Is the noose finally tightening?

UNDP has shown remarkable skill at avoiding scrutiny of its activities over the last decade or so.

Anecdotal evidence of UNDP as corrupt and inept circulated fairly extensively but was never followed up for various reasons. Everybody just knew that they were inept and corrupt, but nobody was allowed to talk about it.

The very few voices of concern more or less shouted into a void of indifference.
Even as calls for reform of the United Nations became more urgent from the beginning of the decade onwards, this concentrated more on the UN Secretariat as well as reform of the outdated structures such as the Security Council.

UNDP continued blissfully with making grandiose promises of all the wonderful things that they were doing and are going to do. Efforts by a very small number of people pointing out that they were not doing any of these things and had no intention of doing any of them invariably fell on deaf ears. Or rather on ears that were concerned somewhere else. Each time it appeared as if attention might shift to UNDP, something else more urgent cropped up. For a while the scandal surrounding Paul Wolfowitz at the World Bank, dominated the discourse surrounding the unaccountability of International Institutions.

But if UNDP seriously believed that they will remain outside of the limelight indefinitely – it is possible that they may have believed such a thing, considering the extent to which they are stuck within their own little bubble – recent developments demonstrate just how wrong they are.
The small trickle of publicly available information has turned in the last few months into a torrent.

The IO Watch website claims: “Articles and allegations raise problems in various UNDP country offices, many of them going back for years.”

The current issues include North Korea, Burma, Cambodia, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Rwanda, Russia, Ivory Coast, DRC, Afghanistan, Somalia, Philippines.

It is by no means the entire list. The real crimes are still to be exposed.

At the IO Watch site we are told: “They involve disregard for rules, intrigues, punishment of whistle-blowers, improper staffing, weak audits, selling improper travel documents, and assisting diamond-dealing and other dubious involvements in war-torn or struggling countries. At UNDP headquarters, allegations involve a meaningless transparency policy, poor governance in a compliant UNDP Executive Board, UNDP management refusal to supply audit reports to that board, inadequate internal audit work, manipulation of Internet blogs, belligerent top leadership, stonewalling on major issues, serious financial management control problems, and rejection of established UN policies and an insistence on an independent operational status.”
A survey in 2004 of staff integrity produced surprisingly negative comments on UN leadership and the management culture. Concerns have overwhelmingly come to focus on UNDP.

Perhaps the most central elements of this UNDP situation can be found in serious troubles uncovered in the UNDP office in North Korea in early 2007, which led Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to call for a “world-wide audit of all programmes and funds.”

Trouble started when Artjon Shkurtaj, UNDP’s Chief of Operations and Security in North Korea (2004-2006) witnessed a range of UNDP abuses such as the funnelling of hard cash to the rogue regime of Kim Jong Il. He reported the issues to his superiors at UNDP. He was told not to make trouble. Finally Shkurtaj blew the whistle outside UNDP. UNDP then sacked him.

Fortunately, the UN has made provision for such situations. Kofi Annan had set up an Ethics Office, housed in the Secretariat and reporting to the secretary-general. Among other things, the Ethics Office is tasked to protect whistleblowers from retaliation.
So Shkurtaj took his case to the UN Ethics Office protesting that he had been sacked in retaliation for his whistle-blowing.

There, the ethics director, Robert Benson, a Canadian, finally produced a confidential memo addressed to the head of UNDP, Administrator Kemal Dervis, and copied to Ban and a number of others. He saw grounds that “a prima facie case had been established” that UNDP was punishing Shkurtaj for his whistle blowing. Mentioning “independent and corroborative information” for his finding, Benson supported Shkurtaj. UNDP officials denied this, saying that he was on a short-term contract that had simply expired.

By now the promised “world-wide audit of all programmes and funds,” after many delays, had shrunk to become only a single audit of the North Korea office.

On 01 June 2007 UNDP issued a statement regarding the preliminary audit report on UN operations in North Korea saying:
“UNDP will be transmitting a formal management response to the ACABQ shortly. UNDP would welcome a continuation of the audit process, including a visit by the UNBOA to DPRK. UNDP looks forward to the final audit report.”

This audit itself was stonewalled, but did manage to find violations of UNDP regulations. Eventually this was tacitly acknowledged, then swept under the carpet by the UNDP management. In a letter sent to UNDP, Mark Wallace, the US State Department ambassador at the UN for management and reform, wrote that the auditors’ testimony shows it is “impossible” for the agency to verify whether its funds “have actually been used for bona fide development purposes or if the DPRK [North Korea] has converted such funds for its own illicit purposes.”

Paradoxically enough, neither Wallace nor the U.S. government were allowed copies of the audits, which are considered “management tools” by UNDP and not even available to the governments that finance the organization.

It also turns out that UNDP, which has no ethics office of its own, is refusing to recognize the jurisdiction of the UN Secretariat’s Ethics Office, promising instead that they will be making their own arrangements for a “complementary external review” that would cover both its North Korea operations and Shkurtaj’s allegations.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon discussed all of this with UNDP Administrator Kemal Dervis, but none of the substance of these discussions is publicly available. Kemal Dervis has also not held a press conference since December 2006. He is simply not available to provide some sort of clarity on what is going on.

On 11 September 2007 the International Herald Tribune reported that:
“UNDP and other specialized UN agencies intend to meet later this month to try to define standards for whistle-blowers, since the entities contend they do not fall under UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's ethics office.”

It is a remarkable feat of arrogance on the side of these agencies to believe that it is up to them to determine, by themselves, under what jurisdiction they want to fall. UNDP did not bring up this point when the Ethics Office was created in 2005. They did not even mention it when they became aware that this office was investigating one of their decisions. It only became an issue when this office made a decision that they did not like.
The IO Watch website suggests that “UNDP is, for most practical purposes, morphing from a development agency into a species of highly privileged rogue state - operating, it seems, outside any jurisdiction.”
Notwithstanding all the talk about jurisdiction, it still remains a fact that the concept of “investigations” within the UN system should also be taken with a pinch of salt.

In an article “The lies from within,” Francis Montil, former Deputy Director of the United Nations' internal investigation agency, OIOS says:
"The culture" is one in which "the hypocrite, the liar, the fraudster, the nepotist and the dilettante is more likely to survive and progress than the average 'thinking' reasonable man or woman".
"The oil-for-food scandal taught them nothing," says Montil, who believes the fraud and corruption in the 2005 tsunami reconstruction period will come back to haunt the UN, which has willfully ignored all the warning signs.
A lot more pressure needs to be applied if a UN agency, especially the so-called principle agency of the system is to be held truly accountable.

The Government Accountability Project (GAP) wrote a letter on 03 October 2007 in this regard to;

Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary General
The United Nations
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Secretary General:

As you may be aware, in 2005, the Government Accountability Project (GAP) provided technical assistance to the Office of the Under Secretary for Management at the United Nations in its efforts to improve internal oversight and transparency. When the Secretary-General issued the bulletin entitled “Protection against retaliation for reporting misconduct and for cooperating with duly authorized audits or investigations” (SGB/2005/21) on December 19, 2005, GAP publicly praised the United Nations for applying best practices in whistleblower protection. However, since that time, serious concerns have arisen regarding the effective implementation of the policy.

We were deeply dismayed to learn of the treatment of Artjon Shkurtaj, a whistleblower who was retaliated against by UNDP management after disclosing misconduct in the UN office in North Korea. The Washington Post (“Reprisal Indicated in a U.N. Program, August 21, 2007)” reported that the UN Development Programme refused a request from the UN Ethics Office to submit to an investigation of Mr. Shkurtaj’s disclosures.

Instead, Kemal Dervis, Administrator of UNDP, announced that he would name candidates for an ad hoc panel to investigate the matter, effectively asserting that UNDP will define its own separate ethical standard. At GAP, we are surprised and troubled to learn that UN Programmes apparently can opt out of the whistleblower protection policy and reject Ethics Office findings.

This ad hoc decision-making comes, unfortunately, as no surprise to those who have watched the reform process at the United Nations closely. In their wisdom, the members of the Redesign Panel on the United Nations System of Administration of Justice anticipated the “confusion” that would surround the scope of the rulings of the Ethics Office and, calling its functions “[A]n essential component of the reform of the Organization,” urged the Secretary General to clarify its jurisdiction more than a year ago.

We would appreciate your written clarification of the basis upon which a troubled progamme, such as UNDP, can be allowed to avoid independent scrutiny of the propriety of its conduct.

Mr. Secretary General, we wish to second the appeal of the Redesign Panel; we ask that you respond positively and urgently apply the rulings of the Ethics Office to the UN Funds and Programmes. The “UN Delivering as One” initiative cannot be achieved with each unit applying a different set of ethical standards, nor can “One UN” be implemented at the country level if led by a UNDP that insists on its own institutional autonomy in the face of General Assembly resolutions.

To remove all controversy and place the United Nations firmly on the road to reform, we appeal to you, Mr. Secretary General, to invoke your authority to oblige the United Nations system to abide by a single code of ethics and to address immediately the plight of those staff members who sought to protect the mission of the United Nations and instead exposed themselves to injustice and retaliation at the hands of unscrupulous actors.

We look forward to your response and wish to take this opportunity to assure you of our highest consideration.

Very truly yours,

Beatrice Edwards
International Program Director
Government Accountablity Project

One can only hope that they receive a response.

How the UN system, specifically UNDP and UNOPS respond to requests for audits

An e-mail by Francisco de Almeida (Assistant Resident Representative UNDP Angola) to Maria Teresa Felix (Programme Officer UNDP Angola) on 12 December 2000:
For the inclusion of the RUTEC project in the audit of our office, mr. Stan asked us to prepare an informative note about the antecedents and major problems related to the RUTEC project.
When could you give this note to Stan???
On the bases of your note Mr Stan will prepare the justification for the inclusion of RUTEC in our audit plan.
Thanks Francisco.

A letter, dated 27 December 2000, that Zoraida Mesa had sent to James Curry, Director of the Office for Audit and Performance Appraisal, UNDP, New York:
This letter is being sent in request of an audit for UNDP Angola. You will find attached justification, from both Programs and Operations, for this audit.
As you will note in the justification for the RUTEC contract Programs has stated that the key issue to be addressed is the lack of information to justify the 1.65 million US dollars recorded by UNOPS as total expenditure for activities related to the NEX project no ANG/96/B01. Clarity is sought on this issue through the audit to enable the preparation of the report of the CO being prepared for the government and donors and in order that recommendations are developed for UNDP and UNOPS to regularise the situation. . .

Amongst the recommendations she concluded:
Only a formal audit could conceivably raise these questions with UNOPS, RUTEC and any other interested parties in a manner that would help clarify them within the framework of the report that the CO needs to prepare for the government and donors on the CRP Trust Fund. The audit would have to elucidate these issues in a way that enables them to make recommendations to UNDP and UNOPS on how to regularise the situation.

Memorandum from James W. Currie, Director, Office of Audit and Performance Review to Bisrat Aklilu, Deputy Executive Director, UNOPS, 14 January 2001

Subject: Project “Capacity Building for the Community Rehabilitation and National Reconciliation Programme” (ANG 96/B01)

This communication relates to issues which the UNDP Resident Representative in Angola has raised with me concerning the UNOPS implementation relating to The Contract UNOPS signed with a South African company by the name of RUTEC under the above mentioned project. The main issues he raises is the general lack of information to justify the use of the funds under The Contract. Specifically, he alleges that:

· It appears that the decision that led to the award of the contract to RUTEC was made by UNOPS, as the implementing agent for this activity, only, without any involvement of the government (the Ministry of Planning), as the executing agent;
· There is lack of information as to the results that may have been achieved or the manner in which the funds under the contract have so far been spent;
· There is no record of a monitoring visit by UNOPS;
· On-site monitoring by RUTEC seems to have been limited to a one-day mission undertaken in 2000, with no substantitive technical support provided for ongoing activities and no mission report on follow-up;
· Apart from the Contract document itself, there is no detailed description of the activity to be undertaken by RUTEC; therefore, there are no specific goals to determine payment of the different instalments of the agreed fees, and;
· There is no final report indicating results achieved and lessons learned.

I would appreciate it if you could look into the above and inform me as to the facts of this matter, with any supporting material as you may deem appropriate.


Response of Bisrat Aklilu (UNOPS) to James W. Currie (OAPR), 13 February 2001

Subject: Project “Capacity Building for the Community Rehabilitation and National Reconciliation Programme” (ANG 96/B01)

This is in response to your Memorandum of 14 January 2001 pertaining to queries and concerns raised on the above mentioned subject by the UNDP Resident Representative in Angola. We believe that before addressing the allegations, a short presentation of the project and the relevant background would help to understand our role in this project.

In September 1996, UNDP submitted to UNOPS a draft Project Document ANG 96/005 “Establishment of a Pilot Community Production Centre in Huambo” with a request to provide implementation services.
The project was to be funded through a UNDP Trust Fund and private sector funding as well (Coca-Cola, Equator Bank). For lack of interest from some Donors, the project never materialised.

In November 1996, UNDP submitted a different Project Document ANG 96/003 “Establishment of a Pilot Community Centre in Huambo” The minutes of the Local Project Appraisal Committee as well as a letter from the Provincial Government of Angola formalising concession of land premises for the Centre in Huambo was also provided. Officials of the Government of Angola were fully involved. UNOPS was requested to act as Executing Agency for the project.
The Project Document identified RUTEC as a pre-selected contractor, which was fully endorsed by the Government. It is UNOPS understanding that RUTEC was pre-selected in accordance with the applicable UNDP procurement rules and procedures.

In December 1996, UNOPS presented this project ANG/96/003 to its Project Acceptance Committee (PAC) which was fully endorsed for execution by UNOPS. The minute of the PAC is attaché herewith.

Due to security reasons and funding issues, activities of the project were initiated only in February 1998. A contract was issued to RUTEC as pre-selected entity, following PRAC recommendations and CPO approval early April 1998.

In March 1998, we received an official communication from the UNDP Country Office stating “please note that RUTEC, though conceived initially as a stand alone project, was made an integral part of the ANG/96/100-Community Rehabilitation Project. It is a subcontract to be financed from the output budget: ANG/96/B01 budget line 2101- Trust Fund for the CRP.”
Due to budgetary constraints, UNDP asked UNOPS to charge the RUTEC contract to this project.
Later on, at UNDP request, RUTEC’s contract was charged against 2 project budgets, ANG/96/B01 and ANG/96/100.

It is UNOPS understanding that all project documents received from UNDP Luanda have followed UNDP’s internal procedures including adequate consultation with the host government and hence we believe that the Government of Angola, and the Ministry of Planning in particular, has endorsed them. It is difficult to conceive that UNOPS would have taken a unilateral decision pertaining to the award of the RUTEC’s contract or any other major project action unless it is in full conformity with the provisions and arrangements specified in the project document which has been signed by both UNDP and the Government.

With respect to project results and achievements of the RUTEC contract, these are documented in the quarterly reports from RUTEC as well as recent expressions of interest from the Government to raise additional funds for this centre.
With regards to the manner in which UNOPS as executing agency, has spent the funds, all financial records have been maintained according to the applicable procedures and are available for verification. An overall audit of Angola Programme was conducted in February 2000.

‘Monitoring visits were made by UNOPS project staff in Angola and can be verified. All invoices from RUTEC were certified by our then Co-ordinator and Programme Manager, Mr Lawrence Doczy and Mr. José Saléma who have visited the Centre regularly. Mr. Dimitri Samaras, the SPMO and myself on mission from New York, visited the site in March 1998 and 1999.’

Contrary to what is alleged by the new UNDP Resident Representative, on site monitoring by RUTEC was not limited to a one-day mission undertaken in 2000. Mr. Dommett, the RUTEC Programme Manager in South Africa visited Angola many times and met with UNOPS staff, UNDP Country Office and Government Representatives. He and his staff in Huambo have met on many occasions to assess project progress. Periodic reports, from which results can be seen, were submitted to UNDP by RUTEC itself. A final report is being prepared by RUTEC.

The statement of work which was to be undertaken by RUTEC is attached to the contract signed with RUTEC and appropriate specific goals and milestones are fully described in the project document as well as the contract.

We are at your disposal to further review this case, if you deem it necessary.

(Note: None of the attachments mentioned in the letter were in fact attached.)

Note Prepared by Leon Kukkuk and distributed to UNDP, UNOPS and Bereket Sletzion, UNDP auditor:

Project: ‘Capacity Building for the Community Rehabilitation and National Reconstruction Programme’
(ANG/96/B01 –BL 2101)

Notes as general background information:

Documents can refer to several project codes:

ANG 96/003
ANG 96/ 003/ 01/31
ANG 96/001
ANG 96/100
ANG 96/005
ANG 96/B01

These all refer to the same project, which was by all appearances implemented without finalising the codes, project documents and clarifying the roles of the partners.
This project is also generally referred to at UNDP as the ‘RUTEC Project’, at UNOPS and RUTEC as ‘The Huambo Community Production Centre’ and in Huambo as ‘Microform’ (This is a local initiative to bypass the problems created by the vague arrangements between UNDP, UNOPS and RUTEC).

There are no signed Project Documents, although there are various related versions of such. Requests over a period of two years to obtain these were unsuccessful. Apparently the Project Document for this project is the CRP programme document.

The project went through a planning phase from late 1995 – beginning 1998.
(The impression that is gained from the correspondence in the files is that implementation was hampered by a lack of funding and by a lack of clarity regarding what RUTEC can provide. Although much of the correspondence does not appear to be available, it seems as though a decision was taken late in 1997 to implement the project before these issues were finalised and that the original contract was signed with RUTEC, without resolving its weaknesses.)
In February 1998 UNOPS signed The Contract with RUTEC.
RUTEC started setting up the project in Huambo in the beginning of June 1998.
Contract amendment 1 brought the original termination date of 31 May 2000 forward to 31 January 2000 based on a starting date of September 1998.
After several delays and a suspension of activities for two months the centre started functioning at the end of January 2000.
Considering that The Contract allows for an 18-month pilot phase, the termination should have been 31 July 2000. This was never contractually or otherwise confirmed.

The Provincial Government requested an extension of the project on the argument that it can perform a key function in the reconstruction of the province.

UNOPS had no presence in Angola since the end of January 2000. Several meetings held with UNDP and CRP suggested that the future of the project shall be decided during a tripartite review. This was originally planned for May 2000, then July 2000. The only review that was eventually held was as part of the Country Co-operation assessment on 21/22 October 2000.

The SDRR (P) visited Huambo on 04 November 2000 where the issues were presented to him. To date no feedback has been received.

On 10 November 2000 the Project Manager received a copy of a letter from UNOPS to RUTEC, dated 01 November 2000, instructing the centre to be closed down and the transfer of custody to UNDP of all assets. This was forwarded to UNDP asking for instructions regarding the action that need to be taken. To date no instructions in this regard had been received.

Due to lack of action on the part of UNOPS and RUTEC, and indecision by UNDP, in defining a specific course of action for the project, the staff in Huambo was faced with three options after July 2000:
Abandon the project along with all ongoing activities, a considerable investment in equipment, vehicles and goodwill.
Place everything in storage pending a solution.
Continue as is best possible pending a solution.

The first option was considered too extreme and the second not practically possible due to local expectations and the absence of sufficient funds. The last option was decided upon after consultation with the staff, CRP (Huambo) and local Government officials.

Local authorities advised that only the Minister of Planning is authorised to close projects of this type. Correspondence between the CRP and the Provincial Government suggested that an extension of the project shall be sought with additional funding as well as replicating the project in another province by December 2000. This is reflected in the CRP Phase II Project Document.

This situation was explained in some detail to the CR team and UNDP representatives on 21 October 2000. The Provincial Governor also specifically requested the CR team to find support for the project.

Due to further lack of action it became practically impossible to continue with the project and, again after due consultation with the staff, CRP (Huambo) and local Government officials, as well as informing UNDP, the centre was closed down on 31 January 2001 amidst substantial chaos and ill feeling.

Immediate consequences for me were the fact that I was confined to my house for two days by the Governor who also wrote a very strongly worded letter to the Ministry of Planning and UNDP. After discussions with him it was decided that I should come to Luanda for one week to resolve the problems of the project.

Action that need to be taken:

UNDP need to take responsibility for the project, which now rests with a private individual, which has neither the resources nor the mandate to solve any of the outstanding issues.
These issues include:
Resolution of expectations of staff, beneficiaries and Angolan Government.
Legal and satisfactory closure of the project.
Unless these issues can be resolved and unless UNDP can regain credibility, all talk of a follow up project is pointless.


Response To Issues Raised By Angola CO In Relation To Project ANG 96/B01 BL 2101 On 27 December 2000 And Memorandum To Mr James W. Currie From Mr Bisrat Aklilu Dated 13 February 2001 (Prepared by Leon Kukkuk on behalf of UNDP)

Issue:
The activity undertaken under this contract was an integral part of the CRP (NEX) project, but was never included in the project evaluation that took place in 1999, or in related NEX audits, thus leaving everyone in the dark regarding its operational performance.
The government executing agency of the CRP, namely, the Ministry of Planning, has verbally stated that it never had any hand in the decisions that led to the award of The Contract and is not aware of any results that may have been achieved or the manner in which the 1.65 million dollars have so far been spent.

UNOPS Response: The copy of the minutes of the PAC is attached. (It is not attached)

UNDP Response: There are no signed copies of Project Document, PAC, PRAC recommendations or CPO approval in UNDP files. Would it be possible for UNOPS to provide such items?
There are no reports from UNOPS or RUTEC itemising expenditure of the amount under the contract.

Issue:
Despite the importance of the amount of money involved, there is no record of any monitoring visit by UNOPS, and on-site monitoring by RUTEC seems to have been limited to a one-day mission undertaken in 2000, with no substantive technical support provided for ongoing activities, and no mission report on follow-up.

UNOPS Response: ‘Monitoring visits were made by UNOPS project staff in Angola and can be verified. All invoices from RUTEC were certified by our then Co-ordinator and Programme Manager, Mr Lawrence Doczy and Mr. José Saléma who have visited the Centre regularly. Mr. Dimitri Samaras, the SPMO and myself on mission from New York, visited the site in March 1998 and 1999.

UNDP Response: (Refer to chronology of project)

Mr Doczy never met any of the project staff from Huambo, neither in Huambo itself nor in Luanda. Attempts to meet with him in 1998 were frustrated by his illness. By October 1998 he was no longer in Angola.
The Project Manager met frequently with Mr José Saléma in Luanda. Mr. Saléma was never in Huambo during the duration of the project. Consistent requests by Claudio Lopes from UNOPS during 1999 to visit the project were turned down. The UNOPS administrator, Ms Filomena Oliveira actively discouraged any assistance by any UNOPS staff member to the project. UNOPS consistently maintained that this is not a UNOPS project but an UNDP one.
In March 1998 there was not yet any project. To date no confirmation of a UNOPS visit in March 1999 can be obtained from WFP flight manifests or from the security unit. Mr Balima visited on 30 March 1999, whilst the Project Manager was in Luanda. Whether or not UNOPS staff accompanied him on this visit remains unclear. There are no UNOPS mission reports in the files.

UNOPS Response: ‘Contrary to what is alleged by the new UNDP Resident Representative, on site monitoring by RUTEC was not limited to a one-day mission undertaken in 2000. Mr. Dommett, the RUTEC Programme Manager in South Africa visited Angola many times and met with UNOPS staff, UNDP Country Office and Government Representatives. He and his staff in Huambo have met on many occasions to assess project progress. Periodic reports, from which results can be seen, were submitted to UNDP by RUTEC itself.’

UNDP Response: In 1998 Mr John Dommett from RUTEC visited Huambo in May and then again in August, both times for two days. The Project Manager met with him in Johannesburg on two occasions. The Centre was not yet established. At no time has he ever met with any government official. (Mr. Dommett had done this in January 1996 and never again subsequently) According to Mr Dommett at the time co-operation with the government is yet undefined and need to be finalised during the course of the project.
In 1999 he met with the Project Manager in Luanda in March then in April in Johannesburg, both times for one afternoon. On 13 October 1999 he met again in Johannesburg with the Project Manager for a morning whilst the latter was in transit to Angola. The Project Manager was told that under no circumstances should he provide any financial information to UNDP as per Teresa Felix’s request. Since then there has been no contact. Project progress was never discussed. Meetings have generally been acrimonious discussions regarding lack of assistance and lack of funds. This can be supported by abundant correspondence. Correspondence also exists to demonstrate that TA (Technical Assistance) passed from Huambo to RUTEC and not the other way around. RUTEC themselves are unaware of John Dommett’s whereabouts since late 1999.
Buzwe Yafele, as acting CEO of RUTEC, visited the project in Huambo on 31 March 2000 during his stay in Angola from 29 March – 03 April 2000. Soon after his return to South Africa he was dismissed from RUTEC. This was perhaps in part because he had failed to secure funding from the project to buy 10 tons of wheat flour and to arrange an extension of the contract with UNOPS. No mission report was produced by RUTEC.
No periodic reports submitted by RUTEC to UNDP exist in the files. (See Annex IV)

Issue:
Apart from The Contract document itself; there is no detailed description of the activity to be undertaken by RUTEC, and no specific goals to determine payment of the different instalments of the agreed fees.

UNOPS response: The statement of work which was to be undertaken by RUTEC is attached to the contract signed with RUTEC and appropriate specific goals and milestones are fully described in the project document as well as The Contract.

UNDP Response: There is no project document attached to the contract.
The problem with the contract is that the item ‘Management of Centre for Two Months’ is not clarified. Only $227 000.00 had been made available to the project by RUTEC over a period of two years. This included all costs for construction, set-up and 18 months running costs.
Of $1 505 000.00 that RUTEC had received from UNOPS there is no explanation of how $1 041 000.00 had been spent. (In contravention with points 2.4 and 2.5 and Article 12 of contract no C-971794.)
An exchange of letters between the current MD of RUTEC, Mr Boris Kamstra, from October 2000 and between Teresa Felix and same in February and March 2001 and myself shows that RUTEC is unable to justify any technical contribution to the project or how funds had been spent under the contract. Mr. Kamstra was for several months after his employment unaware that RUTEC had a UN contract to implement a project in Angola.
Abundant communication between RUTEC and myself exists regarding lack of financial support to the project. This was communicated to Mr Michel Balima at UNDP on 19 September 1998, 10 February 1999, 03 September 1999 and 12 November 1999.

In addition it is interesting to note the following:

Local staff was employed on 01 July 1998 and consistently received their salaries two to three months in arrears until November 1999. Salaries were then paid on time until January 2000. The Project Manager supported staff salaries in February and March 2000 before it fell into arrears again.
RUTEC had provided no insurance, employment or health benefits to any staff as was required by the contract. (Article 5 General Conditions for UNOPS Contracts for Professional Services.)
The Project Manager was employed on 28 May 1998 and received his first salary on 23 March 1999. A promise to provide him with cash allowance in Huambo was honoured once in September 1999. His salary is currently 16 months in arrears until July 2000. To date he has not received any payment in this regard in spite of continued requests. Add to this the fact that he has now spent an additional 9 months dealing with the problems of this project, without any contract or salary, which means that he has now been two years without an income.
By the end of 1999 he had personally invested $10 000.00 in the project.

Issue:
Although by all indications the activity is considered by UNOPS as having been satisfactorily completed (the last instalment of The Contract fee has been paid) there is not a final report indicating results achieved and lessons learned.

UNDP Response: RUTEC is unaware of what the project activities were and cannot justify any expenditure under the contract.
A draft final report will be prepared by Leon Kukkuk, as Consultant for CRP, following recommendations by the audit team.

Issue:
The Country review mission did not focus on this project. However, following a visit to the project site in Huambo, the mission separately raised many questions with the CO regarding the nature of the undertaking between UNOPS, UNDP and RUTEC.

UNDP Response: During the visit to Huambo on 21/22 October 2000 the following issues were raised:

With Leon Kukkuk, Project Manager:

The project was not monitored by UNOPS or UNDP. RUTEC made only $227 000.00 of the $1.65 million available to the project, provided no logistical support or technical assistance.
UNOPS in Luanda claimed that it was not their project.
Substantial correspondence to UNDP failed to elicit any responses. Specifically a letter from UNOPS to RUTEC (01 November 2000) ordering the cessation of all activities under the contract and referring the project staff to the UN Resident Co-ordinator in Luanda for the practical and logistical aspects of such a transfer to the custody of UNDP, received no response. This left project staff with the responsibility for a substantial investment but no mandate or contractual framework within which to act. This was complicated by the fact that the Provincial Government was requesting that further funds be mobilised for the project.
Staff is working without salaries or contracts pending a solution.

With Paulo Kassoma, Provincial Governor:

The project is potentially one of the most important in the province, yet is treated like a second or third-rate project. It has no proper infrastructure, the reports submitted to the provincial government does not reflect the commitment of $1.65 million made by the international community.
‘We don’t want to see money or sign cheques, we only want to see that promises made to us are honoured.’

With Fernando Arroyo, OCHA Field Advisor:

The project is one of the most visible activities of the CRP in the province, yet receives no logistical or financial support.

Date: Fri, 15 Jun 2001 15:27:44 +0200
From: "Bereket Sletzion"
To: Herbert Haraldsson
CC: M Ali-Kparah , Stanislaus Nkwain , Teresa felix
Subject: (no subject)

Subject: UNDP ANG - Project "Capacity Building For the Community Rehabilitation and National Reconciliation Programme..." (ANG/96/B01).

Background: The project was executed by UNOPS and a South African company (RUTEC) was selected to implement activities whose funds were US$ 1.65 million. Regarding this arrangement, the following events should be noted.

1) The former UNDP-ANG RR requested for an audit to be carried out for the above mentioned project through a letter to Mr. J. Currie on 27 December 2000. In her letter she raised issues and concerns justifying her request for an audit.
2) Mr. Currie requested UNOPS/HQs to provide clarification on the issues raised by the RR. (refer to his memo of 14 January 2001).
3)UNOPS/HQs responded to Mr. Currie through a memo on 13 February 2001 generally disagreeing with the concerns raised by the RR. This memo was also sent by UNOPS/HQs to the CO.

As a follow up, the audit discussed the issue with the management of UNDP-ANG during the management audit carried out in April/May this year. As a result of the discussion, the following were decided:

1) The CO felt that an audit was still necessary. However, an evaluation of the project would be carried out before finalizing the arrangements for an audit mission.
2) A response to the UNOPS/HQs memo of 13 February 2001 would be sent to UNOPS/HQs and copied to OAPR. (At the exit of the mission a draft was already prepared and a copy is with the audit).

OAPR is therefore to wait for the results of the evaluation; renewed request for the audit; the COs response to the UNOPS memo of 13 Feb. and the reaction of UNOPS.

If you require more clarification, kindly let me know.

Regards.


An e-mail sent by Dimitri Samaras (UNOPS) to Herbert Behrstock (UNDP Angola) on 12 March 2001:
. . .Lots of money have been spent in Angola and wasted for no reason. . . or reasons beyond my imagination.
We have invested but never capitalised on it. Cost benefit analysis is indeed needed.
I do believe that this office needs a Central Management and Coordination Unit which will implement/ execute and supervise all operational activities.
. . . Regarding RUTEC, we have responded to the auditors and I am sending you a copy as well as their reaction.
I will provide at anytime all infos related to the said activity.

From Michele Falavigna to Dimitri Samaras on 13 April 2001:
Thank you Dimitri for transmitting the enclosed fax from RUTEC on ANG/96/003.
I believe that the sense of frustration about this project goes beyond not receiving the final report. There are questions in the CO on the appropriate use by RUTEC of UNDP funds and fulfilment of the contract obligations. That’s (why), the Audit which is expected to start in Angola next week has been asked to look into the matter. Definitively, this project has projected a negative image that is important to address. I was wondering whether UNOPS has any suggestion of how the failure of this project can be addressed apart from drawing lessons for the future.
Thank you.

The fax attached went like this:

Subject: ANG 96/003 Huambo Development Centre

Dear Sir,
I am in receipt of your fax of 10 April 2001.
I appreciate the frustration you are experiencing in receiving the final report. It is not that we have not been paying attention to deliver this report, but we have been out of contact with the centre in Huambo. Having recently joined RUTEC I have no knowledge of the project and it would be senseless for me to provide you with a report as all I can report on is the instructions from yourself. It is almost impossible to receive any instructions from the centre if we are out of contact with them, we have investigated the possibility of chartering an aircraft to physically take us there. However, no charter company will fly to the area. The only flights in and out are those of the World Food Programme and the military. To get on any of these we need to talk to the centre. This gives some idea of the dilemma we find ourselves in.
Your instruction to close the centre was forwarded to the centre. We were informed that this was not in accordance with the procedure required and there was a concern for the centre staff’s safety should they unilaterally close the centre. I informed them that with no further payments from UNOPS for the contract it would not be possible to provide them with additional funding. In the light of this the contract was closed. It appears that the centre took it upon themselves to continue operating whilst trying to secure funds for its future. This was a decision taken at that level with no instructions to do so from RUTEC and as such any liabilities or credit cannot be accounted to RUTEC.
We have recently re-established with the centre manager and are in the process of receiving the material for a final report, which we will forward to you as soon as we complied it into a report.
As I do not have the fax numbers of Mr Behrstock and Mr Almeida please could you forward a copy of this fax to them.
I apologise for the intolerable delay in finalising this issue.
Yours Faithfully

(Note: There is something interesting that need to be noted with regard to this fax. The “facts” represented in it are of course all fabrications. RUTEC had made no attempt, and had no intention of making any such an attempt, to travel to Huambo, by chartered plane or otherwise, and they did not need to since the Project Manager was in touch with them almost daily wanting to know what they had done with $1.65 million that they had received. The thing that is interesting is that the very same people, who had received this very large sum of money to implement a project in Huambo, now claimed that they were unable to report on how they had in fact implemented that project since they have no contact with this project and does not know how to get to it.)


On 23 April 2001 an e-mail written by Dimitri Samaras (UNOPS) to Michele Falavigna (UNDP New York):
Many thanks Michele .
One thing which I am sure of is that UNDP participated fully in the selection and the award of the contract to RUTEC and the funds were used for services that are spelled out in the RUTEC’s contract.
In addition, it is my understanding that the activities undertaken were so positive that the Local authorities were to mobilize additional funding.
I can assure you that the Production Centre’s initiative had met the full endorsement of many actors and in particular the Funder i.e. UNDP and the Recipient i.e. the Government of Angola.
So to question it today, as it was done by UNDP new Leadership was indeed not a plus in terms of projecting a positive image but rather was felt as some kind of “ retaliation” for which UNOPS is not part of.
Mr James Curry, Director of OAPR submitted to UNOPS on 14 January 2001 a memo in which he referred to some allegations made by the Resident Representative. That kind of attitude is indeed not conducive to constructive understanding of what went well and wrong.
Nevertheless we have answered his queries and concerns in a memo dated 13 February 2001. A copy of this memo will be sent to all so that you get a better idea of the situation (where we started, how we started and which role we played). Talking about failures is already taking a strong position which I believe at this juncture is premature.
I am scheduling a visit to Angola next month with the Division Chief and would hopefully be able to clarify the misunderstandings that are occurring.
I hope we can joint efforts and try to overcome perhaps things that are beyond our control.
I am waiting as well as a positive reaction from the CO since I have many times offered my services to regularize situations which can be with of course a good will.
MANY THANKS.
I stand ready to bring any contribution required from our end and serve the noble cause that we are serving after all i.e. the development one.

And then the issue became forgotten until one Erick de Mul came up with the following justification in a letter to the staff, dated 13 January 2002, and addressed also to the Director of Planning Dr. Henrique Barbosa, the Governor, Engo Paulo Kassoma and the Minister of Planning, Ana Dias Lourenço:
Subject: Your requests of 21 December 2001 and 09 January 2002

The office of the United Nations Development Programme in Angola has the honour to present its respectful compliments to the collective of the ex-staff of the project RUTEC-Microform in Huambo and makes reference to the issue mentioned in the title line.

In this respect we would like to inform you that we take note of your concerns manifested by way of your requests, and to guarantee you that our office has pledged to do everything since the end of 2000 to find a solution to this difficult situation.
However, as you know UNDP did not have any direct responsibility in the execution and implementation of the RUTEC-Microform project in the province of Huambo. The responsibility of UNDP is limited to the formulation and financing of the project[1], the execution of the same having been entrusted to the United Nations Office for Project Services “UNOPS,” that had in turn contracted the private South African company “RUTEC” as implementing agent for the project.
. . .
(Signed by Erick de Mul as Resident Representative UNDP)

One wonders if it should be noted that Graig N. Murphy, in his pseudo-factual book “UNDP: Abetter Way?” describes UNDP as a “model of efficiency.”
[1] Underlined by Author.

A World of Development Experience

This is a slightly revised and shortened extract from my book:

A lot had been by know been said about UNDP and I may have hinted here and there that perhaps it was a somewhat haphazard and unprofessional organisation. Perhaps it would be best to stand back a little and have a look at what other people were saying about them. We shall also not forget to have a look at what they have to say about themselves.
It is important to keep in mind that the international humanitarian and development aid system is omnipresent in the Third World. Even if a development issue is purely local, there is a strong likelihood that an international organisation would be involved in addressing the issue. The poorer the country and the weaker its Government is, the more important the role and the power of International Development organisations. In many African countries, for instance, Development is to all practical extents, managed by the UNDP Resident Representative and The World Bank delegation.
In Luanda the United Nations occupies an eight-story building, with some agencies, such as WFP, UNHCR and OCHA occupying their own premises. For local communities, this international presence is often seen as much part of the problem as of the solution.
Soon after my arrival in Luanda, on 21 February 2001, I was given the report from the UNDP Country Review undertaken from 16 October to 03 November 2000. This was the same group of people that had visited our centre on 21 and 22 October 2000. United Nations Agencies work in countries within the legal context of a thing called the Country Co-operation Framework (CCF), renewed periodically, which defines what they are supposed to do.
In Angola the UNDP CCF ran from 1997-2000 and included the following programmes:
Theme 1: Direct Post Conflict Activities, Theme 2: Community Rehabilitation and National Reconciliation and, Theme 3: Economic Management, Institutional Reform and Administrative Modernisation (Governance).
These were all ambitious objectives, especially for an organisation, that, from my own experience, was still battling with the modalities and mechanics of internal communication, unable to use the excellent postal service provided by WFP or even to realise that they have to respond to letters.
Just to make things clear to those not familiar with these sorts of things. The above mentioned themes are considered to be programmes. Projects are then designed to comply with the thematic objectives of these programmes. Our project, for example, was part of Theme 2: Community Rehabilitation and National Reconciliation.
What did the report have to say about UNDP’s endeavours to do these things?
Their overall assessment makes the following statement:

“While these programmes were well conceived, relevant and important, they all suffered major problems for a number of reasons, and lasting results are very few. Principally, the success of immediate post-conflict activities depends on a secure environment, which was not (and has yet to be) fully achieved in Angola. The contribution by these programmes towards the achievement and consolidation of more peaceful conditions was limited, if any.
Yet other factors influenced the implementation of these activities:
Poor design of the actual projects, without adequate consultations with and ownership by the government institutions involved;
Weak programme management by UNDP and inadequate accountability by its institutional partners, especially UNOPS;
Inadequate transfer of technical and management expertise by external consultants to local staff; and
Inability by UNDP to quickly modify programmes to reflect the changing political and security environment. This includes the absence of an effective monitoring and evaluation system.”

Time and again one would come up against arguments from UNDP that they do not have funds to do many of the things that they had promised to do. Yet the country review stated quite clearly, that, with $65.9 million available:

“UNDP had thus a very good starting point for the implementation of its CCF. However, as this Country Review will show, most programmes and projects suffered serious problems during implementation, some had to be terminated, and there are very few sustainable results at the end of the CCF. The big paradox is therefore: How could these seemingly good programmes produce so meagre results? Could this have been avoided? And what lessons can UNDP and the government draw from these experiences?”

This report mentions that it was not the first time that an evaluation reported on large scale failures by UNDP. The previous review, in 1997, identified a list of five weaknesses in the previous CCF. These included poor quality of national staff, high turnover of senior staff, lack of coherent and flexible strategy in the face of emergencies, no capacity in co-ordination and implementation of reintegration and rehabilitation roles and that the absence of translation facility delayed approval of project documents, but then goes on to say that:
“Unfortunately, only the last point has resulted in a remedial measure, while all other “lessons learned” did not lead to any substantial change – and indeed were thus not “learned” by UNDP in Angola. Similarly, practically none of the objectives and success indicators of the CCF were achieved during this period. The minimum requirement for the next CCF is that it establish more realistic immediate objectives for UNDP interventions and measurable performance indicators that permit evaluation and periodic assessment.”

I personally would suggest, on the point of establishing more realistic immediate objectives for UNDP, that they stick to the basics such as to train their staff to be able to communicate with their colleagues from one office to another, that they learn to respond to correspondence in a meaningful way and, very advanced for UNDP, but important to learn anyway, that failures are a necessary part of the learning process providing the reasons for failures are adequately addressed and become part of the lessons learned and the procurement of solutions.
I could thoroughly agree, from personal experience, with the report’s observation that:
“It seems equally evident that UNDP did not thoroughly scrutinize the proposed programmes and projects, before accepting funding.”

The report then proceeds to observe that:
“The relationship between UNDP and government partners was not good at the central level during 1997-98.”

“Both NGO’s and private sector partners interviewed by the CR Team indicated that their experience with UNDP in the execution of projects to have been negative.”

“Experience in project execution through UNOPS has also appeared to be costly, bureaucratic and slow. . . Partners have questioned the quality of technical assistance particularly that recruited through UNOPS. The CR Team has not been able to find performance evaluations nor information on targets, indicators and outputs, which could corroborate these opinions.”

“Bureaucratic procedures have been employed by both UNDP and National partners to protect themselves and to provide excuses for inaction.”

Regarding the CRP specifically, the report mentions:
“. . . the impact on communities targeted by programming in this sector has by and large been negative. High expectations have not been met, promised funding to community projects has been slow to deliver at best, and often not arrived. Local level leaders and NGO partners have lost credibility with their constituencies.”

The report concludes with a number of observations and recommendations:
“The above analysis uncovered serious weaknesses in the way the Country Office has functioned . . . “ (more or less a repetition of previous reasons)

“. . . the CO[1] did not adequately support the implementation of these projects in a timely and efficient fashion but was rather seen as slow, bureaucratic and without transparency.”

“UNDP must also ensure that the inputs, especially the international advisors and consultants that are funded, are relevant, efficient, effective and client oriented.”

“The CR Team strongly believes that UNDP should not handle any more cost sharing, Trust Funds and other funds on behalf of other partners, before it has drastically improved its own performance and efficiency.”[2]

This last point is particularly important and cause for some concern. Why would an organisation not be required to handle things such as cost sharing, Trust Funds and other funds on behalf of other partners? Could it perhaps be that they cannot adequately explain how the money entrusted to them are spent? And if they cannot, or are unwilling, to explain how it is spent, where are they in fact spending it? We are not talking about small change here but about several tens of millions of Dollars, in other words several large suitcases worth of money, if one was to convert it into cash. One is inclined to believe that it would be difficult to loose track of such an amount of money unless a deliberate effort was made to do so.
The UNDP website states:
“UNDP helps developing countries attract and use aid effectively. In all our activities, we promote the protection of human rights. . .”

If you had a few million lying around in spare cash, would you give it to UNDP to use effectively?
On the other hand, one could accept that the Country Review was done by a bunch of vindictive individuals more concerned with doing harm to UNDP than with constructive comments. Nevertheless, in a technical meeting on the Country Review held on 02 March 2001, chaired by the Deputy minister of Planning, it highlighted the fact that in general the Government agreed with the assessment of the CR team.
Arve Ofstad, Director of the Chr. Michelsen Institute in Norway, previously the UNDP Resident Representative in Sri Lanka, and team leader for the Angola Country Review, later wrote a paper entitled; ”When Peace And Development Both Fail – The UN System In Angola.” These are his observations:
“The UN development agencies, here exemplified by UNDP, has a mixed experience in Angola, in periods playing a very traditional “developmentalist” role, and in other periods taking on innovative roles much earlier that elsewhere. In the initial phase, before and up to the peace accord in 1991 and the elections in 1992, UNDP was very active in “filling and bridging the gaps” to the humanitarian and political spheres. UNDP was in fact providing support to the coordination of humanitarian assistance prior to establishment of DHA[3] in 1993, and contributed funding to the first elections. While this was early compared to UNDP in most other countries, this could have been partly inspired by the transition and elections in Namibia just before.
However, when the war broke out in 1993, UNDP suspended its regular development programme, as a traditional development agency would do. But during the follow-up from the 1994 peace accord, UNDP again changed its position, and provided heavy support to this follow-up through the organisation with the government of a major Round Table with donors in Brussels in 1995. During this period the new UNDP Resident Representative combined this role with the position of WFP Country Director and being the Humanitarian Aid Co-ordinator as well, and he worked very closely with the SRSG[4]. This seemed to be the “golden period” for UN cooperation, and their support to a peace process.
In the following “in-between” phase, UNDP nevertheless failed almost completely. It turned incapable to make good use of these opportunities, while it also suffered from deteriorating external environment. Despite a good and relevant programme and substantial donor support, very few sustainable results were obtained. This can partly be explained by the weak leadership of another Res. Rep, who did not combine the post as Humanitarian Aid Co-ordinator. In a study of “in-between” phases, the poor performance by UNDP, and the lessons and experiences from this, will require special attention. As the 1998-99 war broke out, UNDP again had to reduce its activities as was unable to redirect its efforts to respond to the changing environment. With the arrival a new Res. Rep again in 2000 and a new combination of the role as Humanitarian Aid Co-ordinator, UNDP seemed to enter a period of slow recovery, also reflecting the new “in-between” phase.
Finally, the humanitarian agencies played a relatively limited role within the UN system before 1991, despite the continuous war with refugees and displacements since independence. However, with the large-scale “war of the cities” in 1993-94, the humanitarian assistance increased rapidly, especially as food aid through WFP. DHA took over direct coordination, most of the period handled by WFP as Humanitarian Aid Co-ordinator. Since then, the humanitarian agencies have maintained a strong role, especially during the periods of large-scale war. In the “in-between” phases the humanitarian agencies have tried to move into support for resettlement and recovery, but not very successfully.
Interestingly, the humanitarian agencies in Angola seem to have had a positive relationship with the political and security presence of the UN, as opposed to the strained relationship that has been the case in many other countries. Especially during the 1993-94 war, the humanitarian agencies through their presence in the field throughout the country were supporting the SRSG in providing information and situation analyses, and in maintaining contacts with the UNITA side. During the 1994-95 “golden period” of UN coordination, the humanitarian agencies were also part of this. Since 1995, however, it seems that the humanitarian agencies have been acting more separately on their own, while expanding their activities, rather than integrating with the developmental parts of the system. During and after the 1998-99 war, the humanitarian agencies have no longer been able to provide assistance to the population in unsafe and in UNITA areas, which is a major breach of basic humanitarian principles.”

Although it is a bit of an aside, Arve Ofstad also asks and then answers some interesting questions:
“Is the volume of aid contributing to or subsidising the war efforts? – This has apparently been seen as an issue in Angola, where regular aid has been limited and further reduced during periods of heavy violence, while humanitarian aid increased. But the military strength of both government and UNITA has depended on other funding sources, and has hardly been influenced by the level of aid. The humanitarian assistance has clearly provided life-saving support to large populations, and it seems unlikely that the two sides would have paid more attention to suffering civilians with less external assistance. This may require more discussion, however.
Can the content of the aid programme provide incentives for the peace process? – This is exactly what was attempted especially in the wake of the 1994 peace accord. This project is an attempt to understand why these incentives were so weak.
Will aid for reconstruction in contested areas promote peace? – Given the clear pro-government position of the UN agencies, they have worked on the assumption that re-establishing civilian administration and initiating development in (previously) contested areas would promote the peace and reconciliation process. However, it is not clear whether this assumption is correct.
What are the options and implications of aid for rehabilitation and development efforts in rebel controlled areas? – This has hardly been an option in Angola for the UN, possibly with the exception of UNICEF. Before 1992 other major donors (USA) and their NGOs were actively involved on the UNITA side, but this was primarily a political position not necessarily motivated by promoting a peace process.”

Not only was this the only person not fully positive about UNDP. In a conference called “The Struggle for Peace, Peace-building and Canadian Policy, Roundtable on Angola,” held in Ottawa, Canada on 26 November 1999, the following statements were made:
“The donor community in 1995 mounted a program as a contribution to peace building, the Brussels Round Table process. It underwrote the Lusaka peace accords with a billion dollar, to assist in community revitalization. It wanted to engage communities in national rehabilitation, as part of a peace-building process. The UN set up independent evaluation teams to look at a well conceived, inclusive program but it was left to the UNDP to implement. UNDP is one of the weakest structures in terms of administering programs. After almost 4 years, none of the rehabilitation had taken place. Proposals received in late 1995 from communities had still not been processed 4 years later. Due to poor implementation, the international community was further discredited. If implemented early and effectively, this program could have assisted in the consolidation of peace.

UNDP’s own bureaucratic systems of financial planning, reporting and monitoring - Imprecise and overlapping sets of definitions of programme and project boundaries made budgeting a difficult process for non UN personnel to understand. Government, Donors and Communities each became frustrated and impatient with programme procedures and tended to look for means to circumvent them. The use of the UN Trust Fund as a pool to finance both the programme administration, necessary office infrastructure rehabilitation, capacity building aspects of project as well as community based projects, without sufficient separation of these functions, prevented programme managers from monitoring the overall financial situation of the CRP. The problem became a serious constraint for local Government and Donors who need clear and accurate financial reporting in order to plan and carry out their functions within the CRP. The lack of transparency of reporting systems hid the fact that only a small proportion of the UN Trust Funds money was invested in community based projects.”

On their website UNDP makes the following claims:
“Accountability, Transparency, and Anti-Corruption
In an era of increasing globalisation, governments play a critical role to ensure economic competitiveness and growth, good governance and sustainable development
Accountable and effective management of public financial resources constitute some of the most fundamental responsibilities and challenges of many governments in the world, particularly those in developing countries and economies in transition. In this era of increasing globalisation of world markets and trade, public sector management and accountability have become critical elements in determining the over-all effectiveness, efficiency, and ability of governments to ensure economic competitiveness and growth, good governance and sustainable human development
The UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/51/59 adopted on 28 January 1997 provides the basis for UNDP’s mandate in assisting development countries to fight corruption. In July 1998, the UNDP Executive Committee approved the corporate position paper, Fighting Corruption to Improve Governance to guide the organization’s work in this field. At the heart of this mandate is UNDP’s holistic approach of tackling corruption as a problem of poor governance. UNDP recognizes that minimizing corruption is critical to reduce poverty and promote social and people-centred sustainable development. UNDP’s emphasis on long-term systemic changes and the human dimensions of development, coupled with its impartiality, underscore its unique contributions in promoting good governance and public accountability and transparency.”

How did UNDP react to this report? Surely if any company or organisation receives a report that concludes that it is almost a complete failure, this would cause a mass panic amongst staff and management and, at the very least, some attempt to start correcting things. Yet, it seemed to be barely noticed by the staff at UNDP. At higher levels the reaction could perhaps be best summarised by the following example:
Michele Falavigna had produced a Back-to-the-Office report soon after his visit to Angola (in March 2001). As an aside, but of interest, was the fact that this twenty-two-page report does not once mention the two-hour meeting that I had had with him. There is nevertheless an interesting section entitled, “Working with Oil Companies.”
It goes like this;
“Collaboration between UNDP and Oil Companies (BP-Amoco, Chevron and Sonangol) has already started with a full cost-sharing project to support fisheries in Ambriz. . . . Considerable progress has been made on setting up infrastructures and equipment. . . . it was suggested to give greater visibility to the accomplishments made to date by producing articles for the national newspapers and videos for the national television. . . .
Beyond, the Ambriz project, the opportunities for increasing UNDP co-operation with oil Companies in Angola are promising. . . .
The Country Office has to pursue the matter vigorously not only because of the opportunity for resource mobilization but also because of the nature of the projects, high visibility and quick impact, which can boost UNDP image as a reliable and efficient co-management partner.”

Sterling stuff, all of it, except for the fact that the report from the Country Review team has the following to say about the very same project:
“The artesian fishing project in Ambriz is a pioneering partnership between UNDP, Equator Bank, BP-Amoco (a private sector petroleum company) and the Ministry of Fisheries.
The programme is still incomplete and the execution has been slow. The primary donor BP-Amoco indicated to the CR Team a certain disillusionment with the performance of UNDP, having expected a more professional management and better reporting. BP-Amoco indicates that reluctantly they are being drawn into a greater “hands-on” role in the project for which they feel poorly equipped as a donor. Due to poor performance in the execution of this project, UNDP risks jeopardising a future relationship with a potentially important investor/partner.”

An important objective of Michele Falavigna’s visit was in fact to close down the CRP. I can well, and with a lot of satisfaction, remember how the top management of UNDP left the office full of confidence for their meeting to do just that. A few hours later they returned, less confidant, and laughing embarrassingly. The Minister of Planning had told them in no uncertain terms that the Angolan government will make such a decision and that Angola is governed by Angolans and not by the staff of UNDP.
Likewise Mark Malloch Brown, the UNDP administrator, in other words the top person in the agency, had visited Angola in February with a view of speaking to the President, José Eduardo dos Santos, in an effort to improve relations between UNDP and the Angolan Government. In spite of not having received any response from the President’s office regarding an audience, Mr. Malloch Brown arrived anyway. After kicking his heels for a day in Luanda, a response arrived.
“The President does not meet with people at this level.” It said, indicating Jorge Chicoti, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs as the appropriate person to speak to.
Mr. Malloch Brown returned to New York after three days and after what was generally considered to be a humiliation. Carol Bellami, head of UNICEF, visits Angola regularly and almost invariably meets with the President. They certainly do not discuss the success of UNICEF projects since in that respect UNICEF is perhaps second only to UNDP in their capacity for failure.
Another indication that Mark Malloch Brown might erroneously have believed that UNDP is in fact doing a reasonable job in Angola could be found in a note he distributed regarding the first regular session held from 24-28 and 31 January 2000 in New York on the Extension Of The First Country Cooperation Framework For Angola. At the very least it suggests that UNDP must have been aware at least at this level that we were active and achieving results. Point three of this note, referring to the CCF from 1997-1999, says:
“The programmes achieved many positive results. Some of the notable ones are the vocational training programmes, community rehabilitation and revival of agriculture and economic livelihoods in six provinces, and capacity-building activities in the Ministries of Planning, Finance, and Civil Service. With the onset of the conflict in Angola in late-1998, and based on discussions with the Government and other partners, the reintegration and community rehabilitation programmes have been shifted to provide vocational training and micro-enterprise services for displaced people in areas with security and access. The capacity-building programmes in the national institutions continue to be relevant in view of the increased government role in humanitarian assistance coordination, and discussions with the Bretton Woods institutions to undertake comprehensive economic reforms beginning in January 2000.”

This was not exactly what the Country Review would find at the end of that same year. (In fact most of the programmes so enthusiastically endorsed by Mr. Malloch Brown did not even exist, or had existed only briefly before being closed down. One can conclude that he was at best misleading, or, more directly, lying to his boss and good friend, Kofi Annan). Another way to judge the quality of the UNDP presence in Angola is to have a look at how the donors support them. This is a bit of a tricky issue, full of real and conceptual pitfalls but we would do our best to make sense of things anyway.
In Angola the UN requests funds from donors through a mechanism called the “Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal” usually simply referred to as the CAP. This mechanism has its origin in the wake of the UN’s poor response to the plight of the Kurds in northern Iraq, when the General Assembly in December 1991 approved resolution 46/182 designed to improve humanitarian coordination. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs[5], created as a result, established the process of consolidated appeals for major emergencies, responding to donor insistence on single requests on behalf of the entire UN system. The idea was that the UN would come up with a co-ordinated response from all its agencies to these emergencies in order to respond in an effective and coherent way. From the Angolan appeals, consisting of a series of one-page project proposals, a thorough background and lots of tables with numbers in them, it would be very difficult to deduce any form of co-ordinated effort behind it all. While the analytical rigour of current UN appeals leaves something to be desired, the response of governments to the new approach still only covers an average of 25 per cent of the UN’s requests.
There is a common misconception that donors only support issues that come to international attention through the media, the so-called media grabbing emergencies. A closer look at multilateral and bilateral funding clearly demonstrates that this is not strictly true. Donor support appears to be given primarily for strategic reasons. Then countries appear to give preferentially to former colonies, to the extent that an undemocratic formal colony can expect about twice as much from a donor as can a democratic non-former colony. Thus in Angola the major donor by far is the United States, for strategic reasons, followed by the Scandinavians, Britain and Portugal in almost equal measure. Since American Aid is almost always linked to governance issues, democracy and human rights, they almost always support organisations that promote these sorts of things. The CAP in Angola has been supported by about 50 to 70 percent of their requests on average. Countries with less strategic value such as Rwanda, Burundi and Eritrea routinely received as little as between 2 and 6 percent of their requests.
For the year 2000 the UN had requested $260 million[6] and from this only 52 Percent had been funded. The bulk of this was for WFP, receiving 52 percent. The Food and Agricultural Organisation received only 29 percent of its requirements. The UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) received only 60 percent of requirements. UNFPA received 48 percent of its needs. UNHCR received 59 percent of funding for IDP protection and assistance programmes. UNICEF received 40 percent of funding. The WHO received 55 percent of requirements.
The UNDP received a paltry 3.3 percent of requirements in 2000.
In 2001 UNDP received 19.00% of requirements. In the same year WFP received 51.29% of requirements, UNICEF 53.67% of requirements, UNHCR 79.82% of requirements, WHO 8.99% and FAO 9.62%. For 2002 UNDP received 5.29% of requirements. In the same year WFP received 80.86% of requirements, UNICEF 53.63% of requirements, UNHCR 55.24% of requirements, WHO 6.86% and FAO 74.26%.[7]
One thus tends to come to the conclusion that the donors are not overly enthusiastic in supporting UNDP, the so-called principal agency of the UN system. UNDP of course would argue that this was because of the war, when emphasis was placed on humanitarian assistance. There may even be a spark of truth in that, yet fails to explain why UNDP only received 5.29% of their funding in 2002 when there no longer was a war and when their mandate had not only become important but imperative. An analysis of how UNDP revised its requirements dramatically upwards as the war came to an end and then downwards as the donors were obviously not responding, would be interesting but, alas, it is fairly technical and boring stuff and there is regrettably no place for it here. Suffice to say, the amounts that UNDP requested varied from a little more than two million to a little more than seven million, peaking at thirteen million in mid-2002, before being cut back by more than half, a far cry from the tens and even hundreds of millions of Dollars UNDP was originally set up to manage annually.
It did not take UNDP long to get into vicious circle of claiming that there are no results because they have no funds and then not getting funds because they have no results. ROAR’s, their famous “Results Orientated Annual Reports” are a perfect example of the prevailing mentality of UNDP. Every year many of the senior staff goes into apoplexy as they start to prepare these reports. After apparently huge efforts they then produce a monumental document full of goals, sub-goals, sub-sub-goals, themes, sub-themes, sub-sub-themes, tables with numbers, tables with lists of countries with little crosses marked of against a number of indicators and little dialogue boxes with all sorts of asides. Reading through all of this is an exercise in endurance and yet at the end of it the all, the important questions; what was done, how does it contribute towards development, how many peoples’ lives are better as a result and how much did it cost? remain unanswered. These reports do not contain a single measurable result. It comes across a little bit like the “baffle them with bullshit” story. Only that there is almost 200 pages of it.
UN Agencies, which we expect to have high moral values, and to occupy the moral high ground, seems to have increasing numbers of freeloaders, parasites, charlatans and impostors within their ranks. A certain illness has crept in, and the illness seems to be infectious. The UN should be mature enough to diagnose the illness, and consider what they can do to treat it, and restore the system to health, and to its proper position of the high moral ground.
Criticism of the UN has reached such a crescendo over the last few years that one finds oneself almost unable to reach through this to the real issues in this specific case. It is easy to be overly critical about the UN. It is nevertheless important to stress that one should separate the UN system, that often fail because its member states do not support it enough, from its agencies, which are largely free from this horse trading, and should be run professionally, competently and work to the highest standards.
These are not unreasonable demands. In fact the UNDP Operational manual makes the same demands:
“In the context of the Mission statement and the 2001 project for management change, UNDP staff and management have agreed on the overall values guiding the work of the organization, namely, a results orientation, integrity in all aspects of work, and respect for the diversity of staff and development partners.

To make development assistance more effective, the General Assembly decided in 1975 that UNDP activities should be seen in terms of outputs or results rather than in terms of a package input of foreign experts, fellowships and imported equipment.”

The specialist agencies of the UN are in fact doing exactly that. There are also some fine and admirable agencies such as WFP, but they are in danger of being overshadowed by the increasing number of self-interested parasitic agencies, that represent something other than the multi-lateral, not-for-profit, not self-serving, public benefit organisations that they should be.
Without wanting to demean WFP in any way, their work is not at all that difficult. All they have to do is get food to people wherever there may be a need. Logistically perhaps very difficult and even complex but conceptually easy. The real work of the UN should be within the agencies that can respond to needs in a more conceptually mature and holistic manner, identifying and solving the underlying causes for suffering, creating programmes and projects that can meaningfully intervene in the lives of people and fundamentally make things better. Without that, the work of WFP, however excellent, is meaningless really. And I have seen this many times in the faces of WFP staff as they respond time and again to the same emergencies, having to try and save the same lives again and again, seeing the same despair and realising the same humiliation, as people live their entire lives on aid with no hope for the future.
All I saw UNDP doing during my time with them was the extent to which they expanded the frontiers of incompetence, down to levels as difficult for me to comprehend, as it is to understand quantum theory.
[1] Country Office.
[2] It must be noted here that this statement was found in the draft copy of the evaluation in my possession but did not make it into the final published version.
[3] Department of Humanitarian Assistance, later OCHA.
[4] Special Representative of the Secretary General.
[5] OCHA forms part of this,
[6] About 2-3% of the British Health budget.
[7] Information from the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals for Angola, 2000. 2001, 2002.

Letter to James Currie, Director Office of Audit and Performance Review 15 April 2002

Dear Sir,

With reference to Project ANG 96B01 BL 2101 ‘Pilot Community Production Centre Huambo Angola’ for which an audit was requested by Zoraida Mesa, Resident Representative UNDP, in December 2000.

Please find some English translations of letters that had been sent to the press, Human Rights Organisations and donors in Angola. This issue will now be resolved through the courts.

Open Letter to Erick Eduard de Mul, Resident Representative – United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Angola

Dear Sir,

Over the last few weeks we have had the privilege to read in the newspapers and hear on the radio, the UNDP promises regarding their new projects that will reduce poverty in Angola.

At the same time the project Microform – ANG 96/B01 BL 2101 – financed by UNDP and implemented in Huambo finds itself in a catastrophe without precedence. The problems related to this – lack of clarity regarding Government authorisation to implement the project, poor planning and control of funds, lack of evaluation and monitoring and a lack of knowledge of how and where almost a million dollars had been spent- was presented to UNDP from the beginning of 1999. Up to the time of this letter we have not yet received a single concrete response from UNDP of how they will solve these issues.

In January 2001 the project closed down chaotically with staff salaries already seven months in arrears and with a variety of other financial obligations. The successes that were achieved started to fail as a result of the inability of UNDP to decide the future of the project.

An audit was requested in December 2000 and all relevant documents handed over to the auditor in April 2001.

Up to date we have not received a single response. A letter dated 16 November 2001, to Stephen Kinloch, a UNDP staff member, requesting clarification of these issues, especially the seven month salary arrears that is already outstanding for more than a year, received on 26 November 2001, a very vague response with the following note:

‘For reasons beyond my control I am no longer authorised to communicate with you on behalf of UNDP. Consider this letter informal and unofficial.’

Presently we have the following questions:

· If UNDP has no capacity to assist with the basic needs of an already successful project on the ground, and to solve its management problems within a reasonable period of time, what capacity do they have to alleviate poverty that is infinitely more complex?
· If UNDP has no capacity to control the funds that they make available, even when they were advised since the beginning of 1999 that these funds are not arriving at the project, what capacity do they have to direct future funds to where they are needed?
· If UNDP has no capacity to treat staff that are already contributing towards poverty alleviation with honesty, respect and dignity what capacity do how have to treat innumerable poor with honesty, respect and dignity according to their hopes?

Concretely, what has been the contribution of more than 26 years of UNDP presence in the Angolan community? What practical and different mechanisms does UNDP have at the moment to ensure a contribution in the future?

Hoping for a quick, clear and factual response.


Huambo, Angola aos 04 de Dezembro de 2001.



Open Letter to Erick Eduard de Mul, Resident Representative – United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Angola

Dear Sir,

A letter was written in December 2001 (annexed) seeking clarification regarding UNDP’s role in Angola. The questions are very basic, legitimate organisations normally respond to these questions as a matter of routine.
We also thought that we had the right to ask UNDP questions about their activities and to receive clear and honest answers. UNDP is a public organisation that depends for its survival on voluntary donations, i.e. our money. It is not unreasonable to ask them what they do with this.

After an interview by Leon Kukkuk on radio Ecclesia, ex-director of the Project mentioned in the first letter, Francisco de Almeida responded on behalf of UNDP, also by way of radio, at the end of January 2002 and the beginning of February 2002.

(Francisco de Almeida, Assistente do Representante Residente do PNUD em Angola para Advocacia, Parceiras e Mobilização de Recursos), did not respond to the questions asked. Instead he simply claimed that the only person responsible for the problems of the project is Leon Kukkuk, as Co-coordinator of the Project in Huambo.

He also visited Huambo on 28 January 2002 to pay about U$D 33 000.00 in salary arrears that is part of about U$D 100 000.00 in financial obligations that we are attributing directly to the incompetence of UNDP. (In contrast to the claims on the radio by Francisco de Almeida in February 2002 that all outstanding debts were paid.)

During the visit he also promised that all outstanding issues (various debts, Project Director Salary and monies paid by Leon Kukkuk from his own funds towards staff salaries) will be solved by way of an audit that is already more than a year in arrears. He indicated that the audit will happen in the first quarter of 2002.

Once more he reiterated the UNDP promise, that they have been making since the beginning of 2000, that they will re-implement the project, based on a proposal by Leon Kukkuk. This new project will employ the staff from the old project.

Most of the problems that this project is suffering at the moment are caused by this promise, that UNDP had neither made any steps to achieve or had demonstrated any capacity to achieve. Circumstances are already bypassing UNDP. Leon Kukkuk, with the Provincial Government of Huambo, has already planned a new project. This project is partially financed, authorised and ready for implementation. This proposal was made by Leon Kukkuk in his private capacity with no contribution whatsoever by UNDP, in spite of their resources. UNDP still does not have the capacity to solve problems of the last four years. Angolans are already looking towards the future.

At the end of the second week of April 2002 there was still no indication of the audit that UNDP have been avoiding for more than a year now.
What is the motivation for this reluctance to have an audit?

The audit would not only have resolved the financial mismanagement of the project but would also have clarified the role of Leon Kukkuk in the project.
In the absence of this audit, by way of an e-mail on 04 April 2002, Francisco de Almeida was asked to make available all the documentation in support of his claim that Leon Kukkuk is the only person responsible for the problems of the project.

Until the date of this letter no response had been received.

The reality is that no such documents exist. On the contrary there is a wealth of documents where UNDP were advised about the project problems and UNDP simply never bothered to respond.

At the beginning of August 2001 all documents related to the project were sent to a lawyer. These are the conclusions:

· In 1996 UNDP had planned, directed and financed the project through its Economic Unit without complying with any of its internal rules or general United Nations policies regarding the type of policies that can be implemented. In addition it did not respect any of the rules regarding their agreement with the government or paid any attention to the opinions of government representatives.
· The implementation of the project was in practice illegal. UNDP treated the advice of the Project Director and Government representatives, over more than two years, to resolve the weaknesses of the project, constantly with disrespect, dishonesty and incompetence.
· UNDP did not follow their own rules for evaluation and monitoring and maintained no control over how project funds were being spent.
· They promised, and continue to promise, a new project without having the capacity to realise this promise. They have demonstrated neither the inclination nor the capacity to comply with the financial implications of this promise.
· Circumstances indicate that there is not a single person at UNDP that knows what problems they are creating for themselves or how it must be resolved.

These documents are available. Along with other documents, also available, it indicates that this project is not a special case, but a typical UNDP project.

We may conclude that in more than four years that we have been involved with UNDP we had never been treated with dignity or respect. They cannot even respond to basic questions. The probability that UNDP will resolve their own problems, which they had created, in good faith and with capacity is highly unlikely. For this reason it was decided that it would be more constructive to treat this issue through a legal process. During this process we shall return to the questions asked in the letter of 04 December 2001, amongst others.


Huambo, Angola aos 15 de Abril de 2002.


Amós David Vassouvava
António José Ernesto Camboco
Carlos Alberto Gomes
Deolindo Manuel Dungula
Emanuel Isaías Jamba Chissingue
Leon Kukkuk
Maria Helena Malaquias N´hamba


Portuguese Version of Letters

Carta Aberta para Erick Eduardo de Mul, Representante Residente – Programa das Nações Unidas para o Desenvolvimento (PNUD), Angola

Estimado Senhor,

As ultimas semanas tivemos o privilegio de ler nos jornais e ouvir na radio as promessas do PNUD sobre os seus novos projectos que vão aliviar a pobreza em Angola.

Ao mesmo tempo o projecto Microform – ANG 96/B01 BL 2101 – financiado pelo PNUD e implementado no Huambo encontra-se ainda embrulhada e numa catástrofe sem precedência. Os impedimentos ligados a este projecto - falta de esclarecimento da autorização do Governo Angolano para implementar projecto, pobre planificação e fiscalização dos fundos, falta de avaliação e monitorização e uma nebulosidade de como e onde foram gastos cerca de um milhão de dólares americanos – que foram apresentados ao PNUD desde o inicio de 1999. Ate a data de elaboração desta carta não recebemos nenhuma resposta concreta do PNUD de como será resolvido este assunto.

O projecto encontrava-se caoticamente fechado desde Janeiro de 2001 com os salários de pessoal com atraso de sete meses e com uma variedade de compromissos financeiros não pagos. Os sucessos alcançados falharam por culpa do PNUD em decidir o futuro concreto do projecto.

Foi solicitada a realização de uma auditoria em Dezembro de 2000 e todos os documentos a motivar a mesma foram entregues ao auditor em Abril de 2001.

Não ha nenhuma resposta ainda. Uma carta datada de 16 de Novembro 2001, para Stephen Kinloch, funcionário do PNUD, a pedir esclarecimento sobre o progresso destes assuntos, principalmente os salários de sete meses que já estão mais de um ano em atraso, recebia em 26 de Novembro de 2001, uma resposta muita vaga com a seguinte nota:

‘Por rações fora do meu controlo não posso mais comunicar com você em nome do PNUD. Considera esta carta informal e não oficial.’

Agora estamos com as seguintes duvidas:

Se o PNUD não tem capacidade de apoiar pequenas necessidades de um projecto já com sucesso no terreno, e resolver os problemas de gestão deste projecto dentro de um prazo razoável, qual a capacidade que tem para aliviar a pobreza no país que é infinitamente mais complexo?
Se o PNUD não tem capacidade de controlar os fundos que disponibilizou, mesmo quando foi avisado desde inicio de 1999, que estes fundos não estavam a chegar ao projecto, qual a capacidade que tem em dirigir os futuros fundos para onde existam necessidades?
Se o PNUD não tem capacidade de tratar o pessoal que já esta a contribuir para aliviar a pobreza com honestidade, respeito e dignidade, qual a capacidade que tem em considerar aos inúmeros pobres com honestidade, respeito e dignidade e de acordo as suas esperanças?

Qual foi concretamente a contribuição de mais de 26 anos de presença do PNUD na comunidade Angolana? Quais são os mecanismos práticos e diferentes que o PNUD tem agora para garantir uma melhor contribuição no futuro?

Esperando uma resposta expediente, clara e factual.


Huambo, Angola aos 04 de Dezembro de 2001.


Leon Kukkuk
Ex-Director do Projecto
ANG 96/B01 BL 2101


Carta Aberta para Erick Eduard de Mul, Representante Residente – Programa das Nações Unidas para o Desenvolvimento (PNUD), Angola

Estimado Senhor,

Em Dezembro 2001 foi escrita uma carta aberta (anexada) que pedia esclarecimento do papel do PNUD em Angola. As perguntas foram bem simples, pois as organizações legais respondem normalmente a este tipo de perguntas em forma de rotina.
Também pensamos que temos direito de pedir respostas ao PNUD sobre as suas actividades e de receber respostas claras e honestas. O PNUD é uma organização publica, que depende para sua sobrevivência as doações voluntárias, portanto, do nosso dinheiro. Não é fora da razão sabermos o que o PNUD faz com isso.

Depois uma entrevista feita pelo Leon Kukkuk a radio Eclesia, o ex-director do Projecto mencionou a primeira carta, que o Francisco de Almeida respondeu pelo PNUD, também através do radio, no final de Janeiro 2002 e no inicio do Fevereiro 2002.

O Francisco de Almeida, Assistente do Representante Residente do PNUD em Angola para Advocacia, Parceiras e Mobilização de Recursos, não respondeu as perguntas que foram feitas. Em vez disso, reclamava que a única pessoa responsável pelos problemas do projecto (Microform- Huambo ANG 96/B01- BL2101) é o Leon Kukkuk, como Coordenador do Projecto no Huambo.

Ele também visitou Huambo ao dia 28 de Janeiro de 2002 para pagar a cerca de U$D 33 000.00 dos salários em atraso que fazem parte de cerca de U$D 100 000.00 de compromissos financeiros que nos estamos a atribuir directamente a pura incompetência do PNUD (contrario das reclamações feitas pelo Francisco de Almeida no radio em Fevereiro 2002 que foram pagos todas as dividas.)

Durante a visita ele também prometeu que serão resolvidos outros assuntos ainda pendentes (varias dividas, salário do Director do Projecto e a contribuição no pagamento dos salários do pessoal feita com fundos privados do Leon Kukkuk) através duma auditoria que está já mais de um ano em atraso. Ele indicava que a auditoria pode contecer no primeiro trimestre do ano 2002.

Reiteram também a promessa do PNUD, de que deles já estão a fazer desde inicio do ano 2000, que vão reiniciar o projecto baseado na proposta elaborado pelo Leon Kukkuk. Este novo projecto vai empregar os funcionários do projecto anterior.

A maioria dos problemas que o projecto sofre actualmente foi criada por causa desta mesma promessa, pela qual o PNUD não deu nenhum passo para o alcançar, nem demonstrou capacidade para alcançar. As circunstancias estão a ultrapassar o PNUD. O Leon Kukkuk, em conjunto com o Governo da Província do Huambo, já tem elaborado um novo projecto. Este projecto encontra-se parcialmente financiado, autorizado e pronto para implementação. Esta proposta esta criada pelo Leon Kukkuk na sua própria capacidade enquanto o PNUD com todos os seus recursos não contribuiu em nada. O PNUD encontra-se ainda com incapacidade de resolver os assuntos de quatro anos atras. Os Angolanos já estão a olhar para o futuro.

No fim da segunda semana de Abril de 2002 não existia nenhuma indicação sobre a auditoria que o PNUD já esta a fugir por mais de um ano.
Qual é o motivo para esta relutância de realizar uma auditoria?

A auditoria, não só resolvia os assuntos financeiros do projecto também clarificaria o papel do Leon Kukkuk no Projecto.
Na ausência desta auditoria, foi pedido, através de um correio electrónico datado de 04 de Abril de 2002, e dirigido ao Francisco de Almeida para disponibilizar todos os documentos que prova a sua reclamação que o Leon Kukkuk é a única pessoa responsável pelos problemas do projecto.

Ate a data desta carta não foi recebida nenhuma resposta.

A realidade é que este tipo de documentos não existe. Antes pelo contrario existe bastantes documentos que atestam que PNUD foi avisado sobre os problemas do projecto e que estes (PNUD) simplesmente nunca responderam.

No inicio do Agosto de 2001, todos os documentos do projecto foram enviados para um advogado. As conclusões tomadas são as seguintes:

O PNUD tinha planificado, dirigido e financiado o projecto através da sua Unidade Económica em 1996 sem cumprir com as suas regras internas ou com as políticas gerais das Nações Unidas sobre os tipos de projecto que pretende implementar. Adicionalmente, não respeitava as regras do seu acordo com o Governo Angolano nem se importava com as opiniões dos Representantes do Governo.
Na pratica a implementação do projecto era ilegal. O PNUD tratava os avisos feitos pelo Director do Projecto e os Representantes do Governo ao longo de mais de dois anos, para corrigir as fraquezas do projecto, constantemente com desrespeito, desonestidade e incompetência.
O PNUD não cumpria com as regras de avaliação ou monitorização do projecto e não controlava como estavam a ser gasto os fundos do projecto.
Prometia, e continuava a prometer, um novo projecto sem a capacidade de realizar estas promessas. As consequências financeiras destas promessas eles não demonstravam nem inclinação nem capacidade de cumprir.
As circunstancias indicam que não ha nenhuma pessoa no PNUD que saiba qual exactamente são os problemas que deles criaram e nem como deve ser resolvido.

Estes documentos estão disponíveis. Em conjunto com outros documentos, também disponíveis, indica que este projecto não e um caso especial, mas só um projecto típico do PNUD.

Podemos concluir que em mais de quatro anos que estamos envolvidos com o PNUD, nunca fomos tratados com honestidade e respeito. Eles nem podem responder a perguntas básicas. Não é muito provável a possibilidade do PNUD em resolver os problemas, que deles próprios criaram, pela sua boa fé e capacidade. Por este razão foi decido que será mais construtivo tratar este assunto através dum processo jurídico. Ao longo deste processo voltaremos a pedir respostas as perguntas da carta de 04 de Dezembro de 2001, entre outras.

Huambo, Angola aos 15 de Abril de 2002.

Amós David Vassouvava
António José Ernesto Camboco
Carlos Alberto Gomes
Deolindo Manuel Dungula
Emanuel Isaías Jamba Chissingue
Leon Kukkuk
Maria Helena Malaquias N´hamba