, o essencial para a administração de qualquer projecto.

A RUTEC não tinha tais informações.

Todos os sistemas administrativos, contabilidade e sistemas de logística requeridos foram eventualmente criados por Leon Kukkuk, sem contribuição da RUTEC.

No dia 13 de junho de 1998 numa reunião com Michel Balima no PNUD em Luanda, Leon Kukkuk perguntou pelo Documento de Projecto e foi-lhe prometido uma cópia.

Ele só recebeu isto no dia 19 de setembro de 2000.

De 15 de junho de1998, começou o trabalho de reabilitação no edifício. Era esperado que a fase inicial, que incluiria reabilitação do edifício, importação de todo o equipamento, veículos, etc., treinamento de pessoal e preparação de material educacional, duraria quatro meses.
No Huambo foram empregados cinquenta e cinco trabalhadores temporários para começar a reabilitação do edifício. Foram contratadas várias companhias para prover diversos serviços.

Ao longo do mês junho de 1998 que foram processadas mais de 250 candidaturas e realizadas as entrevistas. Na última semana de junho de 1998, um Gerente de Centro, um Consultor e quatro Treinadores e também algum pessoal de apoio que assinaram um contrato inicial de três meses que incluía Termos e Condições e uma Descrição de Trabalho.

No final de junho de 1998, John Dommett foi ao Huambo para aprovar o pessoal empregado. Na reunião com a pessoal ele falou que a função primária deles seria gerir uma loja que tem de vender o mais possível equipamentos e matérias-primas.

Esta foi a última visita da RUTEC no Huambo em mais de dezanove meses.

O Consultor e quatro Treinadores foram por dois meses de treino a Joanesburgo no dia 10 de julho de 1998. Leon Kukkuk fez todos os preparativos de viagem.

Nesta fase tinha descoberto que era quase impossível obter quaisquer fundos a partir da RUTEC. A ausência destes fundos estava causando imensas dificuldades, aliado ao facto de que nem PNUD nem UNOPS assumiram responsabilidade em organizar o visto para o Leon Kukkuk como é especificado no contrato. Ele permaneceu sem documentos jurídicos até 15 de março de 2000.

Os fundos pedidos para pagar o pessoal um adiantamento de salários antes de viajar, ao Leon Kukkuk fora dito que isto não seria possível porque a RUTEC não tinha ninguém disponível para viajar a Angola. Ao pessoal será dado um adiantamento dos salários após a sua chegada a Joanesburgo.

No final de julho de 1998, Leon Kukkuk e Carlos Alberto Gomes, o Gerente de Centro, viajam a Joanesburgo.
Era suposto que o Carlos Gomes receberia um curso de formação de administração de duas semanas. Ele não recebeu isto. Nenhum dos dois fez qualquer trabalho que justificasse ou que poderia ser considerado como contribuição para o estabelecimento de um centro no Huambo. Esta visita de duas semanas foi por eles considerada um desperdício do seu tempo.
Em Joanesburgo, não foi dado ao pessoal o alojamento e comida conforme fora prometida, mas só alojamento. A eles também não fora pago qualquer adiantamento de salário como fora prometido, por esta causa, eles tiveram de sobreviver duas semanas com chá quente e biscoitos que lhes eram dados no curso.

Para ter os salário do pessoal pago adiantadamente, Leon Kukkuk contactou John Dommett que durante a discussão declarou que o pessoal seria tratado pela RUTEC tendo em conta as práticas semelhantes desta na África do Sul, isto é, seriam pagos só uma parte da comissão das propinas dos estudantes e dos equipamentos vendidos. Quando lhe foi explicado que o projecto teria que gerar U$D 3 milhões durante 18 de meses para cobrir salários, então ele cedeu. Não obstante, em Outubro de 1999, Leon Kukkuk recebeu documentos que o indicavam a implementar este sistema. Foi enviado ao Huambo e arquivado. Efectivamente o que a RUTEC queria era alcançar o maior lucro possível do projecto no Huambo, para além do U$D 1.5 Milhão que eles já estavam recebendo do UNOPS - tudo virtualmente a nenhum custo para eles.

Leon Kukkuk preparou uma projecção de orçamento detalhado que previa U$D 50 000.00 para construção, e despesas operacionais mínimas de U$D 12 500.00 por mês.

Não há nenhuma razão em acreditar que alguém da RUTEC prestou alguma atenção a este documento.
Um pedido do Leon Kukkuk para abrir uma conta bancária em Angola foi negado com o argumento de que isto seria muito caro.
Não estava claro quem na RUTEC seria o responsável pelo projecto. Também não estava claro quem teria habilidades apropriadas e experiência para ser responsável por tal projecto ou de contribuir de qualquer forma para ele.
Leon Kukkuk, numa reunião com o pessoal da RUTEC em Joanesburgo, mencionou que precisaria de uma melhoria significativa na competência de RUTEC se eles quisessem administrar um projecto prospero no Huambo, Angola.
As melhorias no desempenho da RUTEC consistiram em pedir ao Leon Kukkuk, que no final de agosto de 1998, viajasse do Huambo a Joanesburgo a fim de organizar a extensão dos vistos para o pessoal angolano que lá estava tendo treinamento.

A sua explicação era novamente o facto de que eles não tinham pessoal para tratar isso.

Em duas ocasiões foi pedido também ao Leon Kukkuk para viajar a Joanesburgo com a finalidade de controlar a logística de envio de aproximadamente quatro contentores de carga de eventual equipamento para o Huambo.

Uma vez mais, a sua explicação disto era o facto de que eles não têm pessoal para fazer isto.

No momento, o Leon Kukkuk estava dirigindo o trabalho de reabilitação e de construção no Huambo, logística em Joanesburgo e tentando descobrir quais seriam os arranjos de administração para o projecto em Luanda. Ele não tinha nenhum documento jurídico e não estava recebendo virtualmente nenhum apoio do UNOPS pelo argumento destes de que era um projecto do PNUD e nenhum apoio de PNUD pelo argumento que era um projecto do UNOPS.

Os contactos com o UNOPS ao longo de 1998 foi considerado informal, porque Lawrence Doczy, o seu Representante em Luanda, esteve doente a maior parte do tempo e fora de Angola. O Leon Kukkuk nunca teve qualquer oportunidade de falar com ele.
Obter fundos da RUTEC provou ser uma tarefa impossível e que nunca foi resolvido. Depois de pedir fundos para mais um mês e explicar que a falta dos mesmos era um problema agudo, Leon Kukkuk, no dia 13 de setembro de 1998, foi solicitado pela RUTEC para viajar a Joanesburgo a busca desses fundos. A sua explicação de que os trabalhos de construção no Huambo eram extremamente difíceis, foi simplesmente despachado considerando que estes trabalhos eram de pouca importância. Também estava programado que o pessoal regressaria a Luanda no dia 20 de setembro de 1998. A acomodação em Luanda, como também transporte para Huambo precisava ser organizado. Isto não seria possível sem fundos. A RUTEC manteve a afirmação que eles não têm pessoal que poderiam viajar a Angola. Eles também não estavam preparados para entregar qualquer fundo a nenhum elemento do pessoal angolano para levar consigo para Angola.

Por causa disto, Leon Kukkuk, sem fundos ou qualquer apoio, viajou para Joanesburgo organizando um voo através das Forças para Paz da ONU (MONUA), chegando lá na manhã de 15 de setembro de 1998. No dia 17 de setembro de 1998 ele voltou com o voo da MONUA a Luanda. Nos dois dias em Joanesburgo só falou com John Dommett durante dez minutos antes de ir para o aeroporto, e sem ter recebido nenhum fundo.

No dia 19 de setembro de 1998, Leon Kukkuk escreveu uma carta a RUTEC e enviou-a por fax, onde formulou protestos muito fortes e queixas da falta de competência destes nos assuntos administrativos, até mesmo básicos, falta de apoio para o projecto e relutância extrema em fornecer fundos para trabalho já em andamento. Uma cópia desta carta foi dirigida para Michel Balima onde pedia orientação de que como estes assuntos deveriam ser solucionados.

Nenhuma resposta sólida foi recebida da RUTEC ou do PNUD. Mike Klosterman, Gerente de Operações da RUTEC, escreveu uma carta na qual ele mencionou que RUTEC estava tentando implementar um projecto numa área onde eles não têm nenhuma experiência. Mas também não ofereceu nenhuma solução específica aos dados assuntos levantados. Em dezembro de 1998 tinha-se acabado a curta carreira por ele vivida na RUTEC.

No dia 20 de setembro de 1998 o pessoal angolano voltou do curso de treinamento de dois meses. Com eles trouxeram U$D 4 700.00 dos U$D 25 000.00 que fora pedido.

Numa reunião realizada com eles no dia 21 de setembro de 1998, eles reivindicaram, e a sua impressão no geral da RUTEC era negativa e que eles tinham muito pouca confiança que RUTEC poderia administrar algum projecto no Huambo. Fora pedido ao Leon Kukkuk para encaminhar estes assuntos e os solucionar antes do projecto ser implementado.

No final de 1998 a situação de segurança em Angola estava se deteriorando. No princípio de setembro de 1998, o UNOPS instrui que a RUTEC suspendesse todas as actividades de projecto no Huambo que requeressem investimento de capital. Actividades que não requeressem investimento de capital e as actividades fora do Huambo (como treinamento de pessoal e preparação de material de treino) poderiam continuar.

No fim de outubro de 1998, a UNOPS tinha dado um acordo verbal de que o projecto poderia continuar. Eles prometeram que seria confirmado por escrito.

No momento a maioria das operações de preparação foram cumpridas no Huambo. O Equipamento em Joanesburgo estava acumulado e pronto a ser transportado por estrada a Kaháma, sul de Angola, e de lá por via aérea para o Huambo.
Leon Kukkuk e Carlos Gomes dirigiram dois veículos, com uma escolta da MONUA, de Luanda para Huambo. Chegaram ao Huambo no dia 05 de novembro de1998 naquela que seria a última escolta da ONU e a última escolta em mais de um ano.
Em 04 dezembro de 1998, a RUTEC recebeu instruções escritas do UNOPS para continuar com o projecto, mostrando a lógica de tomar decisões de Nova Iorque.

No dia 05 de dezembro de 1998, contudo, outra guerra total começou em Angola.

As Guerras, quase por definição, são tempos de insegurança e incerteza. Considerando o estado avançado do planeado e a autorização do UNOPS, Leon Kukkuk ficou em contacto diário com John Dommett de RUTEC, Michel Balima de PNUD e José Salema de UNOPS em Luanda, na busca da orientação do melhor curso de acção. Naturalmente, eles estavam na incerteza de que como proceder, mas mencionaram que tal uma decisão seria provavelmente melhor feita no terreno.

Logicamente, especialmente à nova realidade, o projecto precisou ser extensivamente repensado. O resto dos fundos, mais de U$D 1.2 milhão nesta fase, provavelmente poderia ser gasto melhor se utilizado no desastre humanitário que estava a ponto de cair no Huambo e em Angola.

Este acordo não permitia este tipo de flexibilidade.
Leon Kukkuk, talvez um pouco irresponsavelmente, decidiu prosseguir. Para alcançar isto, ele perguntou e subsequentemente recebeu todo o apoio do pessoal angolano.

De 09 a 12 de dezembro de 1998, foram recebidos quatro aviões/voos em equipamento.

Na altura, milhares de pessoas corriam para o aeroporto na tentativa de sair em qualquer voo do Huambo para qualquer lugar. O aeroporto e um quilometro no perímetro em redor, era fortemente guardado pela polícia e o exército. Huambo foi bombardeado e atacado em várias ocasiões. Ao inicio de janeiro de 1999, dois aviões de ONU foram abatidos fora da cidade. Chuva torrencial caía quase diariamente.

No dia 05 de janeiro de 1999, MONUA, as Forças de Paz da ONU, partiram numa escolta para Benguela, no litoral.

Em 25 de janeiro de 1999, o Centro era estabelecido e pronto começar a funcionar.

Nenhum dos assuntos administrativos e as duvidas que haviam sido gerados nos meses anteriores estavam resolvidos.

Trabalhando Num Projecto de Desenvolvimento Numa Guerra

Uma das primeiras e das maiores vitórias que o projecto alcançou, de uma grande dimensão que fez recuar todas as suas subsequentes calamidades, era o psicológico. Embora tivesse muitos altos e baixos e embora alcançasse poucos resultados que valessem a pena, nunca foi esquecido como se estabeleceu e começou a operar numa altura quando Angola foi mergulhada numa guerra devastadora pela segunda vez em menos de uma década.

Ninguém tinha alguma experiência em Micro Empresas. Considerando a falta de apoio técnico da RUTEC e o facto que o treinamento recebido em Joanesburgo ser considerado largamente irrelevante para Angola, tudo teve que ser aprendido desde os princípios mais básicos.

Ao final de março 1999 Leon Kukkuk viajou para Luanda. Era sua intenção para se encontrar com John Dommett (RUTEC), Michel Balima (PNUD) e José Salema (UNOPS, Novo Representante, Luanda) em Luanda para discutir o projecto.
Coincidentemente Michel Balima e aparentemente Dimitri Samaras (UNOPS, Nova Iorque) viajam ao Huambo no dia 31 de março de 1999 para visitar o projecto. Embora Michel Balima parecia estar contente com o que ele viu, não há nenhum relatório de missão disponível relativo a esta visita.
Em Luanda Leon Kukkuk, José Salema e John Dommett reuniram nesse mesmo dia.
John Dommett, na altura já tinha vendido 75% da RUTEC ao Banco de Desenvolvimento de Terra e a União Nacional dos Trabalhadores de Minas na África do Sul por cerca de U$D 3 milhões.

Neste dia foram levantados os assuntos seguintes:

As tendas provaram ser incomodante quente, molhado e insalubre. Fundos deveriam ser disponibilizados para estas serem substituídas por estruturas que usam tecnologia local? Alternativamente, deveriam ser usados centros já existentes. Isto espalharia o impacto geográfico do projecto.

Resposta: O uso de tendas nos projectos era altamente lucrativo para a RUTEC. Outra alternativa não deveria ser considerada. Só podem ser usados centros novos se forem assinados pertinentes contratos com UNOPS.

A maior parte do equipamento fornecidos pela RUTEC são impróprios. Muitos são de baixa qualidade e chegaram quebrados. Isto, como também o alto preço (U$D1 000.00-U$D 5 000.00 por equipamento) do equipamento faz isso altamente improvável para que qualquer dos beneficiários pudesse compra-lo ou de que qualquer financiamento para isto poderia ser conseguido. Seria possível produzir localmente equipamento?

Resposta: Produção local de equipamento não pode ser considerada. Porém, se qualquer pessoa estivesse preparado para assinar um acordo de licenciamento, equipamento poderia ser montado no Huambo. (O equipamento que foi produzido pela RUTEC ou estava dentro do domínio público ou com violações de direito autorais. Existe também evidência isso sugere que RUTEC enviasse ao Huambo deliberadamente equipamento que estava quebrado para encurtar custos.).

A f alta de fundos foi discutida, mas nunca solucionada.

Nenhum dos arranjos administrativos foi discutido. José Salema disse que este é um assunto que deveria ser tratado com o PNUD. A data do final do projecto precisava ser determinada por acordo. Este deveria ter sido a 30 de junho de 2000. Nunca foi formalmente concordado.

No princípio de abril de 1999, Leon Kukkuk reuniu com Teresa Felix (teresa.felix@UNDP.org) o novo Oficial Nacional de Programa do PNUD, Luanda.
Ela o informou de que ele precisava trabalhar mais intimamente com o PRC e também pediu relatórios mensais que contenham um resumo de actividades e as contas. Isto foi subsequentemente enviado mensalmente. Não há nenhuma evidência para sugerir que qualquer pessoa já os leu.

Ao regressar ao Huambo, Leon Kukkuk reuniu com o Governador Provincial, Paulo Kassoma e o Director de Planeamento, Henrique Barbosa. Sentia-se que o projecto, como foi concebido, seguiria o mesmo caminho dos outros projectos da Organização Internacional do Trabalho(OIT) e UNOPS onde muito dinheiro é gasto em treinamento, mas que nenhum novo emprego é criado.
Foi decidido então que o centro proverá treinamento e apoiará novos negócios como também apoio logístico e aconselhamento pelo menos durante o primeiro ano. A Produção local será encorajada e equipamento, até onde for possível, será produzido localmente.
Um Conselho de administração local foi criado para seguir o centro.
O Governador mudou o nome do centro para "Centro de Formação e Fomento de Micro Indústrias do Huambo - MICROFORM".
Tinha se tornado agora efectivamente numa iniciativa local apoiada pelo Governo Provincial e com um grande apoio da Development Workshop, um ONG canadiana com muitos anos de experiência em Angola.
Eles tornaram-se agora efectivamente responsáveis pelo projecto. Antes, os reais donos do projecto tinham sido excluídos por falta de interesse e competência.
O Leon Kukkuk foi encarregado, novamente para aproximar o PNUD, UNOPS e RUTEC para melhorar as questões de administração, especificamente a avaliação e monitoria, como também assegurar ajuda técnica significante e fundos para o centro. Ele sugeriu que isto poderia ser melhor com todos os parceiros juntos.

A RUTEC estava passando por suas próprias dificuldades que resultaram numa mudança espectacular de pessoal sénior. Como sempre, o PNUD ficou mais preocupado como justificar a sua existência e pela chegada, no final de 1999, do novo Representante Residente, Zoraida Mesa, que era a responsável de repor o PNUD novamente na linha. Ela duraria um pouco mais de um ano. UNOPS tropeçou como sempre, não sentia que este projecto era de sua responsabilidade, e no fim de janeiro de 2000 saiu de Angola, esperamos que é para sempre.

No princípio de outubro de 1999, depois de uma discussão com Buswe Yafele, o novo Director da RUTEC, Leon Kukkuk começou a planificar uma missão para o Huambo. Estas coisas deveriam ser organizadas pelo PNUD, como um assunto de rotina, mas o PNUD raramente tem pessoal que trabalhe fora dos seus escritórios em Luanda e raramente gaste mais de algumas horas no interior do país.

No dia 14 janeiro de 2000, Leon Kukkuk reuniu com João Ferreira, o Director de PRC, no escritório dele em Luanda. Dr. Ferreira reiterou a posição dele ao projecto como foi planificado originalmente. Por causa dos resultados alcançados no Huambo, porém, era imperativo que fosse avaliado e elaborada uma decisão relativa ao seu futuro. Era suposto que haveria uma reunião tripartida a ser organizada por PNUD.

A missão aconteceu no dia 31 de março de 2000 composta por Representantes do PRC, PNUD e RUTEC.
Buzwe Yafele (RUTEC) estava principalmente preocupado como tentar vender 10 toneladas de farinha de trigo da África do Sul para o centro. Era suposto que o centro devia procurar fundos para isto. Ele mencionou que pudessem ser discutidos os assuntos que a administração do centro estava levantando desde que fosse recebida uma garantia que o contrato da RUTEC seria estendido.
Francisco de Almeida (fransisco.almeida@UNDP.org), Assistente do Deputado Representante Residente do PNUD em Luanda, várias vezes perguntou porquê que o centro parecia ser tão pobre assim se tinham sido arranjados fundos suficientes disponíveis para sua administração. Ele não recebeu nenhuma resposta e não procurou ir ao fundo do assunto.

No dia 03 de abril de 2000 uma reunião foi realizada em Luanda. Nenhum resultado conclusivo foi obtido desta reunião. Vagueou-se um pouco pelas actas escritas em abril de 2001 num esforço para determinar o que foi dito na ocasião. Nada.

No final de junho de 2000 deveria terminar o projecto, mas esta data não tinha sido oficialmente determinada. Alguma menção foi feita que seguramente na reunião tripartida e avaliação marcada para maio de 2000 iria determinar o futuro do projecto.
Em menos de três meses para a dita reunião, era imperativo que uma decisão concreta fosse alcançada rapidamente.

No final de abril de 2000 o PRC emitiu um relatório que declarou que o projecto será avaliado com uma visão para extensão, e que um projecto com linhas semelhantes será planificado para Benguela, a ser implementado em dezembro de 2000.

No final de abril de 2000, Buswe Yafele havia sido despedido da RUTEC e sido substituído por Boris Kamstra.

O Que Alcançou o Projecto?

Esta é uma das perguntas mais difíceis de responder. Não há nenhuma informação disponível de qualquer avaliação objectiva e competente.
Qualquer tentativa para avaliar as suas actividades tem que levar em conta os arranjos de administração muito complexos e um olhar profundo de como os fundos foram gastos.
A parte do centro no Huambo que tinha mantido registos meticulosos, contas delineadas não existem. Contas mais ou menos específicas estão disponíveis. Para ficar mais claro foi elaborado um breve sumário testamento:

Num dia em 1998, o PNUD transferiu uma quantia de U$D 1 645 116.00 do Fundo de Maneio para o UNOPS.
O UNOPS, como de costume, reteve 10% desta quantia como gastos Administrativos e acima do Apoio: U$D 164 511.00.
De junho de1998 a junho de 2000, UNOPS pagou um total de U$D 1 505 521.00 a RUTEC em vinte fases ao longo de um período de dois anos.

Durante o mesmo período de tempo o Centro no Huambo tinha gasto um total de U$D 235 152.00. Isto inclui toda a construção, reabilitação, administração, viagens internacionais, salários locais e despesas operacionais que é o equivalente a 15% do orçamento total disponível.
Desta quantia U$D 227 000.00 provenientes da RUTEC e para um equilíbrio dos gastos foram emprestados por Leon Kukkuk um valor total de U$D 8 152.00.
A RUTEC também proveu equipamento para o centro. Embora que factura deles tenha falhas, reflecte uma quantia de U$D 285 000.00.

Isto significa que uma quantia em redor de U$D 1 milhão, ou seja, dois terços dos fundos disponíveis, precisam ser explicados.

O UNOPS pagou de certeza este dinheiro a RUTEC.

O que a RUTEC fez com isto?

Uma série de e-mails entre Teresa Felix (PNUD) e Boris Kamstra (RUTEC) extraiu as respostas seguintes:

24 de fevereiro de 2001:
"Tenho receio que esta informação eu não a possuo. Eu só entrei na Rutec no final deste projecto e terei que encontrar os arquivos pertinentes para estabelecer o que foi fornecido e o seu custo.… Adquirir informações mais adiantes será difícil e não é possível antes de pelo menos quarta-feira, porque eu terei que contactar John Dommett que está em Portugal (eu penso)".

05 de março de 2001:
“O que eu tenho é o que está registado pela companhia na altura do projecto. O sistema usado não separou os preços de custo, como tal é muito difícil de alocar alguns custos ao projecto e outros não, especialmente não sabendo a história do projecto ou quais pessoas foram empregadas para este projecto.

Eu sou capaz, por alguns extractos bancários de achar alguns custos específicos como: voos para Angola e pagamentos do telefone satélite. Mas isto de qualquer forma nos dá resposta a qualquer quadro mais claro do que foi gasto neste projecto.

Sinto muito eu não posso ser mais específico. Não tendo a informação à mão e nenhuma ideia da história do projecto torna isto impossível para que possa adquirir os números exactos”.

Ao longo do projecto (junho de 1998 -junho de 2000) os salários do pessoal local atrasavam dois a três meses antes de ser liquidados, com a excepção de novembro e de dezembro de 1999, e também em janeiro de 2000 quando Leon Kukkuk pagou os salários com os seus recursos próprios.
Leon Kukkuk durante o mesmo período de emprego (junho de 1998-junho de 2000) recebeu salários pagos, depois muitos dificuldades de receber, em de março de 1999, fevereiro de 2000, abril de 2001 e junho de 2001. Na hora em que permanece incerto se o seu salário esta actualizado ou não.

Deixando por enquanto de parte este assunto, é óbvio que o projecto precisa ser avaliado em dois níveis.

Primeiro, o PNUD e UNOPS num acordo com a RUTEC, num valor de mais de U$D 1.5 milhão, que é por nós considerado um fracasso absoluto e espectacular que nunca deverá ser repetido. Nós estaremos a olhar como PNUD procederá para corrigir este erro.

Num segundo nível, é preciso considerar o outro projecto ‘MICROFORM’, em que todas as intenções e finalidades são uma iniciativa completamente local e o que conseguiu alcançar com U$D 227 000.00.

As suas realizações estão muito brevemente resumidas :

Foram desenvolvidas várias oportunidades de Micro Empreendimento a partir de princípios básicos, usando recursos e tecnologia locais. Falta de fundos foi o principal constrangimento para a expansão.
Equipamento, adaptado às realidades locais e frequentemente de qualidade superior, foram produzidas localmente. Produção foi limitada por falta de fundos.
Produtos novos ou produtos que foram previamente importados começaram a aparecer no mercado. Falta de fundos limitou esta expansão.
Em dois anos, aproximadamente 250 pequenas empresas foram criadas. Aproximadamente 500 pessoas ganharam emprego por actividades indirectas - os fornecedores de matéria-prima, vendedores, transportadores, etc.
Foi visto como o veículo para o futuro desenvolvimento de Huambo que poderia beneficiar comunidades vulneráveis urbanas e rurais.

Foi calculado que um eficiente projecto, criaria num ano mais de mil empresas com um orçamento de U$D 350 000.00 por ano. Foi localmente considerado que com a participação da RUTEC não só seria caro, mas também prejudicial ao projecto. Com fundos disponíveis, numa iniciativa local poderia ajudar até 50 000 pessoas directamente e indirectamente num período à volta de 4 anos e teria um impacto significante na Província.

E sobre o futuro?

Embora não oficialmente confirmado, a fase piloto do projecto acabaria no final de junho de 2000. Em qualquer eventualidade, era bem provável que fundos ultrapassariam esse tempo.

Uma decisão deveria ser feita relativamente ao seu futuro. Esta é a responsabilidade do PNUD, como dono do projecto.

Várias opções devem ser consideradas, levando em conta os desejos da comunidade local e do Governo Provincial como também interesse dos doadores e a disponibilidade de fundos.
Estas opções incluem:

Encerramento total do projecto.
Continuação sob mesmas condições.
Continuação sob novas modificações.

Cada uma destas opções teria consequências e custos associados que precisam ser administrados. Uma decisão relativa aos veículos e outros activos só podem ser tomados pelo Representante Residente do PNUD baseado em recomendações Comité de Pesquisa de Propriedade Local do PNUD.
O Pessoal precisava de ser informado, pelo menos com antecedência de 3 meses , se os seus contratos seriam terminados ou seriam estendidos e as remunerações necessárias a serem feitas de acordo com Lei angolana do trabalho.
Na antecipação, Leon Kukkuk pediu uma transferência da RUTEC de um valor de U$D 45 000.00 para pagar os habituais salários atrasados e outras dívidas. Ele recebeu U$D 19 125.00 da quantia pedida no princípio de junho de 2000. Um pedido adicional para U$D 25 000.00 resultou no recibo de U$D 9 980.00 no final de julho. Contribuindo U$D 5 000.00 dos seus recursos próprios ele pôde então pagar salários até o fim de julho de 2000, enquanto ficava a quantia acima de U$D 100 000.00 em contas não pagadas e compromissos.

O Governo Provincial estava fazendo muita pressão ao Leon Kukkuk para encontrar uma solução. Isso significou que ele foi carregando em frente toda a responsabilidade, mas sem nenhuma autoridade. Em dois anos, os seus esforços não mostraram nenhum resultado, mas como estava se acabando o contrato da RUTEC, várias opções se apresentaram.

Com promessas vagas vindas de PNUD que o projecto seria avaliado, vagueou num estado nubloso. Esperando o melhor, o pessoal continuou funcionamento sem contratos ou salários. Este era um projecto que tinha alcançado muitos resultados positivos debaixo de circunstâncias extremamente difíceis. Muitos doadores demonstraram um interesse em financiar, se os problemas externos pudessem ser resolvidos. Ninguém quis ser envolvido em quaisquer "acordos engraçados com UNOPS e RUTEC". Embora eles permanecem anónimos por enquanto, também há uma forte convicção entre certas pessoas que deveria ser removido o envolvimento de PNUD no projecto: "que é o beijo de morte para qualquer projecto".

A partir do final de abril de 2000, o Leon Kukkuk gastou mais uma vez o seu tempo, não com o trabalho que ele foi empregado para fazer, mas compensar, como um indivíduo, a falta de competência de organizações como o PNUD, UNOPS e RUTEC. Um projecto no qual supostamente a responsabilidade era distribuída mais de três entidades jurídicas veio agora descansar nos ombros de um indivíduo privado.

Não vamos perder tempo falar sobre as maquinações destas três organizações para evitar as consequências das suas faltas consideráveis. Nem nas suas maquinações para buscar créditos dos sucessos do projecto seja descrito em qualquer grande detalhe.

Noventa nove por cento de correspondência, e-mail, telefonemas e conversações encetadas pelo Leon Kukkuk não obtiveram qualquer resposta.

Dentro deste mar de indiferença pode ser resumidos brevemente os seguintes eventos:

MICROFORM: Motivado por promessas vagas do PNUD, o centro tropeçou de um plano de contingência para o próximo. Pessoal trabalhou sem contratos ou salários. Leon Kukkuk perdeu tempo de 19 de setembro a 10 de outubro de 2000 em Luanda, mas voltou a Huambo sem alcançar qualquer significante resultado. No dia 31de janeiro de 2001 o centro fechou entre consideráveis caos e sentimento de dor. Antes do fecho final, o Leon Kukkuk tentou obter apoio do Governo Provincial e outras ONGs. Henrique Barbosa (o Director de Planeamento) disse que este tipo de projecto só poderá ser fechado depois de uma avaliação e autorização do Ministro do Planeamento. Alberta Gomes (Representante ADRA no Huambo, uma ONG angolana) e Carlos Figueiredo (Representante da Development Workshop no Huambo), ambos os membros do conselho directivo de MICROFORM, opuseram-se veementemente a tal um encerramento.
Que prosseguiu de qualquer maneira.
O problema maior era o que fazer com quantidade significativa de equipamentos. Estes foram divididos em quatro categorias:
Os que podem ser distribuídos a beneficiários seleccionados.
Os que podem ser distribuídos ao Ministério de Agricultura, Centros de Treinamento e Pesquisa e ONG.
Os que podem ser vendidos.
Os que podem ser armazenados para possível uso num pendente futuro.

Parte dos salários em atraso do Pessoal era liquidado na medida do possível com a venda de equipamento e caso nenhum movimento positivo relativo ao projecto, o restante equipamento seria vendido até ao final de fevereiro de 2001 .
Em 11 de fevereiro de 2001, Leon Kukkuk viajou num voo militar a Luanda.

RUTEC: A RUTEC pensava que com o seu projecto “positivo”, o projecto seria estendido como um assunto de rotina. Eles não entendiam porque que a RUTEC com um tal próspero projecto no Huambo, não estava sendo apoiado. Disseram-lhes que a RUTEC necessariamente não era bem visto como parte do projecto no Huambo e deveriam elaborar uma proposta construtiva de como eles poderiam continuar a ter um papel. Esta proposta deveria responder a pergunta de como envolvimento de RUTEC poderia contribuir para o projecto como também endereço a percepção que o seu envolvimento até a data era não-existente e muito caro.
A sua resposta: “Para o futuro do projecto eu não sei o suficiente do que vocês querem e como é que a Rutec poderá ajudar e poder avançar um plano coerente para o futuro”.
No dia 10 de novembro de 2000, quando a UNOPS enviou as instruções ao Leon Kukkuk para terminar o projecto: “Por favor, me manda qualquer comentário que você pode ter sobre isto, e entra qualquer em acção que você julga apropriado e determinado que nós não estaremos em condições de o apoiar financeiramente até termos novo um acordo”.

UNOPS: UNOPS não tem nenhuma presença em Angola desde janeiro de 2000. Eles não fizeram entrega alguma do projecto antes de partir, presumivelmente porque eles achavam que não era o seu projecto.
Num fax 01 de novembro de 2000, enviado por Dimitri Samaras a Boris Kamstra, RUTEC recebeu ordens para terminar o projecto imediatamente.
Uma nota diz: “para implementar os pontos 3 e 4 acima, UNOPS contactará PNUD/CO para iniciar nosso procedimento interno das ONU para transferência de equipamento de projecto para o Governo e identificação da entidade designada por último beneficiário (s); a transferência oficial acontecerá em uma decisão do Coordenador Residente de ONU baseado numa recomendação do Comité de Pesquisa da Propriedade Local PNUD (LPSB).’

É quase desnecessário dizer que nada estava terminado. Muita correspondência enviada por Leon Kukkuk a busca de claridade relativamente aos aspectos práticos e logísticos de tal uma transferência permanecem sem resposta.

Em 15 de maio de 2001 Leon Kukkuk falou com Dimitri Samaras por telefone. Seguir é uma cópia das notas dele na conversação:
UNOPS para desembolsar o projecto e não para implementar.
Pierre Marie Achy para autorizar pagamentos, depois disso PNUD RR.
Não teve boas relações com John Dommett, e quase cancelou contrato.
Está disponível ajudar a achar soluções.
A forma de tratamento do PNUD é retaliativa, mas aquela administração nova poderia ter uma atitude diferente.
RUTEC era um contratado pre-selecionado, não seguiu os procedimentos habituais.
UNOPS foi contactado à última hora no projecto e o seu papel nunca foi clarificado completamente.
Quando ele tentou adquirir ligação com John Dommett para discutir soluções, lhe foi dito que esta pessoa não estava mais na RUTEC e achou que a nova administração tem muito pouca ideia sobre projecto.

PNUD: No dia 13 de julho de 2000, Francisco de Almeida (PNUD) escreveu um e-mail a Teresa Felix (PNUD):
“Por favor, prepara a nota para o arquivo da reunião da nossa viagem ao Huambo com o Director de RUTEC para estar pronto o mais tardar segunda-feira. Este assunto precisa ser finalizado antes da partida de Sr. Balima, marcado para o dia 18. Por favor, dê prioridade de topo a este assunto para pôr o nosso escritório no lado seguro. A propósito o que está acontecendo com o Leon?
Por favor, peça que venha nos ver, assim nós podemos discutir o futuro do projecto tendo em conta nossa situação financeira atual”.

Novamente não será desperdiçado nenhum tempo ou espaço para dizer que isto não foi feito.

Como parte da Revisão do País, a Equipa de Revisão visitou o projecto no Huambo no dia 22 de outubro de 2000, e ficou informado das dificuldades. Como resultado Zoraida Mesa, o PNUD RR, escreveu um memorando não assinado a James Curry (james.curry@UNDP.org), Director do Escritório de Auditoria e Revisão de Desempenho que em resposta do dia 14 de janeiro de 2001 fez estas perguntas a Bisrat Aklilu, Deputado Director Executivo, UNOPS, Nova Iorque. A resposta dele no dia 14 de Fevereiro de 2001 demonstra aquele UNOPS tinha perdido qualquer ligação ténue que eles já podem ter estado usando este projecto ao fim de 1998.

Em 04 de novembro de 2000 Stan Nkwain (stan.nkwain@UNDP.org) Deputado Representante de Residente Sênior-Projetos, PNUD, Luanda, foi ao Huambo e discutiu o projecto com Leon Kukkuk. No final do dia ele voltou a Luanda com alguns documentos e uma promessa que uma futura resposta será dada dentro de duas semanas.

Estes documentos desapareceram e nenhuma resposta ainda foi dada.

No final de março de 2001 Leon Kukkuk e Teresa Felix apresentaram o projecto a Michel Falavigna (michel.falavigna@UNDP.org), o Conselheiro de Programa Regional do PNUD, Nova Iorque.

Como é habitual isto não foi mencionado no relatório “regresso-para-escritório” de sua parte, nem lá existe qualquer avaliação.

Leon Kukkuk foi contratado pelo PRC de 01 de março 2001 a 30 de junho de 2001 encarregado do seguinte:

Preparar a documentação pertinente para os auditores, como motivação para uma avaliação detalhada e auditoria do projecto.
Preparar um Relatório Final e Inventário de equipamento actualmente em Huambo
Preparar um rascunho de Documento de Projecto para uma possível continuação do projecto.

Na preparação do plano de trabalho de Leon Kukkuk houve uma troca de cartas que a seguir é descrita:
“Antes de ser aprovado este plano, pode você clarificar o que quer dizer por “ encerramento legal do projecto?”.

Obrigado.

Querido Sr Nkwain,

Muito obrigado pela sua pergunta que tentarei clarificar sob meu ponto de vista.

Para além dos beneficiários e doadores que são uma prioridade importante há vários parceiros que de facto têm uma estaca no projecto. Estes são PRC, o Governo Provincial e claro que UNOPS, PNUD e RUTEC.

Em julho de 2000, quando o contrato com RUTEC estava se acabando, e nós não estávamos recebendo nenhuma instrução de concreto do UNOPS ou PNUD, nós fomos em frente com três opções:

Abandonar o projecto.
Fechar o projecto e armazenar tudo. (ou entrega-lo ao governo que estava pedindo com base em documentação)
Continuar como melhor podermos /pendentes numa solução.

Estas opções foram apresentadas às autoridades locais que me falaram que opções um e dois seria ilegal em termos de procedimento reconhecido. (tenham em conta que eles querem uma continuação do projecto e é muito difícil de ter o seu apoio por qualquer coisa que seja diferente )

Quando nós fechamos ao no final de janeiro de 2001, foi dito uma vez mais que isto é considerado a uma acção ilegal da minha parte, porque era uma decisão unilateral, sem qualquer apoio de documentação ou instruções das autoridades propriamente reconhecidas. Disseram-me que estas instruções deveriam estar baseadas em decisões feitas entre os donos do projecto em Luanda e que o governador deveria ser informado primeiro. Não seguindo este procedimento, poderia ser intentada contra mim uma acção judicial. (Eu fiquei limitado em minha casa durante dois dias como consequência de decisão do fecho do projecto)

Neste contexto o que seria então encerramento legal?

Algo que não é determinado por mim unilateralmente.
Resolução do sentimento de pesar considerável que actualmente existe relativamente ao caos e desordem debaixo do qual este projecto funcionou e fechou.
Baseado na documentação que reflecte a decisão dos donos do projecto.
Informando as autoridades locais.

Como já aconteceram muitos enganos e decisões dolorosas, eu penso que o fechamento legal também deveria incluir algum tipo de controle de danos para recuperar a credibilidade”.

Uma vez mais toda a informação disponível foi apresentado a Bereket Sletzion (bereket.sletzion@UNDP.org) o auditor de PNUD que aparentemente nos meados de junho de 2001 informou aos seus superiores que ele sentia que uma auditoria era necessária para uma avaliação concreta.

Aos 27 de junho de 2001 Leon Kukkuk distribuiu o rascunho do Relatório Final e da Proposta de Projecto. O rascunho da Proposta de Projecto estava completo e preparada para consulta com o Governo Provincial de Huambo, Development Workshop, ADRA e Cooperação Suíça e uma cópia também foi enviada a cada um deles para avaliação. Eles queriam com urgência saber que possibilidades futuras existem e para a sua própria planificação estratégica.

A missão de avaliação foi assegurada para 21-24 de agosto de 2001. Nenhum relatório de missão está disponível, mas será respondida quando o recebermos. Talvez a descrição mais cortês da missão é que foi um obscuro fracasso resultando na perda da pequena credibilidade que o PNUD tinha.

Em 13 meses passados, nenhum progresso foi registado e nada foi feito para solucionar quaisquer assuntos. A maioria destes assuntos foram apresentados pela primeira vez no dia 19 de setembro de 1998 .

É difícil não chegar à conclusão que PNUD é uma organização obsoleta, arrogante e incompetente que só se interessa com a sua própria dinâmica interna. Carregada de pessoal, em todos os níveis, que se esquecem ou nunca souberam quais são os supostos objectivos que o PNUD deve ter.
Isto está tendo um efeito imensamente destrutivo nas nossas vidas porque não está próxima nenhuma solução.

Se o povo angolano tinha fixado as suas esperanças em qualquer ajuda de PNUD na reconstrução do seu país então esse povo esperará em vão.

Estas são as perguntas que nós queremos que sejam respondidas:

PNUD

O PNUD seguiu os seus próprios procedimentos internos e protecções na preparação do Documento do Projecto com consulta devida aos seus parceiros do Governo angolano?
Qual é a política de PNUD em projectos com condicionantes? Que passos são dados para prevenir estes tipos de projectos a serem implementados pelo PNUD?
Como é que o PNUD assegurou que o contrato que o UNOPS assinou com a RUTEC confirma os objectivos do Documento de Projecto?
O PNUD seguiu os seus próprios procedimentos internos para monitorização e avaliação, revisões de tripartida, relatórios de seguimento oportunos e eficientes e em cooperação com os seus parceiros no Governo angolano? Onde estes relatórios estão?
Tentou o PNUD com UNOPS, RUTEC, o Governo Central e Provincial e outros parceiros, assegurar que o fim da fase de piloto é administrado de um modo significativo, numa forma oportuna e de acordo com os seus próprios procedimentos internos?
Que passos são dados pelo PNUD para assegurar que são implementados projectos que originam do seu escritório e são por eles financiados, que tenham o respeito devido para os direitos fundamentais de seu pessoal e beneficiários de acordo com os estatutos do sistema de Nações Unidas?

UNOPS

Que passos foram dados para assegurar que o contrato que eles assinaram com a RUTEC continha os objectivos específicos e realizáveis como reza o projecto documento e conforme os procedimentos internos postos em lugar para assegurar que estes objectivos serão conhecidos?
Que passos foram dados para assegurar que a metodologia de treinamento de RUTEC é original (e não talvez uma cópia do sistema de OIT) e que o seu equipamento é original (e não talvez dentro do domínio público ou violações de direito autorais) antes de pagar uma taxa de licenciamento de U$D 250 000.00?
Justificação de como o U$D 164 511.00 recebido como AOS tinha sido gasto em administração, enquanto assegurava complacência com os objectivos do projecto, com missão oportuna e eficiente informação e avaliação dos assuntos levantados.
Eles têm certificados de conclusão que justificam o pagamento de U$D 1 505 521.00 em vinte parciais? Nesse caso, qual era a qualificação desta pessoa (s) para assegurar que estavam sendo conhecidos os objectivos do projecto e justificar o pagamento?
Que passos foram dados para assegurar que o fim da fase piloto é administrado de um modo eficiente conforme a realidade e os desejos de PNUD, UNOPS, RUTEC, o Governo Central e Provincial e outros parceiros, numa forma oportuna e em acordo com os seus próprios procedimentos internos?
Que passos foram dados pelo UNOPS para assegurar que são implementados projectos que lhes são exigido implementar com devido respeito para os direitos fundamentais de seu pessoal e beneficiários de acordo com os estatutos do sistema de Nações Unidas?

RUTEC

O que aconteceu com o U$D 1 milhão?
Foram organizados seguro de saúde e de desemprego para o pessoal como foi requerido pelo contrato? Se não, como fazer para que esta omissão seja corrigida.
Que relatório está disponível mostrando que ajuda técnica a RUTEC tenha providenciado ao projecto, ou em geral que benefício recebeu o projecto da RUTEC ? Estes são apoiados por contas claras?
Que passos foram dados para assegurar que o fim da fase piloto é administrado de um modo eficiente conforme a realidade e os desejos de PNUD, UNOPS, RUTEC, o Governo Central e Provincial e outros parceiros, e numa forma oportuna?
Que passos deu a RUTEC para assegurar que são protegidos os Direitos fundamentais do seu pessoal e beneficiários?


Luanda e Huambo, Angola,


15 de setembro de 2001

(Copias originais em Inglês e Português foram assinados pela toda pessoal do projecto e distribuído ao Ministério de Planeamento, Comissão de Direitos Humanos do NU, entre outros. Não a nenhuma resposta ainda.)