Being Rude to Somebody

Over the years I have had a number of reactions to my book.

Most of them are good.

The strangest reaction of them all by far, from a Zambian friend, who, without availing herself of the tedium of getting the facts or reading the book, dismissed the whole saga as me “being rude to somebody.”

This person also has some very definite ideas as to who is responsible for dealing with the destructive effects of corruption on Africans; “Somebody has to do it.” Or rather as I was told “it is not your place to do it.”

Generally feedback that I get is quite good, if sometimes a bit odd. Here are two recent ones:

“Thank you for showing me that there're people like you in this world. Hope everything is going well for you!!”

“Kind of remind me of Mel Gibson in "Year of Living Dangerously." Hope it's not that dangerous for you!”

Sreeram Chaulia provides a quick summary in “Angola: Empire of the Humanitarians:”

“Where did the UN Trust Funds money go, if not to local communities of Angola? Kukkuk’s remarkable testimony of corruption, deceit and lies in the UNDP bears elaboration. RUTEC, a South African company with dubious links to diamond dealers, started a ‘micro enterprise development project’ in Huambo in 1998 with $1.5 million of funding from UNDP and UNOPS (UN Office for Project Services). The author, who was selected as the Project Director, found to his shock that only a pitifully small amount of money actually reached him on the ground in Huambo. “This contract seemed to neatly sidestep the usually strict procurement rules in place within the UN system.” RUTEC was chosen as sub-contractor by UNDP although this company was spurious, lacking local roots and planning for what kinds of training would benefit the war-affected economy. The author’s higher-ups in RUTEC instructed him, “We do not have to tell anybody what we are doing in Huambo and what we are spending on this project.” (p.217). Progress reports submitted to UNOPS contained no financial statements. There was no competitive bidding or justification shown by UNDP for choosing RUTEC as the sub-contractor. Under the CRP, projects had to be reviewed and authorised by a local appraisal committee. RUTEC never received one. UNDP “got involved, planned and gave money to a project that none of its staff understood or made an effort to learn to understand.” RUTEC was “yet another typical UNDP mess, a fiasco that usually accompanies UNDP projects.” For RUTEC to get vehicle documents, imported equipment or even work visas, well-paid UNDP staff requested “missing documents” (euphemism for $100 bills). RUTEC in Johannesburg was, on its part, harnessing this “sweetheart deal with UNOPS”, further increasing its profits by over-invoicing and manipulating equipment transfers to Angola.”



Then out of the blue some unexpected feedback via Skype:



[23/03/2010 07:48:59] [name-removed] :



Leon



I had dealings with John Dommett at Rutec late 90s

What I have read from you seems about right, but there is more.

If you know what I am talking about I will hear from you



[23/03/2010 08:04:22] Leon Kukkuk: tell me more i can be contacted at [name@place.com] We did speak once on the phone I remember and then when I called you back a day later you had already been dismissed



[28/03/2010 13:25:00] [name-removed]: I wasn’t dismissed I got too close to what you have exposed The money via Brazil?



[28/03/2010 13:36:17] Leon Kukkuk: which money via brazil? I am not aware of that?



[28/03/2010 13:46:26] Leon Kukkuk: Can you send me more information? There were many things I was never able to get to the bottom of. The project in Huambo avoided all audits. Someone who took over at rutec and apparently had an audit claimed to have found nothing wrong but refused to let me see the audit report.



[28/03/2010 13:46:57] Leon Kukkuk: The project in Huambo avoided all audits.



[28/03/2010 13:47:12] Leon Kukkuk: UN audits



[28/03/2010 14:02:44] [name-removed]: All I remember, bearing in mind it is about 10 years now, was Dommet let it slip that the money from UNDP went via Brasil and was skimmed there (about 1/3). Also that you had money diverted to Caribbean by Rutec and only pocket money sent to Huambo. I was due to take your pocket money on my visit but I got out as Dommet suspected I was snooping and became more secretive with Buswe Yafele and MWU

The truly disturbing fact is that many of the same criminals responsible for this are still working at UNDP. It makes one wonder who exactly is responsible for getting rid of them.

Any Response Yet?

This comment posted at the end of Press Release (and the resulting tantrum by UNDP) remain as relevant now as when it was first posted. It is therefore moved here in the interest of requesting Stephen Kinloch if in the intervening months he has managed to decide on a possible response yet. (And I do not consider the inability of UNDP to provide straightforward answers to simple questions as an excuse for ongoing silence.)


Assunto: Defamatory use of online service:
http://www.publishedauthors.net/leonkukkuk/events.html
Remetente: stephen.kinloch-pichat@undp.org
Data: Fri, 24 Novembro 2006 00:03
Para: leonkukkuk@publishedauthors.net

Dear Mr. Kukkuk,

It has just come to my attention that my name, together with that of several colleagues who either work or have worked for the United Nations (UN) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Angola or elsewhere, is mentioned in hidden (but searchable and
readable) text, together with defamatory terms such as 'fraud'
or 'corruption' in your webpage:

http://www.publishedauthors.net/leonkukkuk/events.html

As you are probably aware, the use of a computer or online service to defame a person carries with it severe potential liability, including for any related claims, proceedings, damages, injuries, liabilities, losses, costs, and expenses.

Therefore, I would like to kindly request you to immediately and completely delete all personal reference, whether hidden or visible, to my name and that of other colleagues from the above mentioned website, and any other website that you may have published.

I have already alerted PublishedAuthors.Net. In order to avoid further measures, I would appreciate your acknowledging receipt of this email and confirming that you have made taken appropriate corrective action.

Yours sincerely,

Stephen Kinloch
Advisor, Strategic Planning
Office of the Resident Coordinator
United Nations - Port-au-Prince


Dear Mr. Kinloch,

In the preamble to my book “Letters to Gabriella Angola’s Last War for Peace: What the UN did and Why” I say:
“I strive at all times to give a fair and honest account of what might have occurred or of what was said. There are those who gave me information in the strictest confidence, who may now be surprised to find it repeated here. I do not apologise for this. Those guarantees of confidentiality were given in exchange for certain promises, these not having been fulfilled, the confidentiality then no longer holds. There may be still be others who might be aggrieved to find they have been quoted and identified; yet again I am reluctant for apologising for doing so, for those most likely to be the loudest in their protestations draw their salaries from public money and donations and they should not expect, much less demand, to be working surrounded by a cloak of secrecy and anonymity.”
You, Mr. Kinloch, as well as your colleagues, are all public servants, drawing your salaries from public money and are thus subject to public scrutiny, being named and identified publicly at the discretion of any member of the public, if they believe that to be in the public interest.
It is not as if I had not been anticipating a tantrum. What I had not anticipated was how long it would take for the first tantrum to arrive.
I am also surprised as to how people, who have demonstrated a total inability to arrange something as basic as an audit, show such alarming enthusiasm to threaten me with “further measures,” surely a substantially more expensive and complex thing to arrange. You are not the first UNDP staff member to threaten me with such, and it may well be that you may not be the last, and my response now remains the same as it has always been: There is nothing that would please me more.
There may possibly be a case to be made for defamation. There is definitely a case for severe potential liability, including for any related claims, proceedings, damages, injuries, liabilities, losses, costs, and expenses. It neither instance are these cases to be made by any UNDP staff member.
Please bear with me through this argument. That way we can establish exactly where we stand.
My book is about fraud. It is principally, but not exclusively, concerned with a scam planned, financed and executed by UNDP, under the guise of a project in Huambo, Angola, of which I was in charge. The book goes into huge detail regarding the anatomy of this scam; it was read by several legal specialists before publication and has since publication attracted a fair amount of meaningful and constructive feedback.
There is no doubt whatsoever that a scam was perpetuated and that UNDP was responsible for this scam. The only measurable outcome of this project, ostensibly designed to assist poor and vulnerable people in Huambo, Angola was that at the end of it, a white man, called John Dommett, from Johannesburg, South Africa, was a millionaire.
This outcome did not happen by accident. It was designed to have this outcome. UNDP staff did not design it like this because they were unable to distinguish between a white man and poor and vulnerable Africans or because they considered John Dommett to be especially needy and somehow entitled to receive UN funds. They did not even do it for altruistic reasons.
If there is anybody that disagrees with this analysis, I urge them to read the book, and to then present me with a counter argument based on the relevant documents.
During the course of my investigations into this scam, conducted over a period of more than six years, and based on a sometimes overwhelming volume of documents, interviews and in-depth research I managed to identify, and name in the book, a number of UN officials, all of whom have left, and still leaves, unanswered questions and concerns in relation to this scam in particular, and the prevalence of corruption and fraud within UNDP in general.
These individuals are: Mark Malloch Brown, James Lee, Dimitri Samaras, Bisrat Aklilu, Michele Falavigna, Erick de Mul, Michel Balima, Stanislaus Nkwain, Stephen Kinloch, Francisco de Almeida.
All of these individuals are involved in one or more aspects of this scam: Oversight (complete lack thereof), planning, executing, covering up, assisting to cover up, ignoring.
Some were involved over a period of many years, others for only a few hours. Some acted on their own initiative, others simply followed instructions. Some play a central role, others acted only on the periphery. Some made deliberate decisions, others did so inadvertently. Some embraced the scam with enthusiasm, others were indifferent, yet others were involved only very reluctantly.
What each and every one of the people named have in common is that the contribution of each and every one, no matter how small, is significant and instrumental in ensuring the perpetuation of this scam over many years and the eventual attempt to cover it up.
The consensus of UNDP as a corrupt, fraudulent, wasteful and inept institution is pretty near universal and I am not now going to enter into that debate. This state of affairs at UNDP is not the result of angels who came fluttering out of the sky and do funny things, neither is it the result of a mysterious force acting upon UNDP. It is also not the mysterious “them” that UNDP staff refers to when reflecting on their organisation. It is the direct, causal result of the staff at UNDP and the decisions that they make. Those who turn a blind eye or ignore wrongdoing around them help foster the atmosphere of corruption and impunity at UNDP. Staff indulge not only in fraud but also in wasteful, fantasy projects (also a form of fraud) knowing that they can rely on managers to cover up for them and to promote them out of harms way when required. Managers cover up fraud and waste knowing that there is no oversight whatsoever within the organisation, no sense of holding responsible staff accountable and that senior management will protect them and the organisation with a barrage of misinformation and spin to the media, drowning out all dissenting voices.
Every single staff member at UNDP is complicit in this; even the honest ones who try and survive within the organisation as best they can by remaining largely invisible. Knowing about wrongdoing and doing nothing about it is a crime. Planning and financing a scam and leaving it to others to execute, sometimes inadvertently, is a crime. Wasting public money is a crime. Using public money for private gain is a crime. That is the law. Staff at UNDP can argue otherwise as much as they like. It still remains the law.
Naming and shaming is a recognized tool for ensuring compliance with the law and to foster a sense of accountability and transparency. It is a tool that the UN itself uses. It is a particularly useful and appropriate tool within the context of the United Nations, which is functionally immune to prosecution, where many staff members hide behind immunities that they have not earned and do not deserve, where corruption and fraud is so endemic that one frequently encounter UN public servants that firmly believe that it is their right to steal.
For four years I raised my concerns with UNDP in a measured and reasonable manner. I was met at first with indifference and resistance, then for a short time with a half-hearted and pretty hopeless attempt to address my concerns, followed rapidly by threats, intimidation, accusation and an outright refusal to communicate with me. (That is the reason why this response to Stephen Kinloch is done publicly and not directly to him.)
In the interest of fairness I had contemplated initially providing a short summary of the role of Stephen Kinloch in the events as recounted in my book by way of justifying why I tag his name (amongst others) to much of what I write in promoting that book. He is a public servant after all, as well as somebody who expresses various opinions, publishes and had made searchable and readable those opinions on the internet. It is therefore reasonable for me to believe that there may be third parties interested in acquiring more information on him and what he does in the public domain. These are all potential buyers of the book in which he is mentioned. No value judgement is implied or intended when doing this. The fact that a name may appear on a page that also contains the words “fraud” and “corruption” by itself is meaningless. Simultaneity does not prove a relationship; much less the nature of the relationship. It may be of concern to somebody with something to hide. I am always quite proud to find my name on pages that also contain the words “fraud” and “corruption.” Yet any relationship can only be established through language, grammar and deductive logic.
However, extracting his case, spread over several chapters, from a complex narrative and presenting it coherently as well as concisely appears to me a daunting task.
What I will do instead is provide a short summary of the main theme in my book to provide some context, followed then simply by all the correspondence between Stephen Kinloch and myself. It should provide at least some explanation. This may be unsatisfactory to many, including perhaps Stephen Kinloch himself. All I can do in my defence is to urge you to read the book.
By way of summary I will quote from “Angola: Empire of the Humanitarians” an excellent paper by Sreeram Chaulia:
“Kukkuk’s remarkable testimony of corruption, deceit and lies in the UNDP bears elaboration. RUTEC, a South African company with dubious links to diamond dealers, started a ‘micro enterprise development project’ in Huambo in 1998 with $1.5 million of funding from UNDP and UNOPS (UN Office for Project Services). The author, who was selected as the Project Director, found to his shock that only a pitifully small amount of money actually reached him on the ground in Huambo. “This contract seemed to neatly sidestep the usually strict procurement rules in place within the UN system.” RUTEC was chosen as sub-contractor by UNDP although this company was spurious, lacking local roots and planning for what kinds of training would benefit the war-affected economy. The author’s higher-ups in RUTEC instructed him, “We do not have to tell anybody what we are doing in Huambo and what we are spending on this project.” (p.217). Progress reports submitted to UNOPS contained no financial statements. There was no competitive bidding or justification shown by UNDP for choosing RUTEC as the sub-contractor. Under the CRP, projects had to be reviewed and authorised by a local appraisal committee. RUTEC never received one. UNDP “got involved, planned and gave money to a project that none of its staff understood or made an effort to learn to understand.” RUTEC was “yet another typical UNDP mess, a fiasco that usually accompanies UNDP projects.” For RUTEC to get vehicle documents, imported equipment or even work visas, well-paid UNDP staff requested “missing documents” (euphemism for $100 bills). RUTEC in Johannesburg was, on its part, harnessing this “sweetheart deal with UNOPS”, further increasing its profits by over-invoicing and manipulating equipment transfers to Angola.”
“Kukkuk recalls the irony of UNDP coining catchy slogans like ‘Project Management, Good Governance and Anti-Corruption’ before putting its own house in order. It employed bureaucratic blockades to cover up scandals like RUTEC and provided excuses for inaction.”
“For the Huambo project’s local employees who were cheated of their salaries by UNDP, “those who lose are always us, due to the fact that it is foreigners that drive the train of deceit.” They repeatedly requested UNDP to “be more human”. When it was to no avail, they accused UNDP of being “the main violator of human rights whilst presenting yourself as the protector of these same rights.””

Here is our correspondence:
Leon Kukkuk on 01 September 2001, soon after the arrival of Stephen Kinloch in Angola as a Deputy Resident Representative UNDP to arrange a meeting:
Please let me know when it would be possible for us to meet.
We used to have a project in Huambo that was unfortunately severely mismanaged and now the subject of lots of to-ing and fro-ing tracing and hopefully recovering funds that had been paid but was not spent on the project. In spite of this the project achieved some very positive results.
All the problems are putting the possibility of raising additional funds under severe strain and need to be solved. I am under lots of pressure from the local authorities to provide some answers and things have now dragged on for several years since I had initially raised the issues with UNDP.

On the same day from Stephen Kinloch to Leon Kukkuk:
As early as possible. As you know, the beginning of the week is going to be quite busy. What about Wednesday at 15:00 in my office?

Leon Kukkuk to Stephen Kinloch 05 September 2001:
Thank you very much for taking time to talk to me. As always I am hoping for a positive outcome.
Attached, please find two documents that provide a summery of the project that should be in the file. A brief perusal indicated that they were perhaps not there any longer.
Also find a copy of my CV.
A talk with Allan Cain from Development Workshop would perhaps be more useful as follow up - free from the intricacies of UNDP and distortion through personal involvement.

On the same day from Stephen Kinloch to Leon Kukkuk:
Thanks, Leon, I really appreciate your taking the time to come and see me. Sorry, really, for the difficulties you have been going through. I will seize any opportunity to meet with Allan Cain, and keep you posted. Have a very good evening. Stephen

On 21 September 2001 from Stephen Kinloch to Leon Kukkuk:
Leon,
To keep you posted of developments.
This office is now following-up with UNOPS in New York.
The idea is to obtain a thorough evaluation/audit of the whole project.
There will be no, repeat: no, new activities, at least until such an audit has taken place.
Meanwhile, we are also looking seriously into ways to compensate former staff for unpaid salaries.
This is not meant to raise any expectations, or make promises, but to assess what can be done.
We all have to act responsibly on all sides, as partners who can respect each other.
I therefore look forward to your cooperation, and to staying in touch with you.
I also trust your judgement on relaying that message to those concerned.
Should you wish to contact me, please do not hesitate.
Have a very good week-end, and take care.

On the same day Leon Kukkuk to Stephen Kinloch:
Respect is something earned, not given.
There will be no, repeat no orders given to me regarding new activities.

On 23 September 2001 Stephen Kinloch to Leon Kukkuk wrote back:
Leon,
Perhaps my message was not clear enough:
I meant: no activities from UNDP side, of course.
As for respect. . . may we, then, all have to earn it?
I look forward to it, from both sides.
Thanks and regards.

(Note: The promised audit never took place.)

On 09 October 2001 Stephen Kinloch to Leon Kukkuk:
As you know, we are actively working on finding a solution for the settlement of pending salaries for staff of the Huambo Training Centre (ANG/96/B01 BL2101) for the months the staff worked without salary after the termination of the project.
Attached is the list of pending salaries we have received from you.
As the documents I have at my disposal are not always consistent, I should be grateful if you could confirm that the period covered is end of July 2000 to end of January 2000 or, if not, if you could provide me with the specific dates for which salary is claimed for each person.
I also note that you are not included in the list of staff whose salary is pending, although I understand you have also been working during the period concerned. Could you clarify this as well?
I look forward to hearing from you soon.

On 18 October 2001 from Leon Kukkuk to Stephen Kinloch:
Attached is a summary of all amounts outstanding to a total of $95 207.78 (before end October 2001).
Our account details are as follows:
. . .
We are looking forward to a prompt solution to this issue.
Although we won’t find any compensation for the mental anguish, stress and waste of our lives caused by this mess, a final resolution would also depend on the following three issues:
1. Some very clear answers need to be given regarding who planned this project, why they planned it, who protected it for more than three years and what steps are being taken to prevent them planning similar things in the future.
2. It has come to my attention that there is a perception amongst certain people that I am the one being investigated for misappropriating funds. I strongly suspect that Jurgen Spangenberg, from the UNDP Insecurity Unit, is responsible for this perception. Whatever the case may be, this is as serious as it is unacceptable. Do you have any suggestions how this misunderstanding can be cleared up? I will highly appreciate it.
I am looking forward to better relations in the future (naturally with a UNDP that is diametrically different from what is now)
Thank you very much and hoping to hear from you soon.

On 21 October 2001 from Stephen Kinloch to Leon Kukkuk:
Thank you very much for the information.
However, in the table, there are elements that we have not discussed, while the precise information earlier requested is not present.
As per my previous email (below), I should be most grateful if you could confirm for each person concerned the precise amounts of unpaid salaries and corresponding dates for the period end of July 2000 to end of January 2000, that is after the termination of the project.
Please note that I will be away until 28 of October as of today.
My colleague, Francisco de Almeida, will be following-up in my absence.

On 25 October 2001 from Leon Kukkuk to Francisco de Almeida:
Francisco, The list contains the salaries of the national staff for the months of July 2000 to February 2001 inclusive, minus amounts paid to them from two sources - either from my own funds or from the sale of equipment. Although the centre closed at the end of January 2001 this was a decision only taken on 22 January 2001 after we had not received any responses to the e-mails (14 January 2001) sent to Teresa Felix and Stan Nkwain and a letter (14 January 2001) to the Co-ordinator of the UN system. We were therefore obliged to offer the staff a months notice and severance pay. Carlos Alberto Gomes is offered an amount of -- per month for looking after the equipment and vehicles from March 2001 to August 2001 (--), under very difficult and at times threatening circumstances.

On the same day from Francisco de Almeida to Leon Kukkuk:
The message below was certainly sent to me by mistake. I am not handling this issue that, I must confess, is getting more and more confused. Stephen will be back early next week. Please liase with him to find out the status of the payment of salaries amounting to $33,340 to the local staff that our Office exceptionally accepted to advance while working out the final solution with RUTEC and UNOPS.
Regards, Francisco

On 01 November 2001 from Leon Kukkuk to Stephen Kinloch:
I appreciate your efforts.
Please provide me with some sort of timescale:
1. for payment of amount of local salaries.
2. Of audit.
Remember, as more time passes more darkness will be shed on this subject, and more expenses accumulate. The time that I am spending without an income or freedom to secure a reliable means of income is also becoming unacceptably long and need to be taken into consideration.

On the same day from Stephen Kinloch to Leon Kukkuk:
Thank you very much for the data on unpaid amounts related to the project, as requested. I truly appreciate your effort to provide a comprehensive picture of the situation, which does give an idea of the problem.
Unfortunately, it also appears more and more that given its complexity, the lack of consistency sometimes between various figures, and the number of actors involved, only a thorough audit could at this stage help determining accurately responsibilities, duties and amounts involved, to settle the issue. We are following up with UNOPS, from whom a response has not yet been received.
Meanwhile, pending such clarification, UNDP has expressed its willingness, and is determined, to settle from its own resources the most immediate, urgent, and clear-cut aspect of the problem, which is the payment of local staff for the period they have been working while not under contract.
Given the above, steps are now been made by this office to settle payment of salaries to local staff for the period of July 2000 and February 2001, on the basis of the attached table received from the staff, as initially envisaged.
This obviously does not meet all expectations and does not sort out or solve all problems, but at least allows us to move forward.
I truly hope it will nevertheless be viewed as a concrete step in the right direction, and will keep you posted of developments in due course.

On 20 November 2001 from Leon Kukkuk to Stephen Kinloch:
Dear Stephen,
I am not getting any response regarding the sort of timetable for payment of local salaries or audit, but have decided to spend the rest of the year in Huambo.
Please keep me up to date with what is happening. The tel. system in Huambo appears to continue to be less than reliable but I can be contacted through WFP radioroom or OCHA as alternatives should it be necessary.
I would very much appreciate your assistance in this regard.
Have a good holiday season + Christmas, etc.

On 26 November 2002 from Stephen Kinloch to Leon Kukkuk:
Thanks for your message. And apologies for my delay in responding to you.
Salaries for local staff (based on table initially submitted by them) have been approved and are being processed for payment. The issue of a formal audit is still being followed up with UNOPS New York.
Unfortunately, for reasons beyond my control, I am no longer authorized to be in touch with you formally on behalf of UNDP, so please do not consider this message as official communication, but as a personal and informal message.
Best wishes to you too.

On 24 January 2002 the last meaningful correspondence with UNDP from Leon Kukkuk to Francisco de Almeida:
We are in receipt of your letter of 22 January 2002 and it has been distributed to some of the staff. We are looking forward to have the considerable ill feeling and confusion related to this project cleared once and for all.
. . .
In addition I would like to request that you stay directly in contact with me. Working through intermediaries and Carlos Gomes, who is working in Kaála, creates a lot of extra work and confusion. If it is the case that UNDP no longer wants to talk to me or that I am persona non grata or responsible for the current problems, the correct procedure would be to motivate this decision by way of the available documentation. Until such a time, I have been responsible for the project and am now responsible to find a solution to its problems. This is a decision taken amongst ourselves and will remain the case until we decide otherwise.
As you may be well aware, I have tried my utmost to find a solution in an agreeable and open manner through maintaining good relations with UNDP in the face of threats, insults, disrespect and gross incompetence on their part. In over three years we have made no progress or received any meaningful responses. If UNDP cannot respond in a like manner, one becomes inclined to believe that perhaps they have something to hide. This is unsuitable behaviour for a public agency that depends for its survival on contributions of our money. I sincerely hope the present circumstances will not continue indefinitely.

It has continued indefinitely.
Over the intervening years my understanding of corruption also increased dramatically. Corrupt practices are invariably very complex, deliberately so, confusion is a key element in how they function and even if they can be unravelled, a wealth of technical jargon makes it difficult to recount the process in a manner that can be readily understood. I am now more aware of how scams are hidden behind a veneer of legitimacy, with legally enforceable contracts, carefully designed to fit into the cracks between different agencies, institutions and governments, even the cracks between national and international law. I now know how accountability is spread so thinly as to be virtually meaningless, which incidentally, combined with complex and overlapping bureaucratic systems, also provides the required opacity for these scams to function. Deniability, or potential deniability, remains the primary motivation informing key decisions at all levels. I now know how the strange audit procedures within the UN system encourage rather than prevent corruption. In looking forward to an audit at UNDP, which never happened, I did not then realise that I was looking forward to process that is used to cover up crimes, not to expose them.
For a long time I naively believed that all I needed to do was to make UNDP aware of how much harm their behaviour was causing and then they would stop. It was too late for me by the time I understood the need for scapegoats in scams and that in this project I was to be that scapegoat. There was no concern about what would happen to the local staff, they were not even considered as human beings. As I embarked in 2002 on a series of interviews explaining the circumstances of this UNDP scam, I immediately found myself under attack by UNDP as Francisco de Almeida reacted thus (and I quote from one of his own documents):

“In a live interview I informed Mr. Mario Vaz from Radio Ecclésia and the listeners of the 12 o’clock news journal that the allegations made by Mr Leon Kukkuk did not correspond to the truth. I clarified the following:

If there was misappropriation of funds, Mr Leon Kukkuk in his capacity of former RUTEC Programme Manager would be the best person to provide any clarification on this manner;”

I am indeed the best person to provide this clarification and have since complied with this request in writing my book, a book that incidentally is the only thing that stands today between myself and me being on the receiving end of accusations and suspicion of corruption. To date nobody from the United Nations System or from UNDP has responded to the conclusions drawn in that book. There may be a case to be made for defamation. It is not a case that can be made easily, by one individual pitted against a corrupt and powerful organisation.

The last official reaction from UNDP comes in the form of a statement issued on 13 January 2002, by Erick de Mul, at the time the UNDP Resident Representative in Angola. Acknowledging the difficulties that we had suffered over so many years and guaranteeing that “our office has pledged to do everything since the end of 2000 to find a solution to this difficult situation,” he then proceeds to deny any wrongdoing, stating instead:
“However, as you know UNDP did not have any direct responsibility in the execution and implementation of the (project) in the province of Huambo. The responsibility of UNDP is limited to the formulation and financing of the project.”

With this statement whatever little respect I may ever have had for Erick de Mul (and it was never very much) disappeared along with the last vestiges of whatever confidence I may have had in UNDP or any of its staff. In searching for any precedence to this sort of argument, I almost immediately stumbled on the names of what is generally considered the vilest criminals of the twentieth century, who tried to use a similar argument and did not get away with it.
There is no reason why UNDP should get away with it.

Stephen Kinloch, you may be dismayed to find that you are being identified and named. It is nothing personal. Neither you nor any of your colleagues mean anything to me as individuals. It is simply a matter of your names having surfaced in an issue with which I am concerned. I am fully entitled to use those names in this context and to use them again if they crop up again in any other context. I make no apologies for that. Everybody that I have named still work for the United Nations, some have even been promoted, most are no longer in Angola. I was the one left behind, trying to cope, alone, with the shambles created by UNDP.
Nevertheless, I am not even picking only on UNDP. The Danish Refugee Council (examples here and here), Medicines sans Frontières, Medicines du Monde and DAPP are all currently under my spotlight.
UNDP may already be quite good at this but they still have a lot to learn from the Danish Refugee Council on how to use fear, insult and intimidation as a management tool. UNDP might comfortably stumble along in its own little bubble; it is yet to achieve the same obliviousness to its surroundings as do MSF. UNDP might be endemically corrupt, its scams however pale into small-scale, amateurish insignificance compared to those of DAPP, who send out criminal gangs to dominate entire countries.
I am concerned with the role of the entire International Community, whose members enter into my home, Africa, only long enough to make a mess, destroying not only my life but the lives of everybody around me, and then disappear.
This makes us go hungry, it makes us fight wars with one another, and it makes us indulge in our own corruption. We suffer from AIDS, TB and Malaria and our children die in vast numbers. There is definitely a case for severe potential liability, including for any related claims, proceedings, damages, injuries, liabilities, losses, costs, and expenses.


Are you prepared to make that case?

A World of Development Experience

This is a slightly revised and shortened extract from my book:

A lot had been by know been said about UNDP and I may have hinted here and there that perhaps it was a somewhat haphazard and unprofessional organisation. Perhaps it would be best to stand back a little and have a look at what other people were saying about them. We shall also not forget to have a look at what they have to say about themselves.
It is important to keep in mind that the international humanitarian and development aid system is omnipresent in the Third World. Even if a development issue is purely local, there is a strong likelihood that an international organisation would be involved in addressing the issue. The poorer the country and the weaker its Government is, the more important the role and the power of International Development organisations. In many African countries, for instance, Development is to all practical extents, managed by the UNDP Resident Representative and The World Bank delegation.
In Luanda the United Nations occupies an eight-story building, with some agencies, such as WFP, UNHCR and OCHA occupying their own premises. For local communities, this international presence is often seen as much part of the problem as of the solution.
Soon after my arrival in Luanda, on 21 February 2001, I was given the report from the UNDP Country Review undertaken from 16 October to 03 November 2000. This was the same group of people that had visited our centre on 21 and 22 October 2000. United Nations Agencies work in countries within the legal context of a thing called the Country Co-operation Framework (CCF), renewed periodically, which defines what they are supposed to do.
In Angola the UNDP CCF ran from 1997-2000 and included the following programmes:
Theme 1: Direct Post Conflict Activities, Theme 2: Community Rehabilitation and National Reconciliation and, Theme 3: Economic Management, Institutional Reform and Administrative Modernisation (Governance).
These were all ambitious objectives, especially for an organisation, that, from my own experience, was still battling with the modalities and mechanics of internal communication, unable to use the excellent postal service provided by WFP or even to realise that they have to respond to letters.
Just to make things clear to those not familiar with these sorts of things. The above mentioned themes are considered to be programmes. Projects are then designed to comply with the thematic objectives of these programmes. Our project, for example, was part of Theme 2: Community Rehabilitation and National Reconciliation.
What did the report have to say about UNDP’s endeavours to do these things?
Their overall assessment makes the following statement:

“While these programmes were well conceived, relevant and important, they all suffered major problems for a number of reasons, and lasting results are very few. Principally, the success of immediate post-conflict activities depends on a secure environment, which was not (and has yet to be) fully achieved in Angola. The contribution by these programmes towards the achievement and consolidation of more peaceful conditions was limited, if any.
Yet other factors influenced the implementation of these activities:
Poor design of the actual projects, without adequate consultations with and ownership by the government institutions involved;
Weak programme management by UNDP and inadequate accountability by its institutional partners, especially UNOPS;
Inadequate transfer of technical and management expertise by external consultants to local staff; and
Inability by UNDP to quickly modify programmes to reflect the changing political and security environment. This includes the absence of an effective monitoring and evaluation system.”

Time and again one would come up against arguments from UNDP that they do not have funds to do many of the things that they had promised to do. Yet the country review stated quite clearly, that, with $65.9 million available:

“UNDP had thus a very good starting point for the implementation of its CCF. However, as this Country Review will show, most programmes and projects suffered serious problems during implementation, some had to be terminated, and there are very few sustainable results at the end of the CCF. The big paradox is therefore: How could these seemingly good programmes produce so meagre results? Could this have been avoided? And what lessons can UNDP and the government draw from these experiences?”

This report mentions that it was not the first time that an evaluation reported on large scale failures by UNDP. The previous review, in 1997, identified a list of five weaknesses in the previous CCF. These included poor quality of national staff, high turnover of senior staff, lack of coherent and flexible strategy in the face of emergencies, no capacity in co-ordination and implementation of reintegration and rehabilitation roles and that the absence of translation facility delayed approval of project documents, but then goes on to say that:
“Unfortunately, only the last point has resulted in a remedial measure, while all other “lessons learned” did not lead to any substantial change – and indeed were thus not “learned” by UNDP in Angola. Similarly, practically none of the objectives and success indicators of the CCF were achieved during this period. The minimum requirement for the next CCF is that it establish more realistic immediate objectives for UNDP interventions and measurable performance indicators that permit evaluation and periodic assessment.”

I personally would suggest, on the point of establishing more realistic immediate objectives for UNDP, that they stick to the basics such as to train their staff to be able to communicate with their colleagues from one office to another, that they learn to respond to correspondence in a meaningful way and, very advanced for UNDP, but important to learn anyway, that failures are a necessary part of the learning process providing the reasons for failures are adequately addressed and become part of the lessons learned and the procurement of solutions.
I could thoroughly agree, from personal experience, with the report’s observation that:
“It seems equally evident that UNDP did not thoroughly scrutinize the proposed programmes and projects, before accepting funding.”

The report then proceeds to observe that:
“The relationship between UNDP and government partners was not good at the central level during 1997-98.”

“Both NGO’s and private sector partners interviewed by the CR Team indicated that their experience with UNDP in the execution of projects to have been negative.”

“Experience in project execution through UNOPS has also appeared to be costly, bureaucratic and slow. . . Partners have questioned the quality of technical assistance particularly that recruited through UNOPS. The CR Team has not been able to find performance evaluations nor information on targets, indicators and outputs, which could corroborate these opinions.”

“Bureaucratic procedures have been employed by both UNDP and National partners to protect themselves and to provide excuses for inaction.”

Regarding the CRP specifically, the report mentions:
“. . . the impact on communities targeted by programming in this sector has by and large been negative. High expectations have not been met, promised funding to community projects has been slow to deliver at best, and often not arrived. Local level leaders and NGO partners have lost credibility with their constituencies.”

The report concludes with a number of observations and recommendations:
“The above analysis uncovered serious weaknesses in the way the Country Office has functioned . . . “ (more or less a repetition of previous reasons)

“. . . the CO[1] did not adequately support the implementation of these projects in a timely and efficient fashion but was rather seen as slow, bureaucratic and without transparency.”

“UNDP must also ensure that the inputs, especially the international advisors and consultants that are funded, are relevant, efficient, effective and client oriented.”

“The CR Team strongly believes that UNDP should not handle any more cost sharing, Trust Funds and other funds on behalf of other partners, before it has drastically improved its own performance and efficiency.”[2]

This last point is particularly important and cause for some concern. Why would an organisation not be required to handle things such as cost sharing, Trust Funds and other funds on behalf of other partners? Could it perhaps be that they cannot adequately explain how the money entrusted to them are spent? And if they cannot, or are unwilling, to explain how it is spent, where are they in fact spending it? We are not talking about small change here but about several tens of millions of Dollars, in other words several large suitcases worth of money, if one was to convert it into cash. One is inclined to believe that it would be difficult to loose track of such an amount of money unless a deliberate effort was made to do so.
The UNDP website states:
“UNDP helps developing countries attract and use aid effectively. In all our activities, we promote the protection of human rights. . .”

If you had a few million lying around in spare cash, would you give it to UNDP to use effectively?
On the other hand, one could accept that the Country Review was done by a bunch of vindictive individuals more concerned with doing harm to UNDP than with constructive comments. Nevertheless, in a technical meeting on the Country Review held on 02 March 2001, chaired by the Deputy minister of Planning, it highlighted the fact that in general the Government agreed with the assessment of the CR team.
Arve Ofstad, Director of the Chr. Michelsen Institute in Norway, previously the UNDP Resident Representative in Sri Lanka, and team leader for the Angola Country Review, later wrote a paper entitled; ”When Peace And Development Both Fail – The UN System In Angola.” These are his observations:
“The UN development agencies, here exemplified by UNDP, has a mixed experience in Angola, in periods playing a very traditional “developmentalist” role, and in other periods taking on innovative roles much earlier that elsewhere. In the initial phase, before and up to the peace accord in 1991 and the elections in 1992, UNDP was very active in “filling and bridging the gaps” to the humanitarian and political spheres. UNDP was in fact providing support to the coordination of humanitarian assistance prior to establishment of DHA[3] in 1993, and contributed funding to the first elections. While this was early compared to UNDP in most other countries, this could have been partly inspired by the transition and elections in Namibia just before.
However, when the war broke out in 1993, UNDP suspended its regular development programme, as a traditional development agency would do. But during the follow-up from the 1994 peace accord, UNDP again changed its position, and provided heavy support to this follow-up through the organisation with the government of a major Round Table with donors in Brussels in 1995. During this period the new UNDP Resident Representative combined this role with the position of WFP Country Director and being the Humanitarian Aid Co-ordinator as well, and he worked very closely with the SRSG[4]. This seemed to be the “golden period” for UN cooperation, and their support to a peace process.
In the following “in-between” phase, UNDP nevertheless failed almost completely. It turned incapable to make good use of these opportunities, while it also suffered from deteriorating external environment. Despite a good and relevant programme and substantial donor support, very few sustainable results were obtained. This can partly be explained by the weak leadership of another Res. Rep, who did not combine the post as Humanitarian Aid Co-ordinator. In a study of “in-between” phases, the poor performance by UNDP, and the lessons and experiences from this, will require special attention. As the 1998-99 war broke out, UNDP again had to reduce its activities as was unable to redirect its efforts to respond to the changing environment. With the arrival a new Res. Rep again in 2000 and a new combination of the role as Humanitarian Aid Co-ordinator, UNDP seemed to enter a period of slow recovery, also reflecting the new “in-between” phase.
Finally, the humanitarian agencies played a relatively limited role within the UN system before 1991, despite the continuous war with refugees and displacements since independence. However, with the large-scale “war of the cities” in 1993-94, the humanitarian assistance increased rapidly, especially as food aid through WFP. DHA took over direct coordination, most of the period handled by WFP as Humanitarian Aid Co-ordinator. Since then, the humanitarian agencies have maintained a strong role, especially during the periods of large-scale war. In the “in-between” phases the humanitarian agencies have tried to move into support for resettlement and recovery, but not very successfully.
Interestingly, the humanitarian agencies in Angola seem to have had a positive relationship with the political and security presence of the UN, as opposed to the strained relationship that has been the case in many other countries. Especially during the 1993-94 war, the humanitarian agencies through their presence in the field throughout the country were supporting the SRSG in providing information and situation analyses, and in maintaining contacts with the UNITA side. During the 1994-95 “golden period” of UN coordination, the humanitarian agencies were also part of this. Since 1995, however, it seems that the humanitarian agencies have been acting more separately on their own, while expanding their activities, rather than integrating with the developmental parts of the system. During and after the 1998-99 war, the humanitarian agencies have no longer been able to provide assistance to the population in unsafe and in UNITA areas, which is a major breach of basic humanitarian principles.”

Although it is a bit of an aside, Arve Ofstad also asks and then answers some interesting questions:
“Is the volume of aid contributing to or subsidising the war efforts? – This has apparently been seen as an issue in Angola, where regular aid has been limited and further reduced during periods of heavy violence, while humanitarian aid increased. But the military strength of both government and UNITA has depended on other funding sources, and has hardly been influenced by the level of aid. The humanitarian assistance has clearly provided life-saving support to large populations, and it seems unlikely that the two sides would have paid more attention to suffering civilians with less external assistance. This may require more discussion, however.
Can the content of the aid programme provide incentives for the peace process? – This is exactly what was attempted especially in the wake of the 1994 peace accord. This project is an attempt to understand why these incentives were so weak.
Will aid for reconstruction in contested areas promote peace? – Given the clear pro-government position of the UN agencies, they have worked on the assumption that re-establishing civilian administration and initiating development in (previously) contested areas would promote the peace and reconciliation process. However, it is not clear whether this assumption is correct.
What are the options and implications of aid for rehabilitation and development efforts in rebel controlled areas? – This has hardly been an option in Angola for the UN, possibly with the exception of UNICEF. Before 1992 other major donors (USA) and their NGOs were actively involved on the UNITA side, but this was primarily a political position not necessarily motivated by promoting a peace process.”

Not only was this the only person not fully positive about UNDP. In a conference called “The Struggle for Peace, Peace-building and Canadian Policy, Roundtable on Angola,” held in Ottawa, Canada on 26 November 1999, the following statements were made:
“The donor community in 1995 mounted a program as a contribution to peace building, the Brussels Round Table process. It underwrote the Lusaka peace accords with a billion dollar, to assist in community revitalization. It wanted to engage communities in national rehabilitation, as part of a peace-building process. The UN set up independent evaluation teams to look at a well conceived, inclusive program but it was left to the UNDP to implement. UNDP is one of the weakest structures in terms of administering programs. After almost 4 years, none of the rehabilitation had taken place. Proposals received in late 1995 from communities had still not been processed 4 years later. Due to poor implementation, the international community was further discredited. If implemented early and effectively, this program could have assisted in the consolidation of peace.

UNDP’s own bureaucratic systems of financial planning, reporting and monitoring - Imprecise and overlapping sets of definitions of programme and project boundaries made budgeting a difficult process for non UN personnel to understand. Government, Donors and Communities each became frustrated and impatient with programme procedures and tended to look for means to circumvent them. The use of the UN Trust Fund as a pool to finance both the programme administration, necessary office infrastructure rehabilitation, capacity building aspects of project as well as community based projects, without sufficient separation of these functions, prevented programme managers from monitoring the overall financial situation of the CRP. The problem became a serious constraint for local Government and Donors who need clear and accurate financial reporting in order to plan and carry out their functions within the CRP. The lack of transparency of reporting systems hid the fact that only a small proportion of the UN Trust Funds money was invested in community based projects.”

On their website UNDP makes the following claims:
“Accountability, Transparency, and Anti-Corruption
In an era of increasing globalisation, governments play a critical role to ensure economic competitiveness and growth, good governance and sustainable development
Accountable and effective management of public financial resources constitute some of the most fundamental responsibilities and challenges of many governments in the world, particularly those in developing countries and economies in transition. In this era of increasing globalisation of world markets and trade, public sector management and accountability have become critical elements in determining the over-all effectiveness, efficiency, and ability of governments to ensure economic competitiveness and growth, good governance and sustainable human development
The UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/51/59 adopted on 28 January 1997 provides the basis for UNDP’s mandate in assisting development countries to fight corruption. In July 1998, the UNDP Executive Committee approved the corporate position paper, Fighting Corruption to Improve Governance to guide the organization’s work in this field. At the heart of this mandate is UNDP’s holistic approach of tackling corruption as a problem of poor governance. UNDP recognizes that minimizing corruption is critical to reduce poverty and promote social and people-centred sustainable development. UNDP’s emphasis on long-term systemic changes and the human dimensions of development, coupled with its impartiality, underscore its unique contributions in promoting good governance and public accountability and transparency.”

How did UNDP react to this report? Surely if any company or organisation receives a report that concludes that it is almost a complete failure, this would cause a mass panic amongst staff and management and, at the very least, some attempt to start correcting things. Yet, it seemed to be barely noticed by the staff at UNDP. At higher levels the reaction could perhaps be best summarised by the following example:
Michele Falavigna had produced a Back-to-the-Office report soon after his visit to Angola (in March 2001). As an aside, but of interest, was the fact that this twenty-two-page report does not once mention the two-hour meeting that I had had with him. There is nevertheless an interesting section entitled, “Working with Oil Companies.”
It goes like this;
“Collaboration between UNDP and Oil Companies (BP-Amoco, Chevron and Sonangol) has already started with a full cost-sharing project to support fisheries in Ambriz. . . . Considerable progress has been made on setting up infrastructures and equipment. . . . it was suggested to give greater visibility to the accomplishments made to date by producing articles for the national newspapers and videos for the national television. . . .
Beyond, the Ambriz project, the opportunities for increasing UNDP co-operation with oil Companies in Angola are promising. . . .
The Country Office has to pursue the matter vigorously not only because of the opportunity for resource mobilization but also because of the nature of the projects, high visibility and quick impact, which can boost UNDP image as a reliable and efficient co-management partner.”

Sterling stuff, all of it, except for the fact that the report from the Country Review team has the following to say about the very same project:
“The artesian fishing project in Ambriz is a pioneering partnership between UNDP, Equator Bank, BP-Amoco (a private sector petroleum company) and the Ministry of Fisheries.
The programme is still incomplete and the execution has been slow. The primary donor BP-Amoco indicated to the CR Team a certain disillusionment with the performance of UNDP, having expected a more professional management and better reporting. BP-Amoco indicates that reluctantly they are being drawn into a greater “hands-on” role in the project for which they feel poorly equipped as a donor. Due to poor performance in the execution of this project, UNDP risks jeopardising a future relationship with a potentially important investor/partner.”

An important objective of Michele Falavigna’s visit was in fact to close down the CRP. I can well, and with a lot of satisfaction, remember how the top management of UNDP left the office full of confidence for their meeting to do just that. A few hours later they returned, less confidant, and laughing embarrassingly. The Minister of Planning had told them in no uncertain terms that the Angolan government will make such a decision and that Angola is governed by Angolans and not by the staff of UNDP.
Likewise Mark Malloch Brown, the UNDP administrator, in other words the top person in the agency, had visited Angola in February with a view of speaking to the President, José Eduardo dos Santos, in an effort to improve relations between UNDP and the Angolan Government. In spite of not having received any response from the President’s office regarding an audience, Mr. Malloch Brown arrived anyway. After kicking his heels for a day in Luanda, a response arrived.
“The President does not meet with people at this level.” It said, indicating Jorge Chicoti, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs as the appropriate person to speak to.
Mr. Malloch Brown returned to New York after three days and after what was generally considered to be a humiliation. Carol Bellami, head of UNICEF, visits Angola regularly and almost invariably meets with the President. They certainly do not discuss the success of UNICEF projects since in that respect UNICEF is perhaps second only to UNDP in their capacity for failure.
Another indication that Mark Malloch Brown might erroneously have believed that UNDP is in fact doing a reasonable job in Angola could be found in a note he distributed regarding the first regular session held from 24-28 and 31 January 2000 in New York on the Extension Of The First Country Cooperation Framework For Angola. At the very least it suggests that UNDP must have been aware at least at this level that we were active and achieving results. Point three of this note, referring to the CCF from 1997-1999, says:
“The programmes achieved many positive results. Some of the notable ones are the vocational training programmes, community rehabilitation and revival of agriculture and economic livelihoods in six provinces, and capacity-building activities in the Ministries of Planning, Finance, and Civil Service. With the onset of the conflict in Angola in late-1998, and based on discussions with the Government and other partners, the reintegration and community rehabilitation programmes have been shifted to provide vocational training and micro-enterprise services for displaced people in areas with security and access. The capacity-building programmes in the national institutions continue to be relevant in view of the increased government role in humanitarian assistance coordination, and discussions with the Bretton Woods institutions to undertake comprehensive economic reforms beginning in January 2000.”

This was not exactly what the Country Review would find at the end of that same year. (In fact most of the programmes so enthusiastically endorsed by Mr. Malloch Brown did not even exist, or had existed only briefly before being closed down. One can conclude that he was at best misleading, or, more directly, lying to his boss and good friend, Kofi Annan). Another way to judge the quality of the UNDP presence in Angola is to have a look at how the donors support them. This is a bit of a tricky issue, full of real and conceptual pitfalls but we would do our best to make sense of things anyway.
In Angola the UN requests funds from donors through a mechanism called the “Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal” usually simply referred to as the CAP. This mechanism has its origin in the wake of the UN’s poor response to the plight of the Kurds in northern Iraq, when the General Assembly in December 1991 approved resolution 46/182 designed to improve humanitarian coordination. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs[5], created as a result, established the process of consolidated appeals for major emergencies, responding to donor insistence on single requests on behalf of the entire UN system. The idea was that the UN would come up with a co-ordinated response from all its agencies to these emergencies in order to respond in an effective and coherent way. From the Angolan appeals, consisting of a series of one-page project proposals, a thorough background and lots of tables with numbers in them, it would be very difficult to deduce any form of co-ordinated effort behind it all. While the analytical rigour of current UN appeals leaves something to be desired, the response of governments to the new approach still only covers an average of 25 per cent of the UN’s requests.
There is a common misconception that donors only support issues that come to international attention through the media, the so-called media grabbing emergencies. A closer look at multilateral and bilateral funding clearly demonstrates that this is not strictly true. Donor support appears to be given primarily for strategic reasons. Then countries appear to give preferentially to former colonies, to the extent that an undemocratic formal colony can expect about twice as much from a donor as can a democratic non-former colony. Thus in Angola the major donor by far is the United States, for strategic reasons, followed by the Scandinavians, Britain and Portugal in almost equal measure. Since American Aid is almost always linked to governance issues, democracy and human rights, they almost always support organisations that promote these sorts of things. The CAP in Angola has been supported by about 50 to 70 percent of their requests on average. Countries with less strategic value such as Rwanda, Burundi and Eritrea routinely received as little as between 2 and 6 percent of their requests.
For the year 2000 the UN had requested $260 million[6] and from this only 52 Percent had been funded. The bulk of this was for WFP, receiving 52 percent. The Food and Agricultural Organisation received only 29 percent of its requirements. The UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) received only 60 percent of requirements. UNFPA received 48 percent of its needs. UNHCR received 59 percent of funding for IDP protection and assistance programmes. UNICEF received 40 percent of funding. The WHO received 55 percent of requirements.
The UNDP received a paltry 3.3 percent of requirements in 2000.
In 2001 UNDP received 19.00% of requirements. In the same year WFP received 51.29% of requirements, UNICEF 53.67% of requirements, UNHCR 79.82% of requirements, WHO 8.99% and FAO 9.62%. For 2002 UNDP received 5.29% of requirements. In the same year WFP received 80.86% of requirements, UNICEF 53.63% of requirements, UNHCR 55.24% of requirements, WHO 6.86% and FAO 74.26%.[7]
One thus tends to come to the conclusion that the donors are not overly enthusiastic in supporting UNDP, the so-called principal agency of the UN system. UNDP of course would argue that this was because of the war, when emphasis was placed on humanitarian assistance. There may even be a spark of truth in that, yet fails to explain why UNDP only received 5.29% of their funding in 2002 when there no longer was a war and when their mandate had not only become important but imperative. An analysis of how UNDP revised its requirements dramatically upwards as the war came to an end and then downwards as the donors were obviously not responding, would be interesting but, alas, it is fairly technical and boring stuff and there is regrettably no place for it here. Suffice to say, the amounts that UNDP requested varied from a little more than two million to a little more than seven million, peaking at thirteen million in mid-2002, before being cut back by more than half, a far cry from the tens and even hundreds of millions of Dollars UNDP was originally set up to manage annually.
It did not take UNDP long to get into vicious circle of claiming that there are no results because they have no funds and then not getting funds because they have no results. ROAR’s, their famous “Results Orientated Annual Reports” are a perfect example of the prevailing mentality of UNDP. Every year many of the senior staff goes into apoplexy as they start to prepare these reports. After apparently huge efforts they then produce a monumental document full of goals, sub-goals, sub-sub-goals, themes, sub-themes, sub-sub-themes, tables with numbers, tables with lists of countries with little crosses marked of against a number of indicators and little dialogue boxes with all sorts of asides. Reading through all of this is an exercise in endurance and yet at the end of it the all, the important questions; what was done, how does it contribute towards development, how many peoples’ lives are better as a result and how much did it cost? remain unanswered. These reports do not contain a single measurable result. It comes across a little bit like the “baffle them with bullshit” story. Only that there is almost 200 pages of it.
UN Agencies, which we expect to have high moral values, and to occupy the moral high ground, seems to have increasing numbers of freeloaders, parasites, charlatans and impostors within their ranks. A certain illness has crept in, and the illness seems to be infectious. The UN should be mature enough to diagnose the illness, and consider what they can do to treat it, and restore the system to health, and to its proper position of the high moral ground.
Criticism of the UN has reached such a crescendo over the last few years that one finds oneself almost unable to reach through this to the real issues in this specific case. It is easy to be overly critical about the UN. It is nevertheless important to stress that one should separate the UN system, that often fail because its member states do not support it enough, from its agencies, which are largely free from this horse trading, and should be run professionally, competently and work to the highest standards.
These are not unreasonable demands. In fact the UNDP Operational manual makes the same demands:
“In the context of the Mission statement and the 2001 project for management change, UNDP staff and management have agreed on the overall values guiding the work of the organization, namely, a results orientation, integrity in all aspects of work, and respect for the diversity of staff and development partners.

To make development assistance more effective, the General Assembly decided in 1975 that UNDP activities should be seen in terms of outputs or results rather than in terms of a package input of foreign experts, fellowships and imported equipment.”

The specialist agencies of the UN are in fact doing exactly that. There are also some fine and admirable agencies such as WFP, but they are in danger of being overshadowed by the increasing number of self-interested parasitic agencies, that represent something other than the multi-lateral, not-for-profit, not self-serving, public benefit organisations that they should be.
Without wanting to demean WFP in any way, their work is not at all that difficult. All they have to do is get food to people wherever there may be a need. Logistically perhaps very difficult and even complex but conceptually easy. The real work of the UN should be within the agencies that can respond to needs in a more conceptually mature and holistic manner, identifying and solving the underlying causes for suffering, creating programmes and projects that can meaningfully intervene in the lives of people and fundamentally make things better. Without that, the work of WFP, however excellent, is meaningless really. And I have seen this many times in the faces of WFP staff as they respond time and again to the same emergencies, having to try and save the same lives again and again, seeing the same despair and realising the same humiliation, as people live their entire lives on aid with no hope for the future.
All I saw UNDP doing during my time with them was the extent to which they expanded the frontiers of incompetence, down to levels as difficult for me to comprehend, as it is to understand quantum theory.
[1] Country Office.
[2] It must be noted here that this statement was found in the draft copy of the evaluation in my possession but did not make it into the final published version.
[3] Department of Humanitarian Assistance, later OCHA.
[4] Special Representative of the Secretary General.
[5] OCHA forms part of this,
[6] About 2-3% of the British Health budget.
[7] Information from the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals for Angola, 2000. 2001, 2002.

How The UN System – In Collaboration With Private Business – Contributes Towards Development And The Reduction Of Poverty

The following letter was written on behalf of ordinary people who find themselves on the receiving end of the efforts of the UN to improve the lives of their community.
These are people from Huambo, Angola who have suffered through more than 30 years of war, watched their city destroyed, agricultural and industrial production reduced to almost nothing and schools, health and social services disappear. They have been bombed, shot at, massacred, mutilated and displaced from their land and homes. These are arguably some of the poorest and most disadvantaged people in the world.
It aims to outline the circumstances of a project that was designed and planned by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Luanda, Angola, to be implemented by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) through a subcontract with a private South African company RUTEC (specialists in Micro Enterprise development (rutec@iafrica.com)).
If all of this sounds very complicated, it is not nearly as complex as the subsequent consequences of this cumbersome agreement, caused by greed, corruption, mismanagement and unbelievable levels of incompetence.

It is our belief that some UN practices constitute a violation of fundamental human rights. These violations are either committed or condoned by the United Nations System, our so-called moral guardians. These events represent only one incidence, but far from being an exception, it is in all probability fairly representative of how the United Nations operate.

Background

Soon after the Lusaka Protocol at the end of 1994 (the peace agreement between the Angolan Government and the rebel forces UNITA) UNDP organised and co-ordinated a meeting in Brussels, Belgium to discuss the reconstruction of Angola. Both Jose Eduardo dos Santos, the Angolan President, and Jonas Savimbi, leader of UNITA, was present at what became known as the Brussels Round Table, as was all major donors and interested parties. The outcome of the meeting was the Community Reconstruction Programme (CRP) a sort of Marshall Plan for Angola. The International Community pledged about U$D 1.00 Billion for this programme for which a Trust Fund was set up, to be administered by UNDP. The CRP never became fully functional and none of its structures were ever fully put in place. Part of the reasons for this was the unstable and deteriorating security situation, mostly because of UNITA’s non-adherence to the Lusaka Protocol. Also, only about U$D 100.00 million of the pledged amount was ever received. Most donors preferred to channel their funding through NGO’s and grassroots organisations.

Sometime, probably late in 1995, the Economics Unit of UNDP, produced a Project Document (PD) for a ‘Community Production Centre in Huambo’. Apparently based on similar ILO projects and adapted in-house, it proposed the establishment of a Production Centre in Huambo where selected beneficiaries will receive training in Micro Enterprises and upon successful completion of the course a relevant kit subsidised by the project at 95% of its actual value. Beneficiaries will be demobilised soldiers, women heads of families, displaced and other vulnerable groups.
It is in general a sound idea that was well elaborated and that contained all the usual safeguards for monitoring and evaluation as is required by the UN. Cost efficiency and sustainability were considered and possible solutions proposed.
Carlos Bessa Victor, employed by Equator Bank, and at the time fairly influential within UNDP, seems to be the motivation force behind the idea.
Initially conceived as a freestanding project, it was to be executed by UNOPS with RUTEC as a subcontractor. Exactly how RUTEC became involved is not known.

There are no evidence to indicate that the contract has been put to tender, as is required under UN rules for services that exceeds U$D 50 000.00.

In January 1996 the Director of RUTEC, John Dommett, and his wife, conducted what they called a feasibility study in Huambo. Their subsequent report mentions that since they were not able to accurately assess the needs in Huambo they based their conclusions on the needs of a similar sized city in South Africa. The model proposed was an exact copy of the model as is found in the RUTEC Operations Manual and throughout the subsequent discussions over the next two years no alterations were made to this model.
There is no city in South Africa that even nearly approximates the reality of Huambo, Angola, and what was proposed was largely irrelevant for that city.
Huambo has an enclave economy that depends heavily on imports in spite of high agricultural potential. It has no industry, few services, no reliable supply of electricity and is virtually under siege with access only by air or in occasional convoys, protected by the military.
Unemployment runs at about 80 – 90%. Per capita income is much lower than the U$D 416.00 usually quoted for Angola. It is probably around U$D 70.00.
Twenty-three Micro Enterprise opportunities were proposed. Almost all of these were not possible for a variety of reasons: there were no suitable raw materials, it depended on formal industry that do not exist in Huambo, it relied on energy (electricity, gas, petrol or diesel) which is not freely available in Huambo, the product is unknown in Angola, the equipment would be too expensive or would not be able to be maintained, etc.
The PD, under various project codes (ANG 96/001, ANG 96/003, ANG 96/005, ANG 96/003/01/31) seems to have been circulated for the next two years looking for funding. Budgets for the project varied between a little more than U$D 500 000.00 to almost U$D 1 million. Possible donors included the Government of Italy, Equator Bank and Coca-Cola.
As this PD was doing its rounds, various questions were being asked within UNDP and UNOPS as to what RUTEC can offer.
The RUTEC proposal never altered. The same idea was presented for whatever amount of funding appeared possible at the time.

A committee meeting held on 18 March 1997, chaired by John Ohiorheneun and attended by Ibrahima Djibo, Leo Merores and Jessie Byron, raised, amongst others, the following issues:
The description of services to be undertaken by RUTEC need to be more explicit.
Justification is required for choosing RUTEC. It is most important to provide some kind of assessment. More details need to be given vis-à-vis RUTEC’s involvement in establishing CPCs. What precisely did they do? How well their performance was?
There was a question on the Due Process being followed in regards of sub-contracting. It is not clear at what point can the Bureau ask for a waiver and if some request does not have to go to the Committee on sub-contract beyond certain amount.
The meeting also felt that one needs to have an idea on the amount of subcontracting involved.
In conclusion, the committee felt that RUTEC seems qualified for the job. Nevertheless, for transparency purposes, all the questions about their work need to be fully answered. Furthermore, a clearer and better justified TOR is needed, placing greater emphasis on the services to be provided by RUTEC. The meeting suggested that the TOR be redrafted and for all recommendations made be incorporated in the new document.’

There is no evidence to suggest that these recommendations were complied to.

A letter dated 27 March 1997 to Bernard Ntegeye, Resident Representative – UNDP Angola from Solomon Akpata, Chief, Division II, Regional Bureau for Africa – UNDP New York, requests the hiring of consultants to consider the ‘waiver request for RUTEC to be awarded subcontract of components of the above project (ANG 96/003 – Community Production Centre in Huambo), which is executed by UNOPS.’
Revised Terms of References (TOR’s) are requested for forwarding to the committee.

There are no revised TOR’s.

A Fax dated 05 September 1997 from Dimitri Samaras (DimitriS@unops.org), Officer in Charge, Africa Division UNOPS New York to Bernard Ntgeye, RR UNDP Angola:

‘We would like to explain that we are not trying to be difficult but RUTEC has repeatedly resisted answering our questions in a straightforward way. …. RUTEC has made it extremely difficult for us to evaluate the value of the contract because they have continuously failed to provide a breakdown of the activities and their related costs. In addition we have explained to them repeatedly that we cannot give them an advance payment equal to over 90% of the contract value.’

At the same time the Provincial Government in Huambo was making repeated requests to Pierre Marie Achy, International Advisor for the CRP in Huambo, about when the project will be implemented. Pierre Marie Achy stated that continued delay in the implementation of this project is causing embarrassment to UNDP.

By all appearances, sometime between November 1997 and February 1998, UNDP instructed UNOPS to start operationalising the project.
Normally for this to happen a Project Document need to be signed by the Government, the implementing agency (UNOPS in this case) and UNDP.

No such document has been found to date.

On 20 February 1998, UNOPS and RUTEC signed contract no. C-971794 ‘ANG 96/003 – Community Production Centre Huambo, Angola’.

The ‘Statement of Work’ in this contract is exactly what RUTEC offered in January 1996 in spite of the fact that its quality had been questioned for almost two years.
The contract makes no reference to any Project Document and no specific, result-oriented goals are set to determine payments.
A total of fifteen milestones are set. The first five deals with licensing fees and the physical establishment of a centre in Huambo, delivery of vehicles and equipment. The remainder simply states ‘Management of Centre for Two Months’ for which U$D 57 126.00 in each instance will be paid.
The total value of the contract is U$D 1 538 201.00.
The contract is for an initial pilot phase of 18 months to end 31 May 2000.
Anticipating an earlier starting date, RUTEC requested an amendment to the contract and on 11 June 1998 signed this, which brought the termination forward to 31 January 2000 based on a starting date of September 1998.

RUTEC was now ready to start doing their thing. What this could possibly be, they are yet to tell.

It does not appear that funding for this project had been finalised at this stage.

On 26 March 1998, Michel Balima (michel.balima@undp.org) Senior Deputy Resident Representative – Projects (SDDR-P) UNDP Luanda, faxed Dimitri Samaras in New York:

‘Reference to your PS 101 regarding prodoc for RUTEC. Please note that RUTEC, though conceived initially as a stand-alone project, was made an integral part of the ANG 96/100 Community Rehabilitation Project. It is a subcontract to be financed from the output budget ANG 96/B01 budget line 2101 – Trust Fund for the CRP.’

In order for projects to be implemented under the CRP, they need to be reviewed and authorised by a Local Project Appraisal Committee (LPAC). This consists of representatives of the Government, the CRP and UNDP.

There is no signed documentation to indicate that this was ever done.

The National Director for the CRP, Dr Joao Ferreira has consistently claimed that CRP authorisation had never been given for this project. His stated reasons is that the project was too expensive for what was being offered and that it would rely on inputs from the outside instead of on local initiatives.

There is no documentation available to show that CRP authorisation had been sought or given.

During the course of 1998, UNDP made two transfers from the Trust Fund to UNOPS, totalling U$D 1 645 116.00. UNOPS retained 10% of this amount as Administrative and Overhead Support (AOS), an amount of U$D 164 511.00.

In The Beginning – Setting Up The Project

Towards the end of May 1998 John Dommett, the RUTEC Director, went to Huambo to start operationalising the project.
On 28 May 1998 he and Pierre Marie Achy interviewed Leon Kukkuk who was subsequently employed as Project Manager. He was given a copy of the contract with UNOPS as an explanation for what the project should do. Since this left him none the wiser, John Dommett explained that the project would consist of a training and production centre for Micro Enterprises. Upon completion of a two week course trainees would have the opportunity to buy a kit at its full value. Kits will be that equipment produced by RUTEC in their factory in Johannesburg, South Africa. Beneficiaries will include anybody that can afford to pay for the kit.

Although sceptical of this explanation, Leon Kukkuk felt that it to be a misunderstanding easily resolved through reference to the Project Document, which he determined to obtain from UNOPS.

Surely the UN system was not going to pay a private company to turn a huge profit in one of the poorest regions of the world?

The Provincial Government had made available an abandoned factory that needed to be cleaned and rehabilitated. It was the intention to work from tents that was to be pitched within the walls of the building. Extensive rehabilitation work was required in order to achieve this.

On 06 June 1998, Leon Kukkuk travelled to Johannesburg, South Africa, where RUTEC is based. Considering that RUTEC had been awarded the contract, without tendering for it, based on their experience on similar projects in South Africa, Leon Kukkuk requested information regarding their administrative and accounting procedures, reporting procedures, sample job descriptions, standard formats, etc. This is, in his opinion, essential for the smooth management of any project.

RUTEC had no such information.

All the administrative, accounting and logistical systems required for the running of a project was eventually put in place by Leon Kukkuk, with no input from RUTEC whatsoever.

On 13 June 1998 in a meeting with Michele Balima at UNDP in Luanda, Leon Kukkuk asked for, and was promised a copy of the Project Document.

He will eventually receive this on 19 September 2000.

From 15 June 1998, rehabilitation work started on the building. It was expected that a set-up phase, which would include rehabilitation of a building, importing all equipment, vehicles, etc, staff training and preparation of educational material, would last four months.
In Huambo fifty-five temporary workers were employed to start rehabilitation of the building. Several companies were sub-contracted to provide to provide various items.

Throughout the month of June 1998 more than 250 job applications were processed and interviews held. In the last week of June 1998 a Centre Manager, a Counsellor and four Trainers and various support staff signed an initial three-month contract that included Terms and Conditions and a Job Description.

At the end of June 1998 John Dommett went to Huambo to approve these appointments. In a meeting with staff he told them that their primary function would be to run a shop that has to sell as much equipment and raw materials as possible.

That was the last that was seen of RUTEC in Huambo for nineteen months.

The Counsellor and four Trainers went for two months training in Johannesburg on 10 July 1998. Leon Kukkuk made all their travel arrangements.

At this stage he had discovered that it is almost impossible to get any funds from RUTEC. The absence of this was causing immense difficulties for him, as was the fact that neither UNDP nor UNOPS assumed responsibility for organising his visa as is specified in the contract. He was to remain without legal documents until 15 March 2000.

Requesting funds in order to pay staff an advance on their salaries before travelling, Leon Kukkuk was told that this would not be possible since RUTEC has nobody with the capacity to travel in Angola. Staff will be given an advance on their salaries upon arrival in Johannesburg.

At the end of July 1998, Leon Kukkuk and Carlos Alberto Gomes, the Centre Manager, travelled to Johannesburg.
Carlos Gomes was supposed to receive a two-week Management Training course. He did not receive this. Neither of them did any substantive work that could be considered as contributing towards the establishment of a centre in Huambo. This two-week visit was considered by them to be a waste of their time.
In Johannesburg, staff were not provided with accommodation and food as was promised, but only accommodation. They also had not been paid any salary advances as had been promised. This meant, in effect, that they had to survive for two weeks on tea and biscuits that was provided on their course.

During discussions at RUTEC to have the staff salary advances paid, Leon Kukkuk was told by John Dommett that the staff, in line with similar practices in South Africa, will only be paid a commission on student fees and equipment sold. When it was pointed out to him that the project would then have to generate U$D 3 million in 18 months in order to cover salaries, he relented. Nevertheless, in October 1999, Leon Kukkuk received documents requesting him to implement this system. It was taken to Huambo and filed. In effect what RUTEC wanted to achieve was to make as much profit as possible out of Huambo, in addition to the U$D1.5 Million that they were already receiving from UNOPS – all at virtually no cost to themselves.

Leon Kukkuk prepared a detailed cash-flow projection that forecasted U$D 50 000.00 for construction and set-up, and minimum running costs of U$D 12 500.00 per month.

There is no reason to believe that anybody at RUTEC ever paid any attention to this document.
A request by Leon Kukkuk to open a bank account in Angola was turned down on the argument that this would be too expensive to run.

It was not clear who at RUTEC would be responsible for the project. It was also not clear which staff had appropriate skills and experience to be responsible for such a project or to contribute towards it in any way.
Leon Kukkuk, in a meeting with RUTEC staff in Johannesburg, mentioned that there would need to be a substantial improvement in RUTEC’s competence if they would want to successfully manage a project in Huambo, Angola.
Improvements in RUTEC’s performance consisted of requesting Leon Kukkuk, at the end of August 1998, to travel from Huambo to Johannesburg to arrange visa extensions for the Angolan staff that was undergoing training there.

Their explanation for this was the fact that they do not have staff that can do this.

On two occasions Leon Kukkuk was also asked to travel to Johannesburg to oversee the logistics of eventually sending about four container loads of equipment to Huambo.

Once again, their explanation for this was the fact that they do not have staff that can do this.

At this time Leon Kukkuk was overseeing the rehabilitation and construction work in Huambo, logistics in Johannesburg and trying to find out what the management arrangements for the project are in Luanda. He had no legal documents and was receiving virtually no support from UNOPS on the argument that this is a UNDP project and no support from UNDP on the argument that it is a UNOPS project.

Contact with UNOPS throughout 1998 was considered informal since Lawrence Doczy, their Representative in Luanda, was ill for most of the time and outside of Angola. Leon Kukkuk never had any opportunity to talk to him.
Obtaining funds from RUTEC proved to be an impossible task that was never resolved. After requesting funds for more than a month and explaining that the lack of such is becoming acute, Leon Kukkuk, on 13 September 1998, was asked by RUTEC to travel to Johannesburg to collect it. His explanation that this would be extremely difficult considering the construction work in Huambo, was dismissed as unimportant. Also the staff were scheduled to return to Luanda on 20 September 1998. Accommodation in Luanda, as well as transport to Huambo needed to be arranged for them. This would not be possible without funds. RUTEC maintained that they do not have staff that can travel in Angola. They were also not prepared to give any of the Angolan staff members any funds to take to Angola with them.

In the face of this, Leon Kukkuk, without funds or any support, travelled to Johannesburg by arranging a lift with the UN Peacekeepers (MONUA), arriving there on the morning of 15 September 1998. On 17 September 1998 he returned with MONUA to Luanda. In two days in Johannesburg he spoken to John Dommett for ten minutes before leaving for the airport, and had received no funds.

On 19 September 1998, Leon Kukkuk wrote and faxed a very strongly worded letter to RUTEC complaining about their lack of competence even in basic administrative matters, lack of support to the project and extreme reluctance to provide funds for work that was already under way. A copy of this letter was left with Michel Balima requesting guidance as to how these issues should be resolved.

No substantive responses were received from either RUTEC or UNDP. Mike Klosterman, Operations Manager for RUTEC, did write a letter in which he mentioned that RUTEC is attempting to implement a project in an area where they have no experience but offered no specific solutions to specific issues raised. By December 1998 his short-lived career at RUTEC had come to an end.

On 20 September 1998 the Angolan staff returned from their two-month training course. With them they brought U$D 4 700.00 of the U$D 25 000.00 that was requested.

At a meeting with them on 21 September 1998, they claimed that their impression of RUTEC in general is negative and that they have very little confidence that RUTEC can in any way manage a project in Huambo. Leon Kukkuk was asked to take up these issues and resolve them before the project is implemented.

All through 1998 the security situation in Angola was deteriorating. In the beginning of September 1998 UNOPS instructed RUTEC to suspend all project activities that would require capital investment in Huambo. Activities that do not require capital investment and activities outside of Huambo (such as staff training and preparation of training material) can however continue.

At the end of October 1998 UNOPS had given a verbal agreement that the project can continue. They promised that this will confirmed in writing.

At this time most preparations had been made in Huambo. Equipment in Johannesburg was packed and ready to be taken by road to Kaáma, Southern Angola, from there to be flown to Huambo.
Leon Kukkuk and Carlos Gomes drove two vehicles, in a MONUA convoy, from Luanda to Huambo. It arrived in Huambo on 05 November 1998 in what was to be the last UN convoy and the last convoy for more than a year.
On 04 December 1998 RUTEC received written instructions from UNOPS to proceed with the project, showing the logic of making decisions from New York.

On 05 December 1998 yet another full-scale war broke out in Angola.

Wars, almost by definition, are times of insecurity and uncertainty. Considering the advanced state of planning and the go-ahead from UNOPS, Leon Kukkuk stayed in daily contact with John Dommett from RUTEC, Michel Balima from UNDP and Jose Salema from UNOPS, Luanda seeking guidance on the best course of action. Naturally, they themselves were very uncertain regarding how to proceed but mentioned that such a decision would probably best made on the ground.

Logically, especially in the face of the new reality, the project needed to be extensively rethought. The remainder of the funds, in excess of U$D1.2 million at this stage, could probably have been spent much more usefully on the humanitarian disaster that was about to descend upon Huambo and Angola.

This agreement did not allow for that sort of flexibility.

Leon Kukkuk, perhaps somewhat irresponsibly, decided to go ahead. To achieve this, he asked for, and subsequently received, the full support of the Angolan staff.

From 09 to 12 December 1998, four planeloads of equipment were received.

Tens of thousands of people descended upon the airport trying to get on any flight out of Huambo. The airport, and, eventually a one-kilometre perimeter around it, was heavily guarded by police and military. Huambo was bombarded and attacked on several occasions. By the beginning of January 1999, two UN planes had been shot down outside the city. Torrential rain fell almost daily.

On 05 January 1999, MONUA, the UN peacekeepers left in a convoy for Benguela, on the coast.

By 25 January 1999, the Centre was set up and ready to start working.

None of the management issues and misgivings that had been generated in the previous months had been resolved.

Working On A Development Project In A War

One of the first and the greatest victories that the project achieved, and one, which, to a large extent, carried it through all its subsequent calamities, was psychological. Even though it had many ups and downs and even though it achieved some worthwhile results, it was never forgotten how it set up and started operating at a time when Angola was plunged into a devastating war for the second time in less than a decade.

None of the staff had any experience in Micro Enterprises. Considering the lack of technical support from RUTEC and the fact that the training received in Johannesburg was considered largely irrelevant for Angola, everything had to be learned from first principles.

By the end of March 1999 Leon Kukkuk travelled to Luanda. It was his intention to meet with John Dommett (RUTEC), Michel Balima (UNDP) and Jose Salema (New Representative UNOPS, Luanda) in Luanda to discuss the project.
Co-incidentally Michel Balima and apparently Dimitri Samaras (UNOPS, New York) travelled to Huambo on 31 March 1999 to visit the project. Although Michel Balima seemed pleased with what he saw, there are no mission reports available regarding this visit.
In Luanda Leon Kukkuk, Jose Salema and John Dommett met on the same day.
John Dommett, by this time had sold a 75% share of RUTEC to The Land Development Bank and the National Mineworkers Union in South Africa for about U$D 3 million.

The following issues were raised on this day:

The tents are proving to be uncomfortably hot, wet and unhealthy. Could funds be made available to replace these with structures using local technology? Alternatively, existing centres can be used. This would spread the geographical impact of the project.

Response: Using tents for projects are highly profitable to RUTEC. An alternative should not be considered. New centres can only be used if relevant contracts are signed with UNOPS.

Most of the equipment supplied by RUTEC is inappropriate. A lot of it is of poor quality and arrived broken. This, as well as the high expense (U$D1 000.00 – U$D 5 000.00 per kit) of the equipment would make it highly improbable that any of the beneficiaries could afford it or that any finance would be able to be raised for it. Would it be possible to produce equipment locally?

Response: Local production of equipment cannot be considered. If, however, anybody would be prepared to sign a licensing agreement, equipment can be assembled in Huambo. (The equipment that was produced by RUTEC was all either within the public domain or copyright violations. Evidence also exists that suggests that RUTEC deliberately sent equipment to Huambo that was broken in order to cut costs.)

Lack of funding was discussed but never resolved.

None of the management arrangements was discussed. Jose Salema felt that this is an issue that should be raised with UNDP. The termination date needed to be determined and agreed upon. This should have been 30 June 2000. It was never formally agreed.

In the beginning of April 1999, Leon Kukkuk met with Teresa Felix (teresa.felix@undp.org) the new National Programme Officer at UNDP, Luanda.
She informed him that he needs to work closer with the CRP and also requested monthly reports containing a summary of activities and the accounts. This was subsequently sent on a monthly basis. There is no evidence to suggest that anybody ever read them.

Back in Huambo Leon Kukkuk met with the Provincial Governor, Paolo Kassoma and the Director of Planning, Henrigue Barbosa. It was felt that the project, as it stands, would follow the same path as other projects by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and UNOPS, where lots of money is spent on training but that no new employment is created.
It was therefore decided that the centre will provide training and support for new businesses as well as logistical support and counselling during at least during the first year. Local production will be encouraged and equipment, as far as possible, will be produced locally.
A local Board of Directors was created to oversee the centre.
The Governor changed the name of the centre to ‘The Centre for the Promotion and Training of Micro Industries in Huambo – MICROFORM’.
It had now effectively become a local initiative, supported by the Provincial Government and to a very large extent by Development Workshop, a Canadian NGO with many years of experience in Angola.
The real owners of the project were now effectively, through their own lack of interest and competence, excluded from the project.
Leon Kukkuk was charged, yet again, to approach UNDP, UNOPS and RUTEC to improve the management arrangements, specifically evaluation and monitoring, as well as ensuring meaningful technical assistance and funding for the centre. He felt that this could best be done by getting all the partners together.

RUTEC was going through its own difficulties, which resulted in a spectacular turnover of senior staff. UNDP, as always, were preoccupied with the justification for their existence, which would see the arrival of Zoraida Mesa, the new Resident Representative, at the end of 1999, charged with putting UNDP back on track again. She would last a little bit more than a year. UNOPS stumbled along, did not feel that this project was their responsibility, and eventually left Angola at the end of January 2000, hopefully for good.

In the beginning of October 1999, after a discussion with Buswe Yafele, the new CEO for RUTEC, Leon Kukkuk started planning a mission to Huambo. These are things that should be organised by UNDP, as a matter of routine, but UNDP staff rarely leave their offices in Luanda and then seldom spend more than a few hours in the interior of the country.

On 14 January 2000 Leon Kukkuk met with Joao Ferreira, the CRP Director, in his office in Luanda. Dr Ferreira reiterated his opposition to the project as it was originally planned. In the light of the results it was achieving in Huambo, however, it was imperative that it be evaluated and a decision made regarding its future. This was supposed to be done through a tripartite meeting to be organised by UNDP.

The mission took place on 31 March 2000 and consisted of Representatives of CRP, UNDP and RUTEC.
Buzwe Yafele (RUTEC) was primarily concerned with trying to sell 10 tons of wheat flour from South Africa to the centre. The centre was supposed to raise the funds for this. He did mention that the issues that the centre management was raising could be discussed once a guarantee has been received that the RUTEC contract will be extended.
Francisco de Almeida (fransisco.almeida@undp.org), Assistant Deputy Resident Representative, UNDP Luanda, asked several times why the centre appears to be so impoverished if sufficient funds had been made available for its management. He received no reply and did not pursue the issue.

On 03 April 2000 a meeting was held in Luanda. No conclusive results were obtained from this meeting. Somewhat rambling minutes were written in April 2001 in an effort to determine what was said at the time.

At the end of June 2000 the project should terminate but this date had not been determined officially. Some mention was made that a tripartite meeting and evaluation meeting will be held in May 2000 to determine the future of the project.
With less than three months to go it was imperative that a concrete decision be reached forthwith.

At the end of April 2000 the CRP issued a report that stated that the project will be evaluated with a view towards extension, and that a project along similar lines will be planned for Benguela, to be implemented by December 2000.

By the end of April 2000, Buswe Yafele had been dismissed from RUTEC and replaced by Boris Kamstra.

What did the project achieve?

This is one of the most difficult questions to answer. There is no information available from any objective and competent evaluation.
Any attempt at evaluating its activities must take into account the very complex management arrangements and a close look at how the funds were spent.
Apart from the centre in Huambo that had kept meticulous records, accounts are sketchy to say the least. More or less specific accounts are available. For the sake of clarity only a brief summary will be given:

Sometime in 1998 UNDP transferred an amount of U$D 1 645 116.00 from the Trust Fund to UNOPS.
UNOPS, as a matter of course, retained 10% of this amount as Administrative and Overhead Support: U$D 164 511.00.
Over a period of two years, from June 1998 to June 2000, UNOPS paid a total of U$D 1 505 521.00 to RUTEC in twenty instalments.

During the same period of time the Centre in Huambo had spent a total of U$D 235 152.00. This includes all construction, rehabilitation, management, international travel, local salaries and running costs and is equivalent to 15% of the total budget available.
Of this amount U$D 227 000.00 were provided by RUTEC and the balance paid by Leon Kukkuk, a total of U$D 8 152.00.
RUTEC also supplied equipment for the centre. Although their invoice for this does not stand up to scrutiny, it reflects an amount of U$D 285 000.00.

This means that an amount in the region of U$D 1 million, or two thirds of the funds available, need to be explained.

UNOPS had quite clearly paid this money to RUTEC.

What had RUTEC done with it?

A series of e-mails between Teresa Felix (UNDP) and Boris Kamstra (RUTEC) elicited the following responses:

24 February 2001:
‘I am afraid that this is information that I don’t have. I only joined Rutec at the end of this project and will have to find the relevant files to establish what was supplied at what cost. … To get further information will be difficult and not possible before at least Wednesday, as I will have to contact John Dommett who is in Portugal (I think).’

05 March 2001:
‘I have been going through the company records at the time of the project. The system used did not separate out the costings, as such it is very difficult to allocate some costs to the project and others not, especially not knowing the history of the project or which people were employed for this project.

I am, through some bank statements, able to find a few specific costs such as flights to and from Angola and payments for satellite phones. But this by no means gives us any clearer picture of what was spent on this project.

I am sorry I am unable to be more specific. Not having the information at hand and any idea of the history of the project makes it impossible for me to get the exact numbers.’

Throughout the project (June 1998 – June 2000) local staff salaries were paid two to three months in arrears, with the exception of November and December 1999, and then January 2000 when Leon Kukkuk paid salaries from his own resources.
Leon Kukkuk for the same period of employment (June 1998 – June 2000) received payments in March 1999, February 2000, April 2001 and June 2001. At the time of writing he remains uncertain if his salary is up to date or not.

Leaving this issue aside for the time being, it is obvious that the project need to be evaluated on two levels.

The first, the UNDP, UNOPS, RUTEC alliance, at a cost of more than U$D 1.5 million, is considered by us to be an absolute and spectacular failure that should not ever be repeated. We shall have a look at how UNDP proceeded to correct this error.

On a second level, one need to consider another project ‘MICROFORM’, to all intents and purposes a completely local initiative, and what it had managed to achieve with U$D 227 000.00.

Its achievements will be summarised very briefly:

· Several Micro Enterprise opportunities were developed from first principles, using local resources and technology. Lack of funds was the major constraint for expansion.
· Equipment, adapted to local realities and often of superior quality, were produced locally. Production was limited by lack of funds.
· New products or products that were previously imported, started appearing on the market. Lack of funds limited expansion.
· Approximately 250 small businesses created in two years. Approximately 500 people gained employment through indirect activities – raw material suppliers, sellers, transporters, etc.
· It was seen as the vehicle for the future development of Huambo that could benefit both urban and rural disadvantaged communities.

It was calculated that an efficient project, with more than a thousand enterprises created in one year can be done on a budget of U$D 350 000.00 per year. The arrangement with RUTEC was considered locally to be not only expensive but also detrimental to the project. With the amount of funds available, a local initiative could have assisted as much as 50 000 people directly and indirectly over a period of 4 years and have made a significant impact on the Province.

What about the future?

Although not officially confirmed, the pilot phase of the project would come to an end at the end of June 2000. At any event, it was likely that funds would run out at about that time.

A decision had to be made regarding its future. This is the responsibility of UNDP, as owner of the project.

Various options needed to be considered, taking into account to the wishes of the local community and the Provincial Government as well as donor interest and the availability of funding.
These options included:

· Full closure of the project.
· Continuation under the same terms.
· Continuation under new arrangements.

Each of these options would have consequences and associated costs that needed to be managed. A decision regarding vehicles and other assets can only be made by the UNDP Resident Representative based on recommendations of the UNDP Local Property Survey Board.
Staff needed to be informed, at least 3 months in advance, whether their contracts would be terminated or extended and the necessary remunerations made according to Angolan Labour Law.
In anticipation of this Leon Kukkuk requested a transfer from RUTEC for an amount of U$D 45 000.00 to pay the usual salary arrears and other debts. He received U$D 19 125.00 of this amount in the beginning of June 2000. A further request for U$D 25 000.00 resulted in the receipt of U$D 9 980.00 at the end of July. Contributing U$D 5 000.00 from his own resources he was then able to pay salaries until the end of July 2000, leaving about U$D 10 000.00 in unpaid bills and commitments.

The Provincial Government was putting a lot of pressure on Leon Kukkuk to find a solution. This meant that he was faced with all the responsibility but had no authority. In two years his efforts had shown no results, but as the RUTEC contract was coming to an end various options presented themselves.

With vague promises coming from UNDP that the project will be evaluated, it drifted into a state of limbo. Hoping for the best, the staff continued working without contracts or salaries. This was a project that had achieved many positive results under extremely difficult circumstances. Many donors demonstrated an interest in financing it, if its external problems could be solved. Nobody wanted to get involved in any ‘funny agreements with UNOPS and RUTEC.’ Although they shall remain anonymous for the time being, there is also a strong belief amongst certain people that UNDP involvement should be removed from the project: ‘that’s the kiss of death for any project’.

From about the end of April 2000, even more of Leon Kukkuk’s time was taken up, not with the job that he was employed to do, but to compensate, as an individual, for the shortcomings of organisations and companies like UNDP, UNOPS and RUTEC. A project, in which responsibility was supposed to be distributed over three legal entities now came to rest on the shoulders of a private individual.

For the sake of brevity, the machinations of these three organisations to avoid the consequences of their considerable shortcomings shall not be gone into. Neither shall their machinations to accept credit for the project’s successes be described in any great detail.

Ninety nine percent of correspondence, e-mail, telephone calls and conversations by Leon Kukkuk failed to elicit any response whatsoever.

Within this sea of indifference the following events can be summarised briefly:

MICROFORM: Motivated by vague promises from UNDP, the centre stumbled from one contingency plan to the next. Staff worked without contracts or salaries. Leon Kukkuk spent from 19 September 2000 – 10 October 2000 in Luanda but returned to Huambo without achieving any meaningful results. On 31 January 2001 the centre closed amidst considerable chaos and ill feeling. Before closing Leon Kukkuk attempted to obtain support from the Provincial Government and other NGO’s. Henrigue Barbosa (Director of Planning) said that this type of project could only be closed after an evaluation and authorisation from the Minister of Planning. Alberta Gomes (Huambo Representative ADRA, an Angolan NGO) and Carlos Figueiredo (Huambo Representative Development Workshop), both members of the board of Directors of MICROFORM, were vehemently opposed to such a closure.
It went ahead anyway.
The biggest problem was what to do with substantial amounts of equipment. These were divided into four categories:
1. Those that can be distributed to selected beneficiaries.
2. Those that can be distributed to the Ministry of Agriculture, Training and Research Centres and NGO’s.
3. Those that can be sold.
4. Those that can be stored pending possible future use.

Staff was paid as much as possible from the sale of equipment and told that if there is to be no movement regarding the project, the balance of equipment shall be sold by the end of February 2001.
On 11 February 2001 Leon Kukkuk flew by military flight to Luanda.

RUTEC: A small flurry of activity as they realized that their contract won’t be extended as a matter of routine. They could not understand why, if RUTEC had such a successful project in Huambo, wasn’t it being supported. They were told that RUTEC is not necessarily seen as part of the project in Huambo and should come up with a constructive proposal if they want to play a continuing role. This proposal should answer the question of how RUTEC involvement can contribute to the project as well as address the perception that their involvement to date has been both non-existent and very expensive.
Their response: ‘For the future of your project I do not know enough of what you require and how Rutec can assist in this to be able to put forward a coherent plan for the future.’
On 10 November 2000, whilst forwarding to Leon Kukkuk instructions from UNOPS to terminate the project: ‘ Please let me have any comments that you may have on it, and take whatever action you deem appropriate given that we will not be in a position to support you financially until a new agreement is worked out.’

UNOPS: UNOPS did not have any presence in Angola since January 2000. They made no handover of the project before leaving, presumably since they felt that it was not their project in the first place.
In a fax dated 01 November 2000 from Dimitri Samaras to Boris Kamstra, RUTEC is instructed to terminate the project immediately.
A note says: ‘In order to implement steps 3 and 4 above, UNOPS shall contact UNDP/CO to initiate our internal UN procedure for transfer of project equipment to the Government and request identification of the designated entity or ultimate beneficiary (ies); the official transfer shall take place upon a decision of the UN Resident Co-ordinator based on a recommendation of the UNDP Local Property Survey Board (LPSB).’

It is almost unnecessary to say that none of this was ever done. A lot of correspondence by Leon Kukkuk seeking clarity regarding the practical and logistical aspects of such a transfer remains unanswered.

On 15 May 2001 Leon Kukkuk spoke to Dimitri Samaras via telephone. Following is a copy of his notes on the conversation:
UNOPS to disburse project and not implement it.
Pierre Marie Achy to authorize payments, thereafter UNDP RR.
Did not get along with John Dommett, and almost canceled contract.
Is available to help find solutions.
Feels that UNDP approach is retaliatory but that new management might have a different approach.
RUTEC was a pre-selected contractor, did not follow the usual procedures.
UNOPS was brought into the project at the last moment and their role was never fully clarified.
When he tried to get hold of John Dommett to discuss solutions, he was told that this person was no longer at RUTEC and found that the new management had very little idea of the project.

UNDP: On 13 July 2000, Francisco de Almeida (UNDP) wrote an e-mail to Teresa Felix (UNDP):
‘Please have the note for the file on the meeting held further to our trip to Huambo with the RUTEC Director ready by Monday at the latest. This issue needs to be finalised prior to Mr Balima’s departure, scheduled for the 18th. So please give top priority to this issue to put our office on the safe side. By the way what is happening to Leon??
Please ask him to come to see us so we can discuss the future of the project in light of our current financial situation.’

Yet again no time or space will be wasted to say that this was not done.

On 22 October 2000, as part of the Country Review, the review team visited the project in Huambo and were informed of its difficulties. As a result of this Zoraida Mesa, the UNDP RR, wrote an undated memorandum to James Curry (james.curry@undp.org), Director, Office of Audit and Performance Review, who in turn on 14 January 2001 posed these questions to Bisrat Aklilu, Deputy Executive Director, UNOPS, New York. His response on 14 February 2001 demonstrates that UNOPS had lost whatever tenuous grasp they may ever have had on this project sometime late in 1998.

On 04 November 2000 Stan Nkwain (stan.nkwain@undp.org) Senior Deputy Resident Representative –Projects, UNDP, Luanda, visited Huambo and discussed the project with Leon Kukkuk. At the end of the day he returned to Luanda with some documents and a promise that a reply will be forthcoming within two weeks.

These documents have since disappeared and no reply had been given to date.

At the end of March 2001 Leon Kukkuk and Teresa Felix presented the project to Michel Falavigna (michel.falavigna@undp.org), Regional Programme Advisor, and UNDP, NEW YORK.

As is usual this is neither mentioned in his back-to-office report, neither has there been any feedback.

Leon Kukkuk was contracted under the CRP umbrella from 01 March 2001 to 30 June 2001 charged with the following:

· To prepare the relevant documentation for the auditors as motivation for a detailed evaluation and audit of the project.
· To prepare a Termination Report and inventory of equipment currently in Huambo
· To prepare a Draft Project Document for a possible follow-up project.

Preparing a work plan resulted in the following exchange:

Before approving this plan, could you clarify what you mean by "legal
closure" of the project?

Thanks.

Dear Mr Nkwain,

Thanks very much for your question, which I will try to clarify from my point of view.

Apart from beneficiaries and donors, which is an important priority, there are several partners that feel that they have a stake in the project. These are PRC, Provincial Government and of course UNOPS, UNDP and RUTEC.

In July 2000, when the contract with RUTEC was coming to an end, and we were not receiving any concrete instructions from UNOPS or UNDP, we were faced with three options:

Abandon the project.
Close the project and place everything in storage. (or hand it over to the government, who was asking for supporting documentation)
Continue as best we can pending a solution.

These options were presented to the local authorities who told me that options one and two would be illegal in terms of recognised procedure. (Remember that they want a continuation of the project and it is very difficult to find their support for anything other than that.)

When we did close down at the end of January 2001,I was once again told that this is considered to an illegal action on my part, since it was a decision made unilaterally, without any supporting documentation or instructions from the duly recognised authorities. I was told that these instructions should be based on decisions made between the owners of the project in Luanda and that the governor should be informed of this first. By not following this procedure I am opening myself up to actions that can be taken against me. (I was confined to my house for two days as a consequence of closing the project.)

In this context legal closure would then be:

Something that is not done by me unilaterally.
Addresses the considerable ill feeling that currently exists regarding the chaos and disorder under which this project functioned and closed down.
Based on documentation that reflects the decision of the owners of the project.
Informing the local authorities.

Since a lot of mistakes and profound decisions had already been made I think legal closure should also include some sort of damage control in order to regain credibility.

Once again all information available were presented to Bereket Sletzion (bereket.sletzion@undp.org) the UNDP auditor, who apparently about the middle of June 2001 informed his superiors that he feels an audit to be necessary pending an evaluation.

On 27 June 2001 Leon Kukkuk distributed the Draft Termination Report and Draft Project Proposal. The Draft Project Proposal was prepared in full consultation with the Provincial Government of Huambo, Development Workshop, ADRA and Swiss Co-operation and a copy was also sent to them for feedback. They urgently want to know what future possibilities exist for their own strategic planning.

The evaluation mission was held from 21 – 24 August 2001. No mission report is yet available but would be responded to once received. The most polite description of the mission is perhaps that it was a dismal failure resulting in the loss of whatever little credibility UNDP thought they might have had left.

Teresa Felix informed staff, that has already been waiting for more than a year for a response from UNDP that they have to wait until phase II of the project is operational, after which their salary arrears will be paid to them in small monthly increments. Responding to a question about when phase II will start she said that it won’t be for several months to a year. She was unaware of the content of the Project Document that she had received two months previously or even of the basic structure of a possible new project.

In 13 months no progress had been made in resolving any of the issues. Most of these issues were presented for the first time on 19 September 1998.

It is difficult not to come to the conclusion that UNDP is an arrogant and incompetent organisation obsessively concerned with its own internal dynamics. Staff, on all levels, had either forgotten or has never known what the objectives of UNDP is supposed to be.
This is having an immensely destructive effect on our lives, which is nowhere near resolved.

If the Angolan people are pinning their hopes on any assistance from UNDP in the reconstruction of their country, one can only advise that it is in vain.

Here are the questions we want answered:

UNDP

Did UNDP follow their own internal procedures and safeguards in the preparation of the Project Document with due consultation to their counterparts in the Angolan Government?
What is UNDP policy on projects with conditionality? What steps are taken to prevent these sorts of projects to be implemented by UNDP?
How did UNDP ensure that the contract that UNOPS signed with RUTEC conforms to the objectives as set out in a Project Document?
Did UNDP follow their own internal procedures for monitoring and evaluation, tri-partite reviews, timely and meaningful follow-up reports and in co-operation with their counterparts in the Angolan Government? Where are these reports?
Did UNDP liase with UNOPS, RUTEC, the Central and Provincial Government and other partners, to ensure that the end of the pilot phase are managed in a meaningful way, in a timely fashion and in accordance to their own internal procedures?
What steps do UNDP take to ensure that projects that originate from their office and are financed by them are implemented with due respect to the fundamental rights of its staff and beneficiaries according to the statutes of the United Nations system?

UNOPS

What steps were taken to ensure that the contract that they had signed with RUTEC conforms to specific and achievable objectives as set out in a project document and conform to the internal procedures put in place to ensure that these objectives are met?
What steps were taken to ensure that the training methodology of RUTEC is original (and not perhaps a copy of the ILO system) and that their equipment are original (and not perhaps within the public domain or copyright violations) before paying a licensing fee of U$D 250 000.00?
Justification of how the U$D 164 511.00 received as AOS had been spent on administration, ensuring compliance with the objectives of the project, with timely and meaningful mission reports and feedback to issues raised.
Do they have completion certificates that justifies the payment of U$D 1 505 521.00 in twenty instalments. If so, what was the qualification of this person(s) to ensure that the objectives of the project were being met to justify payment?
What steps was taken to ensure that the end of the pilot phase are managed in a meaningful way in accordance with the reality and the wishes of UNDP, UNOPS, RUTEC, the Central and Provincial Government and other partners, in a timely fashion and in accordance to their own internal procedures?
What steps do UNOPS take to ensure that projects that they are required to implement are implemented with due respect to the fundamental rights of its staff and beneficiaries according to the statutes of the United Nations system?

RUTEC

What happened to about U$D 1 million?
Was health and unemployment insurance arranged for the staff as was required by the contract? If not, how can this oversight be corrected.
Are any reports available that shows what technical assistance RUTEC had provided to the project, or in general terms shows what benefit RUTEC was project? Are these backed up by clear accounts?
What steps were taken to ensure that the end of the pilot phase are managed in a meaningful way in accordance with the reality and the wishes of UNDP, UNOPS, RUTEC, the Central and Provincial Government and other partners, and in a timely fashion?
What steps do RUTEC take to ensure that the Fundamental Rights of its staff and beneficiaries are protected?


Luanda and Huambo, Angola


15 September 2001

(This document has been prepared in preparation for action that we are taking against UNDP. The Provincial Government in Huambo, Angola has already started legal procedures against UNDP, UNOPS and RUTEC for non-payment of salaries, misappropriating funds and non compliance with promises that was made to them. We also have the support of the Central Government and are hoping to take this issue as far as possible to ensure that UNDP are not any longer in any position to harm peoples lives. Any advice and assistance will be highly appreciated.)


Portuguese Version:

Como o Sistema da ONU - Em colaboração com Negócio Privado - Contribui Para Desenvolvimento e a Redução da Pobreza

A carta seguinte foi escrita em nome de pessoas ordinárias que no fim se acham receptoras dos esforços da ONU para melhorar a vida da sua comunidade.
Estas pessoas são do Huambo, em Angola, pessoas que sofreram mais de 30 anos de guerra, que assistiram a sua cidade a ser destruída, produção agrícola e industrial reduzida a quase nada e que as escolas, saúdes e serviços sociais desaparecem. Eles foram bombardeados, mortos a tiro, massacrados, mutilados e deslocados das suas casas e das suas terras. Alguns deles são provavelmente mais pobres que a maioria das pessoas mais desvantajosas no mundo.
Esta carta tem como objectivo esboçar as circunstâncias de um projecto que foi projectado e planificado pelo Programa das Nações Unidas para o Desenvolvimento (PNUD) em Luanda, Angola, a ser implementado pelo Escritório das Nações Unidas para Serviços de Projecto (UNOPS) que subcontratou uma companhia privada sul africana RUTEC (os especialistas em Micro Empreendimento e desenvolvimento (rutec@iafrica. com)).
Se tudo isto soar muito complicado, quase não é tão complexo quanto as consequências subsequentes deste incomodo acordo, causado por ganância, corrupção, má gestão e níveis incríveis de incompetência.

É nossa convicção que algumas práticas de ONU constituem uma violação de direitos humanos fundamentais. Estas violações ou estão comprometidas ou perdoadas pelo Sistema das Nações Unidas, denominado nosso guardião moral. Este relato representa só uma incidência, muito longe de ser uma excepção, é com toda a probabilidade bastante representativa de como as Nações Unidas operam.

O INICIO

Após o Protocolo de Lusaka, no final de 1994 (o acordo de paz entre o Governo angolano e a força rebelde UNITA) o PNUD organizou e coordenou uma reunião em Bruxelas, Bélgica para discutir a reconstrução de Angola. Ambos, José Eduardo dos Santos, o Presidente angolano, e Jonas Savimbi, líder de UNITA, estavam presentes ao que foi conhecido como a Mesa-redonda de Bruxelas, onde estava os principais doadores e os partidos interessados. O resultado da reunião era o Programa de Reconstrução Comunitária (PRC) um tipo de Plano Marshall para Angola. A Comunidade Internacional prometeu U$D 1 Bilhão para este programa, para o qual foi criado um Fundo de Maneio, a ser administrado por PNUD. O PRC nunca esteve completamente funcional e nenhuma das suas estruturas funcionou no seu ligar devidamente. Parte das razões era a instabilidade e a deteriorada situação de segurança, principalmente pela causa da não aderência da UNITA ao Protocolo de Lusaka. Também, só U$D 100.00 milhões da quantia prometida foi recebida. A maioria dos doadores preferiram apoiar as ONG's internacionais, nacionais e locais.

Num dia, provavelmente no final de 1995, a Unidade de Economia do PNUD, produziu um Documento Projecto (DP) para um "Centro de Produção Comunitária no Huambo". Aparentemente, baseado em projectos semelhantes aos da OIT e adaptados localmente, propôs o estabelecimento de um Centro de Produção no Huambo onde seleccionou os beneficiários que receberiam treinamento em Micro Empresas e no final do curso aos beneficiários com aproveitamento seriam distribuídos equipamento subsidiado pelo projecto a 95% de seu valor real. Seriam beneficiários os soldados desmobilizados, mulheres chefes de famílias, deslocados e outros grupos vulneráveis.
É no geral, uma ideia que foi bem elaborada e isso conteve todas as habituais formas de protecção, monitoria e avaliação como é requerida pela ONU. Foram consideradas a eficiência de custo e sustentabilidade e as propostas de soluções possíveis.
Carlos Bessa Victor, empregado pelo Banco de Equador, e na ocasião bastante influente dentro de PNUD, parece ser à força de motivação da ideia.
Inicialmente concebido como um projecto independente, seria executado pelo UNOPS tendo a RUTEC como subcontratante. Exactamente como é que a RUTEC foi envolvida não é conhecido.

Não há nenhuma evidência a indicar que o contrato foi submetido a concurso publico, como são as regras das ONU para serviços que excedem U$D 50 000.00.

Em Janeiro 1996, o Director da RUTEC, John Dommett, e a sua esposa, visitaram Angola e elaboraram um estudo de viabilidade no Huambo. O relatório subsequente deles menciona que não puderam avaliar com precisão as necessidades no Huambo e fundamentaram as suas conclusões nas necessidades de uma cidade de tamanho semelhante na África do Sul. O modelo proposto era uma cópia exacta do modelo utilizado pelo Manual de Operações da RUTEC e ao longo das discussões subsequentes nos dois anos a seguir nenhuma alteração foi feita a este modelo.
Não há nenhuma cidade na África do Sul que quase iguala ou se aproxima à realidade do Huambo, Angola, pelo que a proposta do estudo de viabilidade é bastante irrelevante para aquela cidade.
Huambo tem uma economia de enclave que depende grandemente de importações, em despeito do alto potencial agrícola. Não tem nenhuma indústria, poucas oficinas, nenhuma provisão segura de electricidade e está virtualmente dependente da via aérea e do acesso terrestre em ocasionais comboios de viaturas escoltadas pelo exército.
O Desemprego abrange aproximadamente 80-90%. Rendimento per capita é muito mais baixo que o U$D 416.00 que normalmente citam para Angola. É provavelmente a volta de U$D 70.00.
Foram propostas vinte e três oportunidades de Micro Empresas. Quase todas estas Empresas não eram possíveis por uma serie de razões: não havia matérias-primas, dependiam da indústria formal que não existe no Huambo, dependiam da energia (electricidade, gás, gasolina ou gasoleo) que não está livremente disponível no Huambo, o produto era desconhecido em Angola, o equipamento seria muito caro ou não poderia ser mantido, etc.
O DP, com vários códigos de projecto (ANG 96/001, ANG 96/003, ANG 96/005, ANG 96/003/01/31) parece ter circulado durante os dois anos seguintes a procura de fundos. Os orçamentos para o projecto variaram entre um mais pequeno de U$D 500 000.00 para um de quase U$D 1 milhão. Os prováveis doadores seriam o Governo de Itália, Banco de Equador e Coca-Cola.
Quando este DP estava circulando, foram sendo feitas várias perguntas dentro de PNUD e UNOPS sobre o que RUTEC poderia oferecer.
A proposta de RUTEC nunca foi alterada. A mesma ideia foi apresentada para qualquer quantia sem ser fundamentada e para qualquer ocasião possível.

Num determinado dia, numa reunião do comité, presidido por John Ohiorheneun e com a participação de Ibrahima Djibo, Leo Merores e Jessie Byron, abordou, entre outros, os assuntos seguintes:
“A descrição de serviços a ser empreendido pela RUTEC precisa ser mais explícita.
É requerida uma justificação pela escolha da RUTEC. É muito importante fazer avaliação. Necessidade de mais detalhes e dados no envolvimento vis-à-vis da RUTEC no estabelecimento dos CPC's. O que precisamente eles fizeram? Será bom o seu desempenho?
Havia uma pergunta no sentido de ser seguido o processo de cumprimento do sub-contratante. Não está claro a qual o ponto a Agência deve pedir desistência e se algum pedido não tem que ir para o Comité em subcontratos além de certa quantia.
A reunião também sentia que aquele precisava ter uma ideia na quantia de subcontrato envolvido.
Em conclusão, sentia o comité que a RUTEC parecia qualificada para o trabalho. Não obstante, para fins de transparência, todas as perguntas sobre o seu trabalho necessitavam de ser respondidas completamente. Além disso, um transparente e um melhor TDR eram justificados, dando maior ênfase aos serviços a ser providos por RUTEC. A reunião sugeriu que o TDR seja redigido novamente e que todas as recomendações feitas sejam incorporados no documento novo.’

Não há nenhuma evidência mostrando que estas recomendações foram incorporadas.

Uma carta datada de 27 de março de 1997 endereçada a Bernard Ntegeye, o Representante Residente-PNUD Angola, de Solomon Akpata, Chefe da II Divisão, Agência Regional para a África-PNUD Nova Iorque, pedindo aos contratantes/consultores para considerar o "pedido de desistência antes da RUTEC ser premiada com o subcontratado com componentes do anterior projecto (ANG 96/003-Centro de Produção da Comunidade no Huambo) que é executado pela UNOPS".
É pedido para remeter ao comité as Condições e Termos de Referências (TDR).

Não há nenhum TDR revisado.

Um Fax datado de 05 de setembro de 1997 de Dimitri Samaras (DimitriS@unops.org), Oficial em Custo, Divisão de África, UNOPS, Nova Iorque, para Bernard Ntgeye, RR PNUD Angola:

‘Nós gostaríamos de explicar que não estamos a tentar dificultar, mas que a RUTEC resistiu a responder repetidamente as nossas perguntas de um modo directo. …. RUTEC fez isto para ser extremamente difícil nós avaliarmos o valor do contrato e porque eles continuamente não têm provido um desorganizar das actividades e dos custos relacionados. Além disso, nós explicamos repetidamente a eles que nós não lhes podemos dar um pagamento adiantado igual ou para cima de 90% do valor do contrato.’

Ao mesmo tempo, o Governo Provincial do Huambo estava fazendo pedidos repetidos a Pierre Marie Achy, Conselheiro Internacional para o PRC no Huambo, sobre quando o projecto será implementado. Pierre Marie Achy declarou que a continuada demora na implementação deste projecto está causando embaraços ao PNUD.

Num dia entre novembro de1997 e fevereiro de 1998, o PNUD indicou a UNOPS que começasse as operações para implementação do projecto.
Normalmente para isto acontecer, um Documento de Projecto deve ser assinado pelo Governo, a agência de aplicação (UNOPS, neste caso) e o PNUD.

Tal documento assinado ainda não foi encontrado.

No dia 20 de fevereiro de 1998, o UNOPS e a RUTEC assinaram o contrato: C-971794 "ANG 96/003-Centro de Produção de Comunidade Huambo, Angola”.
A Descrição de Trabalho deste contrato é exactamente o que RUTEC ofereceu em janeiro de 1996 apesar de que a sua qualidade tinha sido questionada durante quase dois anos.
O contrato não faz nenhuma referência a qualquer Documento de Projecto e nenhuma meta específica e orientada é estabelecida para determinar os pagamentos.
Um total de quinze parciais por objectivos (etapas) é fixo. As primeiras cinco etapas são para a autorização do uso dos direitos de autor, o estabelecimento físico de um centro no Huambo, entrega de veículos e equipamento. As restantes etapas são simplesmente declaradas para "Administração do Centro" aprazadas em dois meses no qual será pago o valor de U$D 57 126.00 por etapa (cada dois meses).
O valor total do contrato é U$D 1 538 201.00.
O contrato é para uma fase inicial de 18 meses a terminar em 31 de maio 2000.
Antecipando para uma data mais cedo o inicio do projecto, a RUTEC pediu uma emenda ao contrato e no dia 11 de junho de 1998 assinou a antecipação do termino para 31 de janeiro de 2000 baseado na data de início em Setembro de 1998.

A RUTEC estava agora pronta para começar a fazer as coisas a sua maneira. O que isto provavelmente poderia ser, eles ainda não tinham mostrado.

Até ao momento o orçamento do projecto não tinha sido elaborado.

No dia 26 de março de 1998, Michel Balima (michel.balima@PNUD.org) Representante Deputado Residente Sênior-Projetos (SDDR-P) PNUD em Luanda, enviou um fax para Dimitri Samaras em Nova Iorque,:

"Referência de seu PS 101 relativo a prodoc para RUTEC. Por favor, note aquele RUTEC, entretanto concebido inicialmente como um projecto separado, foi entregue como parte integrante do ANG 96/100 Projecto de Reabilitação de Comunidade. É um subcontrato para ser financiado do orçamento de produção ANG 96/B01, orçamento linha 2101-Fundo de maneio para o PRC".

Para que projectos a serem implementados sob alçada do PRC, eles precisam de ser revisados e autorizados por um Comité Local de Avaliação de Projecto (LPAC) composto por representantes do Governo, o PRC e PNUD.

Não há nenhuma documentação assinada para indicar que isto já foi efectuado.

O Director Nacional para o PRC, Dr. João Ferreira reivindicou constantemente que o PRC não deu autorização para implementar este projecto. As razões por si declaradas são de que o projecto era muito caro para o que estava sendo oferecido e que dependia de contribuições do exterior em vez de iniciativas locais.

Não há nenhuma documentação disponível para apresentação em que tenha sido contactado o PRC para obter a autorização.

Durante o ano de 1998, PNUD fez duas transferências do Fundo de Maneio para o UNOPS, totalizando U$D 1 645 116.00. O UNOPS reteve 10% desta quantia como gastos “Apoio Administrativo e custos correntes” (AOS), a quantia de U$D 164 511.00.

No princípio-Montando O Projecto

No final de Maio de 1998 John Dommett, o Director da RUTEC, foi ao Huambo para começar a operacionalizar o projecto.
No dia 28 de maio de 1998, ele e Pierre Marie Achy (Representante do PNUD em Huambo) entrevistaram Leon Kukkuk que subsequentemente foi empregado como Director de Projecto. A ele fora entregue uma cópia do contrato com UNOPS com uma explicação como o projecto deveria ser implementado. O John Dommett explicou que o projecto consistiria num centro de treinamento e de produção para Micro Empresas. No final de um curso de duas semanas ter-se-ia a oportunidade de comprar um equipamento no seu valor comercial. Os equipamentos só serão produzidos pela RUTEC na sua fábrica em Joanesburgo, África do Sul. Beneficiários incluiriam qualquer pessoa que pudesse pagar o equipamento.

Embora céptico pela explicação, Leon Kukkuk pensava que isto poderia ser facilmente solucionado se pode-se obter do UNOPS o Documento Projecto com as referências necessárias.

Seguramente o sistema de ONU não iria pagar a uma companhia privada para tirar um enorme lucro numa das regiões mais pobres do mundo?

O Governo Provincial disponibilizou uma fábrica abandonada que precisava de limpeza e reabilitação. A intenção era trabalhar em tendas que seriam montadas no interior do edifício.

No dia 06 de junho de 1998, Leon Kukkuk viaja a Joanesburgo, África do Sul, onde RUTEC está baseada. Considerando que RUTEC tinha ganho o contrato, sem se enternecer com isto, e baseado na sua experiência em projectos semelhantes na África do Sul, Leon Kukkuk pediu informações sobre a capacidade administrativa e procedimentos de contabilidade, informações sobre procedimentos, descrições de trabalho estandardizados, etc. Isto é, na sua opinião, o essencial para a administração de qualquer projecto.

A RUTEC não tinha tais informações.

Todos os sistemas administrativos, contabilidade e sistemas de logística requeridos foram eventualmente criados por Leon Kukkuk, sem contribuição da RUTEC.

No dia 13 de junho de 1998 numa reunião com Michel Balima no PNUD em Luanda, Leon Kukkuk perguntou pelo Documento de Projecto e foi-lhe prometido uma cópia.

Ele só recebeu isto no dia 19 de setembro de 2000.

De 15 de junho de1998, começou o trabalho de reabilitação no edifício. Era esperado que a fase inicial, que incluiria reabilitação do edifício, importação de todo o equipamento, veículos, etc., treinamento de pessoal e preparação de material educacional, duraria quatro meses.
No Huambo foram empregados cinquenta e cinco trabalhadores temporários para começar a reabilitação do edifício. Foram contratadas várias companhias para prover diversos serviços.

Ao longo do mês junho de 1998 que foram processadas mais de 250 candidaturas e realizadas as entrevistas. Na última semana de junho de 1998, um Gerente de Centro, um Consultor e quatro Treinadores e também algum pessoal de apoio que assinaram um contrato inicial de três meses que incluía Termos e Condições e uma Descrição de Trabalho.

No final de junho de 1998, John Dommett foi ao Huambo para aprovar o pessoal empregado. Na reunião com a pessoal ele falou que a função primária deles seria gerir uma loja que tem de vender o mais possível equipamentos e matérias-primas.

Esta foi a última visita da RUTEC no Huambo em mais de dezanove meses.

O Consultor e quatro Treinadores foram por dois meses de treino a Joanesburgo no dia 10 de julho de 1998. Leon Kukkuk fez todos os preparativos de viagem.

Nesta fase tinha descoberto que era quase impossível obter quaisquer fundos a partir da RUTEC. A ausência destes fundos estava causando imensas dificuldades, aliado ao facto de que nem PNUD nem UNOPS assumiram responsabilidade em organizar o visto para o Leon Kukkuk como é especificado no contrato. Ele permaneceu sem documentos jurídicos até 15 de março de 2000.

Os fundos pedidos para pagar o pessoal um adiantamento de salários antes de viajar, ao Leon Kukkuk fora dito que isto não seria possível porque a RUTEC não tinha ninguém disponível para viajar a Angola. Ao pessoal será dado um adiantamento dos salários após a sua chegada a Joanesburgo.

No final de julho de 1998, Leon Kukkuk e Carlos Alberto Gomes, o Gerente de Centro, viajam a Joanesburgo.
Era suposto que o Carlos Gomes receberia um curso de formação de administração de duas semanas. Ele não recebeu isto. Nenhum dos dois fez qualquer trabalho que justificasse ou que poderia ser considerado como contribuição para o estabelecimento de um centro no Huambo. Esta visita de duas semanas foi por eles considerada um desperdício do seu tempo.
Em Joanesburgo, não foi dado ao pessoal o alojamento e comida conforme fora prometida, mas só alojamento. A eles também não fora pago qualquer adiantamento de salário como fora prometido, por esta causa, eles tiveram de sobreviver duas semanas com chá quente e biscoitos que lhes eram dados no curso.

Para ter os salário do pessoal pago adiantadamente, Leon Kukkuk contactou John Dommett que durante a discussão declarou que o pessoal seria tratado pela RUTEC tendo em conta as práticas semelhantes desta na África do Sul, isto é, seriam pagos só uma parte da comissão das propinas dos estudantes e dos equipamentos vendidos. Quando lhe foi explicado que o projecto teria que gerar U$D 3 milhões durante 18 de meses para cobrir salários, então ele cedeu. Não obstante, em Outubro de 1999, Leon Kukkuk recebeu documentos que o indicavam a implementar este sistema. Foi enviado ao Huambo e arquivado. Efectivamente o que a RUTEC queria era alcançar o maior lucro possível do projecto no Huambo, para além do U$D 1.5 Milhão que eles já estavam recebendo do UNOPS - tudo virtualmente a nenhum custo para eles.

Leon Kukkuk preparou uma projecção de orçamento detalhado que previa U$D 50 000.00 para construção, e despesas operacionais mínimas de U$D 12 500.00 por mês.

Não há nenhuma razão em acreditar que alguém da RUTEC prestou alguma atenção a este documento.
Um pedido do Leon Kukkuk para abrir uma conta bancária em Angola foi negado com o argumento de que isto seria muito caro.
Não estava claro quem na RUTEC seria o responsável pelo projecto. Também não estava claro quem teria habilidades apropriadas e experiência para ser responsável por tal projecto ou de contribuir de qualquer forma para ele.
Leon Kukkuk, numa reunião com o pessoal da RUTEC em Joanesburgo, mencionou que precisaria de uma melhoria significativa na competência de RUTEC se eles quisessem administrar um projecto prospero no Huambo, Angola.
As melhorias no desempenho da RUTEC consistiram em pedir ao Leon Kukkuk, que no final de agosto de 1998, viajasse do Huambo a Joanesburgo a fim de organizar a extensão dos vistos para o pessoal angolano que lá estava tendo treinamento.

A sua explicação era novamente o facto de que eles não tinham pessoal para tratar isso.

Em duas ocasiões foi pedido também ao Leon Kukkuk para viajar a Joanesburgo com a finalidade de controlar a logística de envio de aproximadamente quatro contentores de carga de eventual equipamento para o Huambo.

Uma vez mais, a sua explicação disto era o facto de que eles não têm pessoal para fazer isto.

No momento, o Leon Kukkuk estava dirigindo o trabalho de reabilitação e de construção no Huambo, logística em Joanesburgo e tentando descobrir quais seriam os arranjos de administração para o projecto em Luanda. Ele não tinha nenhum documento jurídico e não estava recebendo virtualmente nenhum apoio do UNOPS pelo argumento destes de que era um projecto do PNUD e nenhum apoio de PNUD pelo argumento que era um projecto do UNOPS.

Os contactos com o UNOPS ao longo de 1998 foi considerado informal, porque Lawrence Doczy, o seu Representante em Luanda, esteve doente a maior parte do tempo e fora de Angola. O Leon Kukkuk nunca teve qualquer oportunidade de falar com ele.
Obter fundos da RUTEC provou ser uma tarefa impossível e que nunca foi resolvido. Depois de pedir fundos para mais um mês e explicar que a falta dos mesmos era um problema agudo, Leon Kukkuk, no dia 13 de setembro de 1998, foi solicitado pela RUTEC para viajar a Joanesburgo a busca desses fundos. A sua explicação de que os trabalhos de construção no Huambo eram extremamente difíceis, foi simplesmente despachado considerando que estes trabalhos eram de pouca importância. Também estava programado que o pessoal regressaria a Luanda no dia 20 de setembro de 1998. A acomodação em Luanda, como também transporte para Huambo precisava ser organizado. Isto não seria possível sem fundos. A RUTEC manteve a afirmação que eles não têm pessoal que poderiam viajar a Angola. Eles também não estavam preparados para entregar qualquer fundo a nenhum elemento do pessoal angolano para levar consigo para Angola.

Por causa disto, Leon Kukkuk, sem fundos ou qualquer apoio, viajou para Joanesburgo organizando um voo através das Forças para Paz da ONU (MONUA), chegando lá na manhã de 15 de setembro de 1998. No dia 17 de setembro de 1998 ele voltou com o voo da MONUA a Luanda. Nos dois dias em Joanesburgo só falou com John Dommett durante dez minutos antes de ir para o aeroporto, e sem ter recebido nenhum fundo.

No dia 19 de setembro de 1998, Leon Kukkuk escreveu uma carta a RUTEC e enviou-a por fax, onde formulou protestos muito fortes e queixas da falta de competência destes nos assuntos administrativos, até mesmo básicos, falta de apoio para o projecto e relutância extrema em fornecer fundos para trabalho já em andamento. Uma cópia desta carta foi dirigida para Michel Balima onde pedia orientação de que como estes assuntos deveriam ser solucionados.

Nenhuma resposta sólida foi recebida da RUTEC ou do PNUD. Mike Klosterman, Gerente de Operações da RUTEC, escreveu uma carta na qual ele mencionou que RUTEC estava tentando implementar um projecto numa área onde eles não têm nenhuma experiência. Mas também não ofereceu nenhuma solução específica aos dados assuntos levantados. Em dezembro de 1998 tinha-se acabado a curta carreira por ele vivida na RUTEC.

No dia 20 de setembro de 1998 o pessoal angolano voltou do curso de treinamento de dois meses. Com eles trouxeram U$D 4 700.00 dos U$D 25 000.00 que fora pedido.

Numa reunião realizada com eles no dia 21 de setembro de 1998, eles reivindicaram, e a sua impressão no geral da RUTEC era negativa e que eles tinham muito pouca confiança que RUTEC poderia administrar algum projecto no Huambo. Fora pedido ao Leon Kukkuk para encaminhar estes assuntos e os solucionar antes do projecto ser implementado.

No final de 1998 a situação de segurança em Angola estava se deteriorando. No princípio de setembro de 1998, o UNOPS instrui que a RUTEC suspendesse todas as actividades de projecto no Huambo que requeressem investimento de capital. Actividades que não requeressem investimento de capital e as actividades fora do Huambo (como treinamento de pessoal e preparação de material de treino) poderiam continuar.

No fim de outubro de 1998, a UNOPS tinha dado um acordo verbal de que o projecto poderia continuar. Eles prometeram que seria confirmado por escrito.

No momento a maioria das operações de preparação foram cumpridas no Huambo. O Equipamento em Joanesburgo estava acumulado e pronto a ser transportado por estrada a Kaháma, sul de Angola, e de lá por via aérea para o Huambo.
Leon Kukkuk e Carlos Gomes dirigiram dois veículos, com uma escolta da MONUA, de Luanda para Huambo. Chegaram ao Huambo no dia 05 de novembro de1998 naquela que seria a última escolta da ONU e a última escolta em mais de um ano.
Em 04 dezembro de 1998, a RUTEC recebeu instruções escritas do UNOPS para continuar com o projecto, mostrando a lógica de tomar decisões de Nova Iorque.

No dia 05 de dezembro de 1998, contudo, outra guerra total começou em Angola.

As Guerras, quase por definição, são tempos de insegurança e incerteza. Considerando o estado avançado do planeado e a autorização do UNOPS, Leon Kukkuk ficou em contacto diário com John Dommett de RUTEC, Michel Balima de PNUD e José Salema de UNOPS em Luanda, na busca da orientação do melhor curso de acção. Naturalmente, eles estavam na incerteza de que como proceder, mas mencionaram que tal uma decisão seria provavelmente melhor feita no terreno.

Logicamente, especialmente à nova realidade, o projecto precisou ser extensivamente repensado. O resto dos fundos, mais de U$D 1.2 milhão nesta fase, provavelmente poderia ser gasto melhor se utilizado no desastre humanitário que estava a ponto de cair no Huambo e em Angola.

Este acordo não permitia este tipo de flexibilidade.
Leon Kukkuk, talvez um pouco irresponsavelmente, decidiu prosseguir. Para alcançar isto, ele perguntou e subsequentemente recebeu todo o apoio do pessoal angolano.

De 09 a 12 de dezembro de 1998, foram recebidos quatro aviões/voos em equipamento.

Na altura, milhares de pessoas corriam para o aeroporto na tentativa de sair em qualquer voo do Huambo para qualquer lugar. O aeroporto e um quilometro no perímetro em redor, era fortemente guardado pela polícia e o exército. Huambo foi bombardeado e atacado em várias ocasiões. Ao inicio de janeiro de 1999, dois aviões de ONU foram abatidos fora da cidade. Chuva torrencial caía quase diariamente.

No dia 05 de janeiro de 1999, MONUA, as Forças de Paz da ONU, partiram numa escolta para Benguela, no litoral.

Em 25 de janeiro de 1999, o Centro era estabelecido e pronto começar a funcionar.

Nenhum dos assuntos administrativos e as duvidas que haviam sido gerados nos meses anteriores estavam resolvidos.

Trabalhando Num Projecto de Desenvolvimento Numa Guerra

Uma das primeiras e das maiores vitórias que o projecto alcançou, de uma grande dimensão que fez recuar todas as suas subsequentes calamidades, era o psicológico. Embora tivesse muitos altos e baixos e embora alcançasse poucos resultados que valessem a pena, nunca foi esquecido como se estabeleceu e começou a operar numa altura quando Angola foi mergulhada numa guerra devastadora pela segunda vez em menos de uma década.

Ninguém tinha alguma experiência em Micro Empresas. Considerando a falta de apoio técnico da RUTEC e o facto que o treinamento recebido em Joanesburgo ser considerado largamente irrelevante para Angola, tudo teve que ser aprendido desde os princípios mais básicos.

Ao final de março 1999 Leon Kukkuk viajou para Luanda. Era sua intenção para se encontrar com John Dommett (RUTEC), Michel Balima (PNUD) e José Salema (UNOPS, Novo Representante, Luanda) em Luanda para discutir o projecto.
Coincidentemente Michel Balima e aparentemente Dimitri Samaras (UNOPS, Nova Iorque) viajam ao Huambo no dia 31 de março de 1999 para visitar o projecto. Embora Michel Balima parecia estar contente com o que ele viu, não há nenhum relatório de missão disponível relativo a esta visita.
Em Luanda Leon Kukkuk, José Salema e John Dommett reuniram nesse mesmo dia.
John Dommett, na altura já tinha vendido 75% da RUTEC ao Banco de Desenvolvimento de Terra e a União Nacional dos Trabalhadores de Minas na África do Sul por cerca de U$D 3 milhões.

Neste dia foram levantados os assuntos seguintes:

As tendas provaram ser incomodante quente, molhado e insalubre. Fundos deveriam ser disponibilizados para estas serem substituídas por estruturas que usam tecnologia local? Alternativamente, deveriam ser usados centros já existentes. Isto espalharia o impacto geográfico do projecto.

Resposta: O uso de tendas nos projectos era altamente lucrativo para a RUTEC. Outra alternativa não deveria ser considerada. Só podem ser usados centros novos se forem assinados pertinentes contratos com UNOPS.

A maior parte do equipamento fornecidos pela RUTEC são impróprios. Muitos são de baixa qualidade e chegaram quebrados. Isto, como também o alto preço (U$D1 000.00-U$D 5 000.00 por equipamento) do equipamento faz isso altamente improvável para que qualquer dos beneficiários pudesse compra-lo ou de que qualquer financiamento para isto poderia ser conseguido. Seria possível produzir localmente equipamento?

Resposta: Produção local de equipamento não pode ser considerada. Porém, se qualquer pessoa estivesse preparado para assinar um acordo de licenciamento, equipamento poderia ser montado no Huambo. (O equipamento que foi produzido pela RUTEC ou estava dentro do domínio público ou com violações de direito autorais. Existe também evidência isso sugere que RUTEC enviasse ao Huambo deliberadamente equipamento que estava quebrado para encurtar custos.).

A f alta de fundos foi discutida, mas nunca solucionada.

Nenhum dos arranjos administrativos foi discutido. José Salema disse que este é um assunto que deveria ser tratado com o PNUD. A data do final do projecto precisava ser determinada por acordo. Este deveria ter sido a 30 de junho de 2000. Nunca foi formalmente concordado.

No princípio de abril de 1999, Leon Kukkuk reuniu com Teresa Felix (teresa.felix@UNDP.org) o novo Oficial Nacional de Programa do PNUD, Luanda.
Ela o informou de que ele precisava trabalhar mais intimamente com o PRC e também pediu relatórios mensais que contenham um resumo de actividades e as contas. Isto foi subsequentemente enviado mensalmente. Não há nenhuma evidência para sugerir que qualquer pessoa já os leu.

Ao regressar ao Huambo, Leon Kukkuk reuniu com o Governador Provincial, Paulo Kassoma e o Director de Planeamento, Henrique Barbosa. Sentia-se que o projecto, como foi concebido, seguiria o mesmo caminho dos outros projectos da Organização Internacional do Trabalho(OIT) e UNOPS onde muito dinheiro é gasto em treinamento, mas que nenhum novo emprego é criado.
Foi decidido então que o centro proverá treinamento e apoiará novos negócios como também apoio logístico e aconselhamento pelo menos durante o primeiro ano. A Produção local será encorajada e equipamento, até onde for possível, será produzido localmente.
Um Conselho de administração local foi criado para seguir o centro.
O Governador mudou o nome do centro para "Centro de Formação e Fomento de Micro Indústrias do Huambo - MICROFORM".
Tinha se tornado agora efectivamente numa iniciativa local apoiada pelo Governo Provincial e com um grande apoio da Development Workshop, um ONG canadiana com muitos anos de experiência em Angola.
Eles tornaram-se agora efectivamente responsáveis pelo projecto. Antes, os reais donos do projecto tinham sido excluídos por falta de interesse e competência.
O Leon Kukkuk foi encarregado, novamente para aproximar o PNUD, UNOPS e RUTEC para melhorar as questões de administração, especificamente a avaliação e monitoria, como também assegurar ajuda técnica significante e fundos para o centro. Ele sugeriu que isto poderia ser melhor com todos os parceiros juntos.

A RUTEC estava passando por suas próprias dificuldades que resultaram numa mudança espectacular de pessoal sénior. Como sempre, o PNUD ficou mais preocupado como justificar a sua existência e pela chegada, no final de 1999, do novo Representante Residente, Zoraida Mesa, que era a responsável de repor o PNUD novamente na linha. Ela duraria um pouco mais de um ano. UNOPS tropeçou como sempre, não sentia que este projecto era de sua responsabilidade, e no fim de janeiro de 2000 saiu de Angola, esperamos que é para sempre.

No princípio de outubro de 1999, depois de uma discussão com Buswe Yafele, o novo Director da RUTEC, Leon Kukkuk começou a planificar uma missão para o Huambo. Estas coisas deveriam ser organizadas pelo PNUD, como um assunto de rotina, mas o PNUD raramente tem pessoal que trabalhe fora dos seus escritórios em Luanda e raramente gaste mais de algumas horas no interior do país.

No dia 14 janeiro de 2000, Leon Kukkuk reuniu com João Ferreira, o Director de PRC, no escritório dele em Luanda. Dr. Ferreira reiterou a posição dele ao projecto como foi planificado originalmente. Por causa dos resultados alcançados no Huambo, porém, era imperativo que fosse avaliado e elaborada uma decisão relativa ao seu futuro. Era suposto que haveria uma reunião tripartida a ser organizada por PNUD.

A missão aconteceu no dia 31 de março de 2000 composta por Representantes do PRC, PNUD e RUTEC.
Buzwe Yafele (RUTEC) estava principalmente preocupado como tentar vender 10 toneladas de farinha de trigo da África do Sul para o centro. Era suposto que o centro devia procurar fundos para isto. Ele mencionou que pudessem ser discutidos os assuntos que a administração do centro estava levantando desde que fosse recebida uma garantia que o contrato da RUTEC seria estendido.
Francisco de Almeida (fransisco.almeida@UNDP.org), Assistente do Deputado Representante Residente do PNUD em Luanda, várias vezes perguntou porquê que o centro parecia ser tão pobre assim se tinham sido arranjados fundos suficientes disponíveis para sua administração. Ele não recebeu nenhuma resposta e não procurou ir ao fundo do assunto.

No dia 03 de abril de 2000 uma reunião foi realizada em Luanda. Nenhum resultado conclusivo foi obtido desta reunião. Vagueou-se um pouco pelas actas escritas em abril de 2001 num esforço para determinar o que foi dito na ocasião. Nada.

No final de junho de 2000 deveria terminar o projecto, mas esta data não tinha sido oficialmente determinada. Alguma menção foi feita que seguramente na reunião tripartida e avaliação marcada para maio de 2000 iria determinar o futuro do projecto.
Em menos de três meses para a dita reunião, era imperativo que uma decisão concreta fosse alcançada rapidamente.

No final de abril de 2000 o PRC emitiu um relatório que declarou que o projecto será avaliado com uma visão para extensão, e que um projecto com linhas semelhantes será planificado para Benguela, a ser implementado em dezembro de 2000.

No final de abril de 2000, Buswe Yafele havia sido despedido da RUTEC e sido substituído por Boris Kamstra.

O Que Alcançou o Projecto?

Esta é uma das perguntas mais difíceis de responder. Não há nenhuma informação disponível de qualquer avaliação objectiva e competente.
Qualquer tentativa para avaliar as suas actividades tem que levar em conta os arranjos de administração muito complexos e um olhar profundo de como os fundos foram gastos.
A parte do centro no Huambo que tinha mantido registos meticulosos, contas delineadas não existem. Contas mais ou menos específicas estão disponíveis. Para ficar mais claro foi elaborado um breve sumário testamento:

Num dia em 1998, o PNUD transferiu uma quantia de U$D 1 645 116.00 do Fundo de Maneio para o UNOPS.
O UNOPS, como de costume, reteve 10% desta quantia como gastos Administrativos e acima do Apoio: U$D 164 511.00.
De junho de1998 a junho de 2000, UNOPS pagou um total de U$D 1 505 521.00 a RUTEC em vinte fases ao longo de um período de dois anos.

Durante o mesmo período de tempo o Centro no Huambo tinha gasto um total de U$D 235 152.00. Isto inclui toda a construção, reabilitação, administração, viagens internacionais, salários locais e despesas operacionais que é o equivalente a 15% do orçamento total disponível.
Desta quantia U$D 227 000.00 provenientes da RUTEC e para um equilíbrio dos gastos foram emprestados por Leon Kukkuk um valor total de U$D 8 152.00.
A RUTEC também proveu equipamento para o centro. Embora que factura deles tenha falhas, reflecte uma quantia de U$D 285 000.00.

Isto significa que uma quantia em redor de U$D 1 milhão, ou seja, dois terços dos fundos disponíveis, precisam ser explicados.

O UNOPS pagou de certeza este dinheiro a RUTEC.

O que a RUTEC fez com isto?

Uma série de e-mails entre Teresa Felix (PNUD) e Boris Kamstra (RUTEC) extraiu as respostas seguintes:

24 de fevereiro de 2001:
"Tenho receio que esta informação eu não a possuo. Eu só entrei na Rutec no final deste projecto e terei que encontrar os arquivos pertinentes para estabelecer o que foi fornecido e o seu custo.… Adquirir informações mais adiantes será difícil e não é possível antes de pelo menos quarta-feira, porque eu terei que contactar John Dommett que está em Portugal (eu penso)".

05 de março de 2001:
“O que eu tenho é o que está registado pela companhia na altura do projecto. O sistema usado não separou os preços de custo, como tal é muito difícil de alocar alguns custos ao projecto e outros não, especialmente não sabendo a história do projecto ou quais pessoas foram empregadas para este projecto.

Eu sou capaz, por alguns extractos bancários de achar alguns custos específicos como: voos para Angola e pagamentos do telefone satélite. Mas isto de qualquer forma nos dá resposta a qualquer quadro mais claro do que foi gasto neste projecto.

Sinto muito eu não posso ser mais específico. Não tendo a informação à mão e nenhuma ideia da história do projecto torna isto impossível para que possa adquirir os números exactos”.

Ao longo do projecto (junho de 1998 -junho de 2000) os salários do pessoal local atrasavam dois a três meses antes de ser liquidados, com a excepção de novembro e de dezembro de 1999, e também em janeiro de 2000 quando Leon Kukkuk pagou os salários com os seus recursos próprios.
Leon Kukkuk durante o mesmo período de emprego (junho de 1998-junho de 2000) recebeu salários pagos, depois muitos dificuldades de receber, em de março de 1999, fevereiro de 2000, abril de 2001 e junho de 2001. Na hora em que permanece incerto se o seu salário esta actualizado ou não.

Deixando por enquanto de parte este assunto, é óbvio que o projecto precisa ser avaliado em dois níveis.

Primeiro, o PNUD e UNOPS num acordo com a RUTEC, num valor de mais de U$D 1.5 milhão, que é por nós considerado um fracasso absoluto e espectacular que nunca deverá ser repetido. Nós estaremos a olhar como PNUD procederá para corrigir este erro.

Num segundo nível, é preciso considerar o outro projecto ‘MICROFORM’, em que todas as intenções e finalidades são uma iniciativa completamente local e o que conseguiu alcançar com U$D 227 000.00.

As suas realizações estão muito brevemente resumidas :

Foram desenvolvidas várias oportunidades de Micro Empreendimento a partir de princípios básicos, usando recursos e tecnologia locais. Falta de fundos foi o principal constrangimento para a expansão.
Equipamento, adaptado às realidades locais e frequentemente de qualidade superior, foram produzidas localmente. Produção foi limitada por falta de fundos.
Produtos novos ou produtos que foram previamente importados começaram a aparecer no mercado. Falta de fundos limitou esta expansão.
Em dois anos, aproximadamente 250 pequenas empresas foram criadas. Aproximadamente 500 pessoas ganharam emprego por actividades indirectas - os fornecedores de matéria-prima, vendedores, transportadores, etc.
Foi visto como o veículo para o futuro desenvolvimento de Huambo que poderia beneficiar comunidades vulneráveis urbanas e rurais.

Foi calculado que um eficiente projecto, criaria num ano mais de mil empresas com um orçamento de U$D 350 000.00 por ano. Foi localmente considerado que com a participação da RUTEC não só seria caro, mas também prejudicial ao projecto. Com fundos disponíveis, numa iniciativa local poderia ajudar até 50 000 pessoas directamente e indirectamente num período à volta de 4 anos e teria um impacto significante na Província.

E sobre o futuro?

Embora não oficialmente confirmado, a fase piloto do projecto acabaria no final de junho de 2000. Em qualquer eventualidade, era bem provável que fundos ultrapassariam esse tempo.

Uma decisão deveria ser feita relativamente ao seu futuro. Esta é a responsabilidade do PNUD, como dono do projecto.

Várias opções devem ser consideradas, levando em conta os desejos da comunidade local e do Governo Provincial como também interesse dos doadores e a disponibilidade de fundos.
Estas opções incluem:

Encerramento total do projecto.
Continuação sob mesmas condições.
Continuação sob novas modificações.

Cada uma destas opções teria consequências e custos associados que precisam ser administrados. Uma decisão relativa aos veículos e outros activos só podem ser tomados pelo Representante Residente do PNUD baseado em recomendações Comité de Pesquisa de Propriedade Local do PNUD.
O Pessoal precisava de ser informado, pelo menos com antecedência de 3 meses , se os seus contratos seriam terminados ou seriam estendidos e as remunerações necessárias a serem feitas de acordo com Lei angolana do trabalho.
Na antecipação, Leon Kukkuk pediu uma transferência da RUTEC de um valor de U$D 45 000.00 para pagar os habituais salários atrasados e outras dívidas. Ele recebeu U$D 19 125.00 da quantia pedida no princípio de junho de 2000. Um pedido adicional para U$D 25 000.00 resultou no recibo de U$D 9 980.00 no final de julho. Contribuindo U$D 5 000.00 dos seus recursos próprios ele pôde então pagar salários até o fim de julho de 2000, enquanto ficava a quantia acima de U$D 100 000.00 em contas não pagadas e compromissos.

O Governo Provincial estava fazendo muita pressão ao Leon Kukkuk para encontrar uma solução. Isso significou que ele foi carregando em frente toda a responsabilidade, mas sem nenhuma autoridade. Em dois anos, os seus esforços não mostraram nenhum resultado, mas como estava se acabando o contrato da RUTEC, várias opções se apresentaram.

Com promessas vagas vindas de PNUD que o projecto seria avaliado, vagueou num estado nubloso. Esperando o melhor, o pessoal continuou funcionamento sem contratos ou salários. Este era um projecto que tinha alcançado muitos resultados positivos debaixo de circunstâncias extremamente difíceis. Muitos doadores demonstraram um interesse em financiar, se os problemas externos pudessem ser resolvidos. Ninguém quis ser envolvido em quaisquer "acordos engraçados com UNOPS e RUTEC". Embora eles permanecem anónimos por enquanto, também há uma forte convicção entre certas pessoas que deveria ser removido o envolvimento de PNUD no projecto: "que é o beijo de morte para qualquer projecto".

A partir do final de abril de 2000, o Leon Kukkuk gastou mais uma vez o seu tempo, não com o trabalho que ele foi empregado para fazer, mas compensar, como um indivíduo, a falta de competência de organizações como o PNUD, UNOPS e RUTEC. Um projecto no qual supostamente a responsabilidade era distribuída mais de três entidades jurídicas veio agora descansar nos ombros de um indivíduo privado.

Não vamos perder tempo falar sobre as maquinações destas três organizações para evitar as consequências das suas faltas consideráveis. Nem nas suas maquinações para buscar créditos dos sucessos do projecto seja descrito em qualquer grande detalhe.

Noventa nove por cento de correspondência, e-mail, telefonemas e conversações encetadas pelo Leon Kukkuk não obtiveram qualquer resposta.

Dentro deste mar de indiferença pode ser resumidos brevemente os seguintes eventos:

MICROFORM: Motivado por promessas vagas do PNUD, o centro tropeçou de um plano de contingência para o próximo. Pessoal trabalhou sem contratos ou salários. Leon Kukkuk perdeu tempo de 19 de setembro a 10 de outubro de 2000 em Luanda, mas voltou a Huambo sem alcançar qualquer significante resultado. No dia 31de janeiro de 2001 o centro fechou entre consideráveis caos e sentimento de dor. Antes do fecho final, o Leon Kukkuk tentou obter apoio do Governo Provincial e outras ONGs. Henrique Barbosa (o Director de Planeamento) disse que este tipo de projecto só poderá ser fechado depois de uma avaliação e autorização do Ministro do Planeamento. Alberta Gomes (Representante ADRA no Huambo, uma ONG angolana) e Carlos Figueiredo (Representante da Development Workshop no Huambo), ambos os membros do conselho directivo de MICROFORM, opuseram-se veementemente a tal um encerramento.
Que prosseguiu de qualquer maneira.
O problema maior era o que fazer com quantidade significativa de equipamentos. Estes foram divididos em quatro categorias:
Os que podem ser distribuídos a beneficiários seleccionados.
Os que podem ser distribuídos ao Ministério de Agricultura, Centros de Treinamento e Pesquisa e ONG.
Os que podem ser vendidos.
Os que podem ser armazenados para possível uso num pendente futuro.

Parte dos salários em atraso do Pessoal era liquidado na medida do possível com a venda de equipamento e caso nenhum movimento positivo relativo ao projecto, o restante equipamento seria vendido até ao final de fevereiro de 2001 .
Em 11 de fevereiro de 2001, Leon Kukkuk viajou num voo militar a Luanda.

RUTEC: A RUTEC pensava que com o seu projecto “positivo”, o projecto seria estendido como um assunto de rotina. Eles não entendiam porque que a RUTEC com um tal próspero projecto no Huambo, não estava sendo apoiado. Disseram-lhes que a RUTEC necessariamente não era bem visto como parte do projecto no Huambo e deveriam elaborar uma proposta construtiva de como eles poderiam continuar a ter um papel. Esta proposta deveria responder a pergunta de como envolvimento de RUTEC poderia contribuir para o projecto como também endereço a percepção que o seu envolvimento até a data era não-existente e muito caro.
A sua resposta: “Para o futuro do projecto eu não sei o suficiente do que vocês querem e como é que a Rutec poderá ajudar e poder avançar um plano coerente para o futuro”.
No dia 10 de novembro de 2000, quando a UNOPS enviou as instruções ao Leon Kukkuk para terminar o projecto: “Por favor, me manda qualquer comentário que você pode ter sobre isto, e entra qualquer em acção que você julga apropriado e determinado que nós não estaremos em condições de o apoiar financeiramente até termos novo um acordo”.

UNOPS: UNOPS não tem nenhuma presença em Angola desde janeiro de 2000. Eles não fizeram entrega alguma do projecto antes de partir, presumivelmente porque eles achavam que não era o seu projecto.
Num fax 01 de novembro de 2000, enviado por Dimitri Samaras a Boris Kamstra, RUTEC recebeu ordens para terminar o projecto imediatamente.
Uma nota diz: “para implementar os pontos 3 e 4 acima, UNOPS contactará PNUD/CO para iniciar nosso procedimento interno das ONU para transferência de equipamento de projecto para o Governo e identificação da entidade designada por último beneficiário (s); a transferência oficial acontecerá em uma decisão do Coordenador Residente de ONU baseado numa recomendação do Comité de Pesquisa da Propriedade Local PNUD (LPSB).’

É quase desnecessário dizer que nada estava terminado. Muita correspondência enviada por Leon Kukkuk a busca de claridade relativamente aos aspectos práticos e logísticos de tal uma transferência permanecem sem resposta.

Em 15 de maio de 2001 Leon Kukkuk falou com Dimitri Samaras por telefone. Seguir é uma cópia das notas dele na conversação:
UNOPS para desembolsar o projecto e não para implementar.
Pierre Marie Achy para autorizar pagamentos, depois disso PNUD RR.
Não teve boas relações com John Dommett, e quase cancelou contrato.
Está disponível ajudar a achar soluções.
A forma de tratamento do PNUD é retaliativa, mas aquela administração nova poderia ter uma atitude diferente.
RUTEC era um contratado pre-selecionado, não seguiu os procedimentos habituais.
UNOPS foi contactado à última hora no projecto e o seu papel nunca foi clarificado completamente.
Quando ele tentou adquirir ligação com John Dommett para discutir soluções, lhe foi dito que esta pessoa não estava mais na RUTEC e achou que a nova administração tem muito pouca ideia sobre projecto.

PNUD: No dia 13 de julho de 2000, Francisco de Almeida (PNUD) escreveu um e-mail a Teresa Felix (PNUD):
“Por favor, prepara a nota para o arquivo da reunião da nossa viagem ao Huambo com o Director de RUTEC para estar pronto o mais tardar segunda-feira. Este assunto precisa ser finalizado antes da partida de Sr. Balima, marcado para o dia 18. Por favor, dê prioridade de topo a este assunto para pôr o nosso escritório no lado seguro. A propósito o que está acontecendo com o Leon?
Por favor, peça que venha nos ver, assim nós podemos discutir o futuro do projecto tendo em conta nossa situação financeira atual”.

Novamente não será desperdiçado nenhum tempo ou espaço para dizer que isto não foi feito.

Como parte da Revisão do País, a Equipa de Revisão visitou o projecto no Huambo no dia 22 de outubro de 2000, e ficou informado das dificuldades. Como resultado Zoraida Mesa, o PNUD RR, escreveu um memorando não assinado a James Curry (james.curry@UNDP.org), Director do Escritório de Auditoria e Revisão de Desempenho que em resposta do dia 14 de janeiro de 2001 fez estas perguntas a Bisrat Aklilu, Deputado Director Executivo, UNOPS, Nova Iorque. A resposta dele no dia 14 de Fevereiro de 2001 demonstra aquele UNOPS tinha perdido qualquer ligação ténue que eles já podem ter estado usando este projecto ao fim de 1998.

Em 04 de novembro de 2000 Stan Nkwain (stan.nkwain@UNDP.org) Deputado Representante de Residente Sênior-Projetos, PNUD, Luanda, foi ao Huambo e discutiu o projecto com Leon Kukkuk. No final do dia ele voltou a Luanda com alguns documentos e uma promessa que uma futura resposta será dada dentro de duas semanas.

Estes documentos desapareceram e nenhuma resposta ainda foi dada.

No final de março de 2001 Leon Kukkuk e Teresa Felix apresentaram o projecto a Michel Falavigna (michel.falavigna@UNDP.org), o Conselheiro de Programa Regional do PNUD, Nova Iorque.

Como é habitual isto não foi mencionado no relatório “regresso-para-escritório” de sua parte, nem lá existe qualquer avaliação.

Leon Kukkuk foi contratado pelo PRC de 01 de março 2001 a 30 de junho de 2001 encarregado do seguinte:

Preparar a documentação pertinente para os auditores, como motivação para uma avaliação detalhada e auditoria do projecto.
Preparar um Relatório Final e Inventário de equipamento actualmente em Huambo
Preparar um rascunho de Documento de Projecto para uma possível continuação do projecto.

Na preparação do plano de trabalho de Leon Kukkuk houve uma troca de cartas que a seguir é descrita:
“Antes de ser aprovado este plano, pode você clarificar o que quer dizer por “ encerramento legal do projecto?”.

Obrigado.

Querido Sr Nkwain,

Muito obrigado pela sua pergunta que tentarei clarificar sob meu ponto de vista.

Para além dos beneficiários e doadores que são uma prioridade importante há vários parceiros que de facto têm uma estaca no projecto. Estes são PRC, o Governo Provincial e claro que UNOPS, PNUD e RUTEC.

Em julho de 2000, quando o contrato com RUTEC estava se acabando, e nós não estávamos recebendo nenhuma instrução de concreto do UNOPS ou PNUD, nós fomos em frente com três opções:

Abandonar o projecto.
Fechar o projecto e armazenar tudo. (ou entrega-lo ao governo que estava pedindo com base em documentação)
Continuar como melhor podermos /pendentes numa solução.

Estas opções foram apresentadas às autoridades locais que me falaram que opções um e dois seria ilegal em termos de procedimento reconhecido. (tenham em conta que eles querem uma continuação do projecto e é muito difícil de ter o seu apoio por qualquer coisa que seja diferente )

Quando nós fechamos ao no final de janeiro de 2001, foi dito uma vez mais que isto é considerado a uma acção ilegal da minha parte, porque era uma decisão unilateral, sem qualquer apoio de documentação ou instruções das autoridades propriamente reconhecidas. Disseram-me que estas instruções deveriam estar baseadas em decisões feitas entre os donos do projecto em Luanda e que o governador deveria ser informado primeiro. Não seguindo este procedimento, poderia ser intentada contra mim uma acção judicial. (Eu fiquei limitado em minha casa durante dois dias como consequência de decisão do fecho do projecto)

Neste contexto o que seria então encerramento legal?

Algo que não é determinado por mim unilateralmente.
Resolução do sentimento de pesar considerável que actualmente existe relativamente ao caos e desordem debaixo do qual este projecto funcionou e fechou.
Baseado na documentação que reflecte a decisão dos donos do projecto.
Informando as autoridades locais.

Como já aconteceram muitos enganos e decisões dolorosas, eu penso que o fechamento legal também deveria incluir algum tipo de controle de danos para recuperar a credibilidade”.

Uma vez mais toda a informação disponível foi apresentado a Bereket Sletzion (bereket.sletzion@UNDP.org) o auditor de PNUD que aparentemente nos meados de junho de 2001 informou aos seus superiores que ele sentia que uma auditoria era necessária para uma avaliação concreta.

Aos 27 de junho de 2001 Leon Kukkuk distribuiu o rascunho do Relatório Final e da Proposta de Projecto. O rascunho da Proposta de Projecto estava completo e preparada para consulta com o Governo Provincial de Huambo, Development Workshop, ADRA e Cooperação Suíça e uma cópia também foi enviada a cada um deles para avaliação. Eles queriam com urgência saber que possibilidades futuras existem e para a sua própria planificação estratégica.

A missão de avaliação foi assegurada para 21-24 de agosto de 2001. Nenhum relatório de missão está disponível, mas será respondida quando o recebermos. Talvez a descrição mais cortês da missão é que foi um obscuro fracasso resultando na perda da pequena credibilidade que o PNUD tinha.

Em 13 meses passados, nenhum progresso foi registado e nada foi feito para solucionar quaisquer assuntos. A maioria destes assuntos foram apresentados pela primeira vez no dia 19 de setembro de 1998 .

É difícil não chegar à conclusão que PNUD é uma organização obsoleta, arrogante e incompetente que só se interessa com a sua própria dinâmica interna. Carregada de pessoal, em todos os níveis, que se esquecem ou nunca souberam quais são os supostos objectivos que o PNUD deve ter.
Isto está tendo um efeito imensamente destrutivo nas nossas vidas porque não está próxima nenhuma solução.

Se o povo angolano tinha fixado as suas esperanças em qualquer ajuda de PNUD na reconstrução do seu país então esse povo esperará em vão.

Estas são as perguntas que nós queremos que sejam respondidas:

PNUD

O PNUD seguiu os seus próprios procedimentos internos e protecções na preparação do Documento do Projecto com consulta devida aos seus parceiros do Governo angolano?
Qual é a política de PNUD em projectos com condicionantes? Que passos são dados para prevenir estes tipos de projectos a serem implementados pelo PNUD?
Como é que o PNUD assegurou que o contrato que o UNOPS assinou com a RUTEC confirma os objectivos do Documento de Projecto?
O PNUD seguiu os seus próprios procedimentos internos para monitorização e avaliação, revisões de tripartida, relatórios de seguimento oportunos e eficientes e em cooperação com os seus parceiros no Governo angolano? Onde estes relatórios estão?
Tentou o PNUD com UNOPS, RUTEC, o Governo Central e Provincial e outros parceiros, assegurar que o fim da fase de piloto é administrado de um modo significativo, numa forma oportuna e de acordo com os seus próprios procedimentos internos?
Que passos são dados pelo PNUD para assegurar que são implementados projectos que originam do seu escritório e são por eles financiados, que tenham o respeito devido para os direitos fundamentais de seu pessoal e beneficiários de acordo com os estatutos do sistema de Nações Unidas?

UNOPS

Que passos foram dados para assegurar que o contrato que eles assinaram com a RUTEC continha os objectivos específicos e realizáveis como reza o projecto documento e conforme os procedimentos internos postos em lugar para assegurar que estes objectivos serão conhecidos?
Que passos foram dados para assegurar que a metodologia de treinamento de RUTEC é original (e não talvez uma cópia do sistema de OIT) e que o seu equipamento é original (e não talvez dentro do domínio público ou violações de direito autorais) antes de pagar uma taxa de licenciamento de U$D 250 000.00?
Justificação de como o U$D 164 511.00 recebido como AOS tinha sido gasto em administração, enquanto assegurava complacência com os objectivos do projecto, com missão oportuna e eficiente informação e avaliação dos assuntos levantados.
Eles têm certificados de conclusão que justificam o pagamento de U$D 1 505 521.00 em vinte parciais? Nesse caso, qual era a qualificação desta pessoa (s) para assegurar que estavam sendo conhecidos os objectivos do projecto e justificar o pagamento?
Que passos foram dados para assegurar que o fim da fase piloto é administrado de um modo eficiente conforme a realidade e os desejos de PNUD, UNOPS, RUTEC, o Governo Central e Provincial e outros parceiros, numa forma oportuna e em acordo com os seus próprios procedimentos internos?
Que passos foram dados pelo UNOPS para assegurar que são implementados projectos que lhes são exigido implementar com devido respeito para os direitos fundamentais de seu pessoal e beneficiários de acordo com os estatutos do sistema de Nações Unidas?

RUTEC

O que aconteceu com o U$D 1 milhão?
Foram organizados seguro de saúde e de desemprego para o pessoal como foi requerido pelo contrato? Se não, como fazer para que esta omissão seja corrigida.
Que relatório está disponível mostrando que ajuda técnica a RUTEC tenha providenciado ao projecto, ou em geral que benefício recebeu o projecto da RUTEC ? Estes são apoiados por contas claras?
Que passos foram dados para assegurar que o fim da fase piloto é administrado de um modo eficiente conforme a realidade e os desejos de PNUD, UNOPS, RUTEC, o Governo Central e Provincial e outros parceiros, e numa forma oportuna?
Que passos deu a RUTEC para assegurar que são protegidos os Direitos fundamentais do seu pessoal e beneficiários?


Luanda e Huambo, Angola,


15 de setembro de 2001

(Copias originais em Inglês e Português foram assinados pela toda pessoal do projecto e distribuído ao Ministério de Planeamento, Comissão de Direitos Humanos do NU, entre outros. Não a nenhuma resposta ainda.)